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The de-industrialisation of the UK economy caused by globalised international 
markets, advancements in technology and production with changing consumer 
demands have made much of what was ‘traditional’ manufacturing redundant; this 
has led to industrial restructuring or even collapse, resulting in mass job 
redundancies. Market and industrial pressures have intensified since the late 
1990s, culminating in the symbolic collapse of MG Rover in 2005 in addition to 
other key producers in the West Midlands, which represented the end of mass 
automotive production in the region (Donnelly et al. 2012). This came alongside 
various geographical, political and economic factors, including the restructuring of 
regional development agencies, prolonged industrial decline and a period of 
national economic recession, which presented challenges for any recovery. 
This thesis examines more precisely the closure of the commercial vehicle 
manufacturer LDV in 2009, once a part of the larger conglomerate British Leyland. 
The closure further reinforced the decline in UK automotive manufacturing until 
that point. The research involves the corporate collapse of LDV and the local 
government reaction to the closure and the following re-employment pathways of 
the redundant LDV workforce. The research continues the discussion of plant 
closures and the issues that redundant workers face when engaged in the labour 
market during economic recession. In particular, the thesis contribution employs a 
qualitative approach to examine the difficulties faced by the office tier, or ‘white 
collar’, workers who possess relatively high skills and who regarded as flexible 
and less vulnerable workers within the labour market. Yet this research exposes 
that highly skilled specialist workers are themselves also subject to unique issues 
when adjusting to the labour market. This topic is covered through the concept of 
worker trajectories:  the research illustrates the unique employability issues and 
job precariousness that highly skilled workers can experience. The research 
concludes that the ability of highly skilled redundant workers to adapt effectively 
requires local job recovery strategies to implement short- and long-term policies 
with an emphasis on better job search and network development for individuals to 
sustain a resilient economy, and to mitigate the effects of plant closure upon 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
A Case of Plant Closure, 














1.1 Contextual Background to the Thesis 
The act of a plant closure is the shutting down of operations within a production 
facility. The issue of plant closures stems from the industrial development of 
advanced economies and the increasing integration of global markets. This often 
results in the restructuring of companies within certain industries in order to reduce 
or consolidate production and development costs to maintain a company’s overall 
global competitiveness. Restructuring can involve a wide range of actions with the 
primary purpose of increasing efficiency, reducing costs and maintaining 
competitiveness. This can be achieved through a variety of methods ranging from 
reducing less profitable departments of the company, selling or merging parts of the 
business to re-finance debt (such as outsourcing research & design), to pulling out of 
a highly competitive market or in the most severe cases closing production facilities 
altogether, vis-à-vis plant closures. When plant closures are announced, large-scale 
redundancies can have short and long-term negative implications for the local and 
wider regional economy and the individual workers themselves. Some plant closures 
have such long-lasting devastating effects for those local communities that in the 
worst circumstances it can take generations for the area to recover and adapt 
(Beatty et al. 2007), with the local area often losing a part of its cultural and cohesive 
identity, weakening its overall economic prosperity. 
This thesis focuses on the LDV plant closure in July 2009. LDV was a commercial 
vehicle manufacturer operating in Washwood Heath in Birmingham, West Midlands, 
UK. From 2000-09, the West Midlands suffered from a successive chain of plant 
closures and labour redundancies, with the automotive industry suffering particularly 
badly. Due to the financial problems and failed mergers/takeovers within LDV’s 
history, combined with the economic recession brought on by the financial crisis of 
2007-8, LDV was unable to maintain its competitiveness and sustain its debts, 
forcing the company to cease production. When the plant closed, this entailed a loss 
of 1,200 jobs directly, and placed a further 4,000 jobs at risk within the local supply 
chain. 
The West Midlands has long been one of the “old industrial regions”’ (referred to as 
OIRs) of the UK, similar to other regions such as North East England, Yorkshire, 






industry within the primary and secondary sectors (e.g. car manufacturing, coal 
mining, steel manufacturing, textiles), and these industries provided the primary 
source of employment and prosperity for locals throughout the nineteenth to the 
mid/late twentieth century. The advancement of technology and the expansion of the 
global economy throughout the late twentieth century set in motion a series of 
restructuring and plant closures in the OIRs. As the process of globalisation gathered 
pace, new competitive economies emerged (e.g. Eastern Europe, Asia and the BRIC 
economies1) alongside the advancement of production techniques, access to 
cheaper markets and the decline of the UK’s global economic dominance, and the 
OIR primary industries experienced decline, mass unemployment and social 
deprivation. 
The late twentieth and early twenty-first century would characterise this period of 
industrial decline presenting constant economic challenges. These regions had the 
task of attracting new industries and growth opportunities, while attending to the 
social and economic needs of the communities that had suffered the worst from the 
industrial decline. This led to an increase in academic literature looking into the 
economic shocks of industrial decline in relation to the effects of redundancy upon 
workforces, the impact on associated supply chains and policy responses (Danson 
2005; Shuttleworth et al. 2005; Bailey 2007; Beatty et al. 2007; Armstrong et al. 
2008; Bentley et al. 2010). This in turn has fed theoretical developments of 
geopolitical and labour market adjustments and post-closure strategies that could 
lead to more economically resilient regions (Bristow 2010; Pike et al. 2010; Hall 
2013; Dawley et al. 2014). These topics form the core context of the research and 
through the case of the LDV closure, this thesis aims to delve into these topics and 
bring some original ideas and new avenues to this academic discussion. 
 
1.2 Introduction to Existing Literature and Research 
Some past research has focused on the main causes of factory closure, evaluating 
the UK decline in hard manufacturing and industry. Kirkham and Watts’s (1997:1560) 
research for example concentrates on the reasoning for factory relocation, pinning it 
                                                          
1 BRIC refers to the rise of four modern major economic powers within the global economy: Brazil, Russia, 
India and China. Of the new emerging and developing nations and economies, these countries in particular have 
greater influence on the global market due to their market size, cheaper labour costs, global investment capacity 






down to four primary regional economic factors: the overall national economy, the 
performance of the sector within the national framework, the strengths of a firm in the 
sector and how the plant is assessed and evaluated by the firm. Although the 
research indicates which factors to consider regarding plant closure, it fails to 
present solutions regarding labour recovery policies. 
The current ‘ideal’ way to overcome the impact of plant closure is to create an 
adaptive labour market and resilient regional economy – a labour market that when it 
suffers from an economic shock is able to adapt to the economic situation by 
developing new market sectors, stimulating new economic growth and thus new job 
opportunities (MacKinnon et al. 2007; Dawley et al. 2010). The adaptability of the 
regions depends heavily on regional skills levels (Bailey and Turok 2000). 
MacKinnon et al. (2007) indicate that the adaptability/resilience of a region depends 
more on regional actors such as labour unions, regional governance direction and 
demand within the region to attract and maintain key skills. Pike et al. (2003) 
advances this approach through the notion of new labour geographies. However, 
these labour principles have two flaws: first the notion of the adaptive 
capacity/resilient economy only realistically applies to competitive regions that 
already enjoy economic success; this is because the workforce will typically have the 
skills and market demand to attract employers. Second, the regions for which these 
ideals appeal (OIRs) will tend to lack the economic demand to stimulate genuine 
‘good’ employment (Danson 2004). The question therefore arises: “does the 
adaptive capacity just revert to the region’s previous economic condition or does the 
region’s capabilities and character change to a new economic path trajectory?” 
(Simmie and Martin 2010). Danson’s (2004) research explains how attempts to 
improve economic ability via aspects related to labour supply tend to fail. Danson 
(2004) goes on to say how OIRs display social barriers to worklessness with high 
concentrations of employment that has the greatest impact on recovery, placing 
greater emphasis on demand-led recoveries for job creation and opportunities. 
Campbell’s (2000) research continues the importance of breaking long-term 
unemployment trends through greater emphasis on policy action on the local level. 
That local policy can better attend to the sensitivity in differences in local character, 







Substantial research has been conducted in the field of plant closures and 
subsequent job rehabilitation with labour market policies through studies of previous 
plant closures. A large-scale and iconic closure was the MG Rover collapse in 2006, 
examined by Armstrong et al. (2008), Bailey et al. (2008, 2010), Bentley (2007), 
Bentley et al. (2010, 2014) and Chapain and Murie (2008). Their studies examined 
the progression of redundant workers in navigating the labour market, the impact of 
job loss for the individual (impact on financial and health well-being) and also the 
impact on local communities and economies. Research into the long-term effects of 
unemployment has created an intellectual excursion into LSE (Low Skills 
Equilibrium) or LST (Low Skills Trajectory) theories, in which redundant workers 
suffer from skill sets that are no longer in demand by the labour market and become 
subject to low-paid employment (Stone and Braidford 2002; Bosworth et al. 2003; 
Wilson et al. 2003). It has already been identified by Armstrong (2006), Bailey (2008) 
and Bentley et al. (2010) that ex-MG Rover workers are categorised as having low 
skills; other research highlights the ‘ambiguity of skills’ in that skills cannot be easily 
defined and have multidimensional facets which can add further employment barriers 
(Green 2003:308). The way in which labour migrates between occupations has 
changed; career progression within traditional manufacturing sectors could occur 
laterally across multi-site organisations, but industrial restructuring career 
progression requires vertical behaviour within companies (Green et al. 1999). Should 
vertical progression become more limited, the balance between commuting mobility, 
migration and social/domestic attachments plays a greater prevalence in 
employment opportunities (Green et al. 1999). All of these contributions have 
relevance to the highly skilled worker outcomes of LDV and how the LDV Taskforce 
accommodated these issues in policy design. 
 
1.2.1 Position of the Thesis within Plant Closure Research 
Researching the causes and impacts of plant closures continues to remain an 
important aspect of study, as developed economies have to continually adapt to 
changing industrial and economic circumstances. Many regions of developed 
economies depend upon one or two significant industries that provide the primary 
engine for employment and economic growth within the region. The West Midlands 






jobs and economic growth but an identity for the region. However, the West Midlands 
suffered significant industrial setbacks with numerous of plant closures, with the 
most high-profile closure in recent times being that of MG Rover in 2006. However, 
the MG Rover closure did not signify the end of plant closures; indeed, further 
restructuring continued within the automotive industry (Bailey 2007; Bentley 2007; 
Bailey et al. 2008). LDV, a commercial vehicle manufacturer, came under severe 
financial pressure and was forced to close its doors in June 2009. Although the plant, 
in comparison to previous closures within the region, was smaller, it was a company 
that had a long heritage within the West Midlands region and had been an important 
employer for the economy and wider supply chain for many years. 
There are also considerable implications on an individual level for the workers that 
are made redundant. There is the immediate impact of losing their jobs and the 
stress that it entails, but there are potential long-term effects that range from physical 
health problems, financial instability and future job search success (Bailey and Turok 
2000; Campbell et al. 2007; Hudson 2007). How this impact will be felt by certain 
individuals will depend on specific factors such as age, skills, qualifications and 
experience in job searching. The geographical distribution of the workers plays a 
significant role towards the impact on the area; the more concentrated the 
redundancies, the more likely those social issues will arise through the potential for 
mass worklessness (Danson 2005; Shuttleworth et al. 2005). This research intends 
to examine these factors with regards to higher skilled workers within the LDV 
context and what distinctive outcomes unfolded. The impact on place is a further 
contributing point. If a certain industry is dominant within a region for a significant 
amount of time, other regional institutions may become reliant on that industry, which 
in turn decreases the employability of the ex-workers within the local labour market. 
This is further exaggerated within the context of economic recession. With the high 
skills closely tied to the declining automotive industry, waning business confidence 
further hampered employment opportunities even for highly skilled workers.  
The thesis explores the case of the plant closure of LDV, its impact on the ex-
workforce, and the level of response to support their re-employment opportunities. 
Figure 1.1 shows the research process of the thesis; it demonstrates how various 
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Figure 1-1: Research Process Framework  
The diagram shows the integration and relationships of the various GPE issues related to plant closures. The 
numbered boxes show the research process and the theoretical development towards greater understanding of 
the LDV plant closure and the impacts on the ex-workers.  
with the individual circumstances and characteristics of the ex-LDV workers. 
Through researching the LDV closure, the thesis aims to demonstrate these links 
and lead to greater understanding of and a strong contribution to the field of plant 
closure. 
The research process begins by emphasising the overarching global processes that 
illustrate the key events or factors that have prompted change and restructuring 
within the automotive industry (both within the UK and worldwide) and the 
implications this has had for established OIRs.  
The middle section of the diagram on the previous page displays the transition from 
wider global economic processes and the automotive setting to discussion of the 
economic impacts of plant closure and the sub-processes that result from it, focusing 
on a regional perspective. This is reflected by the structure of the thesis as the 
literature review and subject chapters embrace the academic and policy discussion 
of the economic impacts of plant closure and its association with regional 
development and the relation to economic theories such as regional resilience, 
geographical political economy and labour market policy. All of these topics tie into 
the aim of the thesis in understanding the impact of redundancy with regard to the 
LDV plant closure of 2009.  
The lower portions of the process diagram represent the crucial topics that will inform 
the research with regard to the LDV plant closure so as to build greater 
understanding of the unique and intricate factors of the LDV closure itself. The topics 
listed within points 3 and 4 represent the key drivers of the empirical investigation 
derived from the LDV Taskforce and ex-workers. The methodological approach is of 
a qualitative data analysis through an interpretivist paradigm with the intent to 
establish the interaction of the variable contextual factors of LDV and the ex-workers. 
The analytical chapters aim to align these ideas and discussions specifically with the 
LDV case, ranging from discussing the position of LDV within the British automotive 
industry, limitations in regional authority capacity and issues around workforce skills 
and abilities in relation to job recovery policies designed to mitigate the shock and 






The process diagram further illustrates how various political, geographical and 
economic processes of plant closures are interlinked so as to produce a certain 
trajectory or outcome. These various processes also have spatial and temporal 
aspects to them that are unique to that particular closure and further shape that 
trajectory or outcome rather than being indicative of ‘cyclical’ or ‘replicable’ events. 
However, in better understanding how these various processes take place and 
evolve, policy makers can take stock and make more appropriate responses to 
mitigate future plant closure shocks. With regard to the LDV closure specifically, this 
relates to the overall lack of industrial strategy to foster manufacturing investment, 
the sharpened decline of the UK automotive industry restricting job growth, and the 
reformation of regional agencies and actors that restricted policy response. The 
political and economic circumstances relating to plant closure mean that the LDV 
case has many facets that enable the thesis to make a contribution to the overall 
academic discussion. It also suggests how policy can be better directed to resolve 
the problems arising from plant closures. The research process frameworks serve to 
show the methodological process in which this thesis will cover the theoretical 
debates of economic process, industrial restructuring and labour recovery strategies 
and how this informs the position of the empirical findings in determining the main 
contribution of this thesis. 
 
1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Thesis 
Plant closures are not a new phenomenon and have been intrinsic to the industrial 
evolution of developed economies for many decades. However, understanding and 
coping with the ‘fallout’ of plant closures on the economy (e.g. absorbing 
redundancies and creating new avenues of growth) and on the workforce (on an 
individual and wider social basis) remains a pressing concern for governments and 
policy-makers to resolve. This has continued the need for research into plant 
closures both in understanding the global economic processes that instigate closure, 
but also how to reduce the impacts of these closures on local economies, and the 
nature of labour market adjustment within the geo-political context of the closure. 
Until recently, research and academic discussion concerning labour redundancies 






on the lower-skilled workforce, and their progression through redundancy into new 
employment.2 More recent research has begun the discussion of how the nature of 
the skills possessed by the redundant workers in combination with certain 
demographic factors, labour market conditions and government policies affects the 
workforce in finding future employment.3 This thesis continues that academic 
discussion through studies of the plant closure of LDV but – uniquely – with regard to 
the highly skilled and office-tier workers. The primary aim of this thesis is to explore 
how the political and economic context of plant closure can have direct implications 
for the associated actors to respond effectively to such closures and the barriers to 
reemployment for redundant workers. Investigating the LDV closure provides the 
opportunity to research these factors during an era of regional governance transition, 
and national economic recovery albeit in an era of austerity. This involves 
understanding what guided (or restrained) the actions of the LDV Taskforce in the 
economic recovery of the local area and the adjustment of the ex-workforce in 
regards to barriers to new employment, new work and pay conditions, necessity of 
retraining and financial hardships. This contributes towards a greater understanding 
of plant closure processes and outcomes that can inform better future policy 
responses regarding plant closures and labour readjustment. 
 
1.3.1 Objectives and Key Topics of the Research 
To achieve its research aims, the thesis will focus on the following research 
objectives: 
● To evaluate the policy response and action taken by the LDV 
Taskforce following plant closure given the geographical political 
circumstances of the LDV closure and to create a comparative insight 
between past experiences and contemporary reactions of taskforces. 
● To investigate how to integrate the regional institutional and 
governance structures that provide appropriate coordination and 
                                                          
2 Such research as Danson (2005) on old industrial regions shows how workers from these areas can be left with 
redundant skills not fit for the current labour market; Shuttleworth et al. (2004) on the Harland & Wolff 
Shipyard closure again reiterate the importance of addressing the needs of low-skilled workers but with a more 
geographic approach to labour policy to suit the needs of local conditions. 
3 Armstrong et al. (2008) raise the issues of job precariousness and the fact that other factors aside from the skill 






leadership structures for aiding re-employment and labour market 
adjustment. 
● To understand the impacts and shock of closure upon the workforce, to 
analyse demographic and geographic factors, in association with skills 
levels, and how certain characteristics of the workforce relate to the 
level of ‘shock’ individuals experience when pursuing new employment. 
● To inform future labour market policy and governmental strategies to 
resolve the impacts of plant closure. 
 
1.3.2 Structure of the Thesis and Progression of the Research 
The introductory chapter has so far explained the aims and objectives of the 
research, including the contextual details concerning the development of the 
automotive industry. This demonstrates the contribution and originality of this 
research within the existing literature.  
Chapter 2 begins by further describing the case of LDV and presenting a detailed 
discussion of the nature of the automotive industry. This gives further insight into the 
development of the automotive industry, the processes and events that led to 
changes in its production methods and the implications these had for regional and 
national economies (in particular plant closures within the U.K). The chapter then 
places LDV within the automotive industry context, explaining the origins of LDV and, 
more specifically, explaining the nuances of the commercial vehicle sector and the 
difficulties faced by LDV in maintaining competitiveness. From this, the decisions 
made by LDV’s management can be examined to explain why LDV ultimately failed 
to remain competitive and in 2009 was forced to cease production. This chapter also 
goes on to discuss how the shockwaves from these developments would in turn 
have negative implications for regions deeply embedded within the production nodes 
and networks of the automotive industry worldwide (such as the West Midlands in 
the UK and Detroit in the US). 
Chapters 3 and 4 form the literature review to discuss the main topics with which the 
research is concerned. The introduction has suggested that emphasis be placed on 
the geopolitical and economic aspects of the LDV closure. The third chapter 






(Tomaney et al. 1999; Pike 2005). In conjunction with this, Chapter 3 also discusses 
theories about the development of regional resilience and better regional 
development (Dawley et al. 2010; Pike et al. 2010) with labour market adjustment 
and how best to assist redundant labour post plant closure (Danson 2005; Pinch et 
al. 2010). As stated, the importance of understanding the level of shock experienced 
by the workers and the regional economy is paramount.  
The literature review continues in Chapter 4, which discusses the shift in government 
priorities from 2010 onwards from a regional approach to sub-regional approach to 
local economic development policy. The chapter explores the capability of taskforce 
responses to plant closure (Pike 2002; Bentley 2007; Bentley et al. 2010; Bailey et 
al. 2014) and goes into more detail about the LDV Taskforce reaction to the LDV 
closure. The fourth chapter finishes by engaging in a discussion about the issue of 
employability with regard to workers’ skill levels to understand the transition through 
the labour market (De Ruyter and Burgess 2003; Bailey et al. 2008; Bentley et al. 
2010). 
The fifth chapter presents the methodology for the thesis. As the research places 
much emphasis on GPE theory, it is critical to clearly establish the case of LDV 
within a GPE framework. This analysis extends to discussion of the company’s 
history, understanding the hierarchy of the company, its ownership history and its 
structure. This analysis of the LDV situation will lead to a more thorough 
understanding of LDV’s occupational and labour market footprint and how this in turn 
affected the taskforce’s response. The chapter turns to the empirical process of the 
research, how it was conducted, the various methods, research design and 
philosophical approaches to achieving the research objectives of the thesis. The 
chapter discusses what restrictions are placed upon the research; for example, data 
limitations, ethical considerations, logistical boundaries and data validation. 
The discussion of the empirical and secondary research is split into two main parts 
between chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 6 discusses the closure of LDV, with information 
obtained through direct engagement with the LDV Taskforce policy stakeholders. 
This contributes to the analysis of policies implemented by the local agencies that 
constituted of the LDV Taskforce. This enables an understanding of the constraints 
and demands that were placed on the taskforce in enacting various policies and 






the closure. This includes interviews with LDV managers past and present to 
comprehend the problems faced by LDV and discuss what help they received from 
the government prior to the closure and also to uncover what additional assistance 
they believe could have been instigated. In addition, interviews with local media 
incorporates other perspectives on the closure and the actions taken by the LDV 
Taskforce. 
Chapter 7 represents the second part of the analysis. It presents an in-depth 
qualitative study of the redundant ex-worker’s experience and their outcomes to re-
employment within the local labour market. This also considers the concept of long-
term dependency on a primary employer and how this can limit an individual’s skills 
capacity and autonomy, thereby reducing potential employability. This is 
encompassed within the employment trajectory analysis of the highly skilled workers 
to conceptualise what combination of factors led towards the outcomes of the ex-
workers in relation to the LDV Taskforce actions. This enables the study to draw 
substantial conclusions about what happened to ex-workers and what policy 
changes should occur in future to better improve post-redundancy employment 
opportunities. 
Finally, the concluding chapter presents a summary of the thesis by first reasserting 
what the aims of the thesis were, and assessing whether these aims were achieved. 
It then moves on to present a summary and discussion of the research findings from 
the two analysis chapters regarding the LDV closure, the experience of the 
workforce and policy responses. Through this discussion, the chapter outlines the 
contributions made by this thesis to theory as well as policy suggestions in the wake 
of the LDV closure. This cements the place of the thesis within the overall academic 
discussion of plant closure and in promoting further research on the topic. 
 
1.4 Chapter Summary 
The introductory chapter has outlined the main topics of this research and 
highlighted the importance of and contribution to theory of studying the LDV plant 
closure of 2009. This chapter explains the contextual background of the thesis 






area. The introduction gave a prelude to what the literature will cover later in the 
thesis, establishing the thesis within these subject topics and clarifying how it will 
contribute to ongoing research debates. This established the need to study the 
impacts of plant closure and the relevance it has within current academic study. 
The introduction established the research aims and objectives of the thesis and its 
overall structure. This has given the reader a clear indication of how the research will 
progress in relation to the subject topics raised within the chapter. This section of the 
introduction has explained the roles of these chapters and how they contribute 
towards the aims and objectives of the research. 
The thesis continues through explaining the contextual background of the automotive 
industry and the LDV brand, and how the process of change within the industry 
slowly led to the eventual closure of the LDV Washwood Heath plant and the 
redundancies that resulted from it. The contextual section also explains the close 
association between the West Midlands and the UK automotive industry, illustrating 
how the modern restructuring of the automotive industry has had drastic implications 
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2.1 Restructuring of the Automotive Industry 
This chapter serves to provide more information specifically regarding the nature of 
the automotive industry and its importance to regional economies and prosperity. 
This brings to the fore how the automotive industry was critical for employment 
growth and how some regions’ economic fortunes have been closely linked to the 
fate of the automotive industry. Regional economic and labour market policies are 
intertwined with this industrial restructuring, none more so than (from a UK 
perspective) the West Midlands region.4 The automotive industry underwent a 
process of evolutionary change in different production methods, increasing 
globalisation and changing consumer demands. Outcomes from this led to 
restructuring among the automotive OEMs and the need to reduce or relocate the 
labour force; this inevitably reverberates throughout regions depending on their 
industrial make-up and has led to mass redundancies within many developed 
economies. This contextual chapter also explains the close association between the 
West Midlands and the UK automotive industry, illustrating how the modern 
restructuring of the automotive industry has implications for the economy such as 
though redundancies from plant closures. The literature on the automotive industry is 
discussed first to explore the differing opinions and aspects of the subject, and to 
gain a contextual insight into trends and drivers within the automotive industry and 
their impacts on national/regional economies. Finally, the chapter explains what LDV 
was, how it emerged from a large conglomerate of firms and how it integrated into 
the local community of Washwood Heath, thus becoming an important ‘anchor’ 
employer for that local area. 
 
2.1.1 A Brief History of the Automotive Industry (from a Western 
Perspective) 
To understand why the automotive industry began an era of immense restructuring 
and how this led to the eventual plant closures that occurred not only within the West 
Midlands but in other developed automotive industrial areas also, this section 
explains in further detail the development and evolution of the automotive industry 
                                                          
4 The West Midlands is the UK’s industrial heartland within the auto-industry, this region housed a significant 






from a US and European perspective and illustrates its relationship with regional 
economic development.  
The history of the automotive industry is strongly correlated with the development of 
the world economy, and to the progression of globalisation and global trade. The late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century saw the development of automotive industries 
with the design, manufacturing and consumer markets confined to the West (Europe 
and North America). Imperial industrial power saw a pattern of low labour costs and 
unique technology production, the monopoly of raw materials/resources with the 
ability to dictate world trade flows and market exploitation through colonial and 
domestic markets in what was a confined, heavily regulated world economy (Dicken 
2011). During this era, the West was able to nurture a diverse range of iconic 
automotive brands or original equipment manufacturers (OEMs).5  
The production method that enabled mass production on a truly vast scale via 
assembly line technology was Fordism. The cornerstone of Fordism production is to 
stimulate high volume production through production standardisation and increasing 
efficiency on the production line. This innovation was achieved through simplifying 
the production process, reducing the amount of manpower and skill level required to 
manufacture the vehicle. Furthermore, the efficiency of Fordism production 
(particular in its early conception) encouraged mass consumption through lowering 
unit production costs in combination with paying workers higher wages. This 
effectively ‘recycled’ the money back into the automotive industry as workers spent 
their earnings on the very cars they produced (Bailey 2007; Bailey et al. 2010). In 
this context, Bentley et al. (2013) further characterise Fordism as a decentralised 
system that relied on globalised processes that integrated production plants within 
particular locales to utilise lower labour costs with the supply chain in a regional and 
global network. The importance of this geographical distribution was to maximise the 
potential for economies of scale in mass production towards a standardised market.  
This process allowed the automotive industry to grow at a rapid rate, exploiting new 
market openings and establishing themselves as vital economic institutions in 
developed economies. In the UK, the Fordism production method was adopted in the 
West Midlands and soon became central to the British automotive industry (Donnelly 
                                                          
5 The term original equipment manufacturers refers to companies that originally produced goods or components 






et al. 2005). The Leyland group (initially a conglomerate of British firms in 1968 - the 
British Leyland Motor Corporation - partly nationalised in 1978 to become British 
Leyland) together with other renowned firms like Rover, embraced the Fordist 
production system. Through a combination of growth within the domestic market, 
lack of external competition and immense pressure from the trade unions for 
favourable employee contracts, Fordism (Donnelly et al. 2005). However, the Fordist 
system would undergo shifts and changes within production that would leave some 
traditional heartlands with a ‘flawed path dependency’ that would emerge in decades 
to come.6  
2.1.2 The Mechanics of Change, Revolutions and Implications for the 
Modern Automotive Industry 
The first revolution in production methods to impact on the automotive industry was 
the shift from Fordism to post-Fordist production in the late twentieth century. Bailey 
et al. (2010) describe this as a change which reflected the evolution of the developed 
economies as a whole and not just the automotive industry itself. Post-Fordism 
represents the changes in auto-motive production systems through the inclusion of 
developing economies into production clusters and a shift of consumer wants 
towards more high-quality products (Bentley 2007; Bailey et al. 2010; Bentley et al. 
2013). 
The major adjustment to the automotive production system was from mass assembly 
lines to production that entailed modularisation, flexible or lean production (Womack 
et al. 1990; Dicken 2011; Bentley et al. 2013). Modularisation is a production method 
that aims to ‘decentralise’ production from the main OEM assembly line to divide the 
overall production of the car into modules from which the responsibility (more 
interaction in design and production) for that module is then handed down to the 
supplier (Bailey 2003; Dicken 2011; Brandes et al. 2013). For example, the typical 
car contains approximately 15,000 components and only a small number of those 
components are developed in-house (Cusumano and Takeishi 1991). This type of 
production would be the catalyst for the restructuring and reform of the entire 
automotive industry from internal restructuring in terms of production processes, 
methods and organisation to the external elements in forming alliances and more 








sophisticated supply chain management. (Bentley et al. 2013:68; Tate et al. 2014). 
With each module being manufactured separately, this devolves the responsibility to 
the supplier of individual components assigned for that module (Bailey 2003). This 
production technique allows for interchangeable modules that can be placed on the 
car body. This in turn leads to further specialisation from suppliers when producing 
components for modules and requires the integration of the supply chain with the 
OEM (Bailey 2003; Bentley 2007). The ultimate aim is for the same production line to 
produce multiple car products, enabling one production facility to meet the demands 
of several markets, resulting in a greater ability to meet cost recovery. In turn, this 
has led to a new adjustment in the automotive production system away from the 
traditional iconic manufacturing plants, instead relying on myriad smaller supplier 
networks to mitigate as much cost as possible. The development of ‘modular supply’ 
or ‘supply integration’ has created the situation where global supply networks are 
fluid and adaptable in order to meet the demands of the module (Bailey 2003; Doran 
2003; Dicken 2011).7  
This development brought reverberations within the spatial organisation of 
production, moving away from Fordist which that favoured locations in low-labour 
cost areas with a vast interconnected supply chain. Post-Fordism, by contrast, 
placed emphasis on proximity to suppliers not just to reduce transportation costs but 
to enable leaner, more flexible production, just-in-time methods and shared 
production problem-solving, with greater design specification integrated into the 
supplier network to adhere to local consumer markets (Bentley et al. 2013: 69). 
Additionally, this agglomeration of production is not just bound to the location of the 
supply chain but also encourages co-operation amongst OEMs to integrate their 
production in order to mitigate production costs and model development 
specifications towards local market demand (Bentley 2007; Stanford 2010; Boehm 
2012; Balcet et al. 2013); and sustain what Bailey et al. (2010: 315) term the ‘crisis of 
cost recovery’.8 To overcome these production and development challenges, OEMs 
engage in platform sharing, so that different brands that share similar designs can 
essentially share the engineering and production processes to create different 
                                                          
7 For example, first-tier suppliers provide the major component systems, significant research and development 
and design expertise. The second tier produces designs provided by assemblers/first-tier suppliers. Third-tier 
suppliers support the more basic components (Dicken 2011). 
8 The term ‘crisis of cost recovery’ stems from the amount of capital investment an OEM has to make to create a 






models on the same production line and thus mitigate production costs and risks 
(Bailey et al. 2010: 315).  
The evolution towards the post-Fordist method of production caused reform and 
revolution within the supply chain itself through two main factors. Firstly, tier-one 
suppliers (companies that provide parts and materials directly to OEMs) have to 
meet ever higher degrees of product quality and diversification at lower costs. 
Second, OEMs also want to reduce the number of suppliers they engage with 
(Brandes et al. 2013). This ultimately means that as OEMs continue to restructure 
their production processes, this will often have a ripple effect within the supply chain, 
often enforcing further restructuring. The issue of cost recovery remains the primary 
driver of consolidation through both OEMs and suppliers, causing agglomeration 
within production regions and the increasing importance of modular production 
(Bailey 2007; Bentley 2007; Dicken 2011; Bentley et al. 2013; Brandes et al. 2013). 
This trend is due to a number of factors, such as market size and demand, domestic 
firms, government restrictions and laws, and labour conditions (Jullein and Pordi 
2013). In Europe, the situation is complex: traditional European brands have been 
taken over by foreign firms (Jaguar-Tata, Opel-GM), or have created new alliances 
(Renault-Peugeot-Citroen, Chrysler-Fiat); non-European firms also have influence 
(Honda, Ford); and many firms have pan-European networks (Volkswagen). All of 
this contributes to an intricate mix of transnational companies (TNCs) and suppliers 
with intermingling production networks – see Fig 2.1 (Clibborn 2012; Domanski et al. 
2013). Similar situations have emerged in China; for instance, any firm wishing to 
establish a production plant for sales directly into China can only do so in a joint 
venture with Chinese firms and then must utilise Chinese suppliers, thus creating 
multinational TNC integration yet in turn creating highly concentrated production 
within regional specific areas (Bentley et al. 2013). Bailey et al. (2010) and Donnelly 
et al. (2005) highlight the fact that during the 1990s the automotive industry became 
a genuinely global industry just as the global economy itself was becoming 
liberalised. Indeed, it was not just the transformation of developed economies but 
global competition that was forcing through change, experiencing the rapid decline of 
established western companies and the rise of the Indian and Chinese automotive 
industry. The emergence of these new markets would have further ramifications for 






Figure 2-1: ‘Who owns Whom – Alliances and Agglomerations’  
‘Who owns whom’ of automotive brands illustrating the complexities of modern automotive brand ownership and alliances. The diagram demonstrates how fragile the 
modern automotive industry has become. In order to sustain development and production costs, large corporations are forced to form alliances and agglomerations to mitigate 
these costs. It also shows that if certain sectors are performing poorly then the reverberations can spread across units and brands, e.g. if a parent company struggles and is then 
forced to sell or release its subordinate company, as was the case with GAZ and LDV in 2009. Source: Car magazine. 2010. 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright.This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged 






2.2 The Modern Auto Industry: Harbinger of Regional 
Restructuring and Plant Closure 
The automotive industry of today has changed radically from the US and European-
dominated ‘golden years’ of the early to late twentieth century. The combination of 
increased consumer awareness and changing consumer attitudes, globalisation, 
technological cost increases, increased ecological awareness, de-industrialisation of 
western economies, revolutions in production methods plus the dominance of the 
Chinese economy with the rise of BRIC economies heralded drastic changes in 
global production in the automotive industry (Bentley et al. 2013).9 The ripples of that 
change have been felt throughout the developed economies of Europe and America, 
especially by the traditional ‘heartland’ automotive industrial clusters and regions like 
the West Midlands and Detroit (Bailey 2007; Bentley 2007; Bailey et al. 2010; Klier 
and Rubenstein 2010; Clibborn 2012). 
The emergence of strong competition via more liberalised markets became a major 
driver of change. The lean production system (LPS) gave Japanese firms a great 
competitive advantage when embarking into western markets (Klier and Rubenstein 
2010; Dicken 2011). What must also be considered is that Japan focuses on 
providing excellent quality and reliability in its products. It seemed that Japanese 
firms were tailored for the post-Fordism era, which goes some way to explain their 
success in the US market (Fujimoto and Takeishi 2001; Klier and Rubenstein 2010). 
Significant changes in the world economy in the 1990s, such as the decrease in 
national tariffs, the creation and expansion of trade blocs, and the easier flow of 
capital, are key factors that stimulated change in the production strategy conceived 
by the automotive industry (Martin and Sunley 1997). This would lead to the 
development of regional production networks that could span national territories that 
best utilised proximity to markets and lower costs of production, and minimised the 
effects of trade barriers and costs, in addition to obtaining favourable legislation or 
policies (e.g. subsidies), for example the shift from Detroit (the ‘birthplace’ of US 
automotive production) to the south of the US and Central Mexico (known as Auto 
Alley) (Bentley 2007; Bailey et al. 2010; Klier and Rubenstein 2010:337 Stanford 
                                                          
9 Brazil, Russia, India, and China: new emerging economies which have increased the pace of globalism, 






2010; Domanski et al. 2013). These revolutions in production methods continue to 
promote ‘regionalisation’ or ‘localised globalisation’ (Bentley et al. 2013).  
 
2.2.1 Regional Restructuring of Plant Production 
As discussed above, the challenge to overcome vast production and development 
costs remains a pressing concern for OEMs to maintain market competitiveness. In 
striving to meet the challenges of cost recovery, this has necessitated the adoption 
of new production strategies. Platform-sharing had become necessary so that 
multiple models or variations of models could be produced from the same line 
(Bailey et al. 2010). But other methods of reducing costs have emerged, such as 
through more inter-firm cooperation within the industry. Many OEMs have forged 
production alliances to share the costs of new product development, particularly in 
China (Stanford 2010). 
The shift from maximising economies of scale – traditional of Fordist production – to 
maximising economies of scope, indicative of the post-Fordist transition, has resulted 
in the relocation of production plants from traditional heartlands to regional clusters 
(Donnelly et al. 2005; Bailey et al. 2010; Clibborn 2012; Bentley et al. 2013). Plant 
closures in the West Midlands between 2005 and 2006 highlighted how the UK’s 
foreign-owned automotive industry cluster was vulnerable to plant relocation 
decisions. Inevitably the repercussions of this also affected the local supplier 
networks, forcing many to diversify their product ranges or to leave the market 
altogether (Donnelly et al. 2005; Bailey 2007; Bentley 2007). Such implications of the 
new production realities have impacted the auto industry in the UK, and are 
illustrated by the collapse of MG Rover in Birmingham and the relocation of the 
Peugeot plant in Coventry (Bentley 2007). This confirmed that even established 
industrial clusters or even successful model brands (such as the Peugeot 206) were 
at the constant mercy of plant relocation. Although large production centres still exist 
within production nodes and clusters, they remain in areas that can offer either low 
labour costs, or attractive tax breaks and incentives, or offer access to trade blocs 
and markets and the ability to platform-share. It is these factors that dictate the 
location of future plant developments and the fate of existing plants, and the 






Klier and Rubenstein (2010) explain how the 1980-90s saw the shift of auto-
production in America to a confined area within the Southern states known as the 
Auto Valley to take advantage of sophisticated US transportation links that grant 
access to US and Canadian markets whilst maximising production efficiency through 
close proximity to supplier networks (see Figure 2.2). However, it must be stated that 
the figure does not explicitly demonstrate which pre-1990 assembly plants or 
associated suppliers have sequentially closed due to the relocation of assembly 
plants post-1990. We can assume from the economic difficulties faced within post-
industrial heartlands such as in Detroit that many of these pre-1990 assembly plants 
and supplier have in fact ceased production. The implications of the structural costs 
often reverberate down the supply chain, via closure, consolidation, mergers and 
relocation (Cusumano and Takeishi 1991; Doran 2003; Bentley 2007; Klier and 
Rubenstein 2010; Bailey et al. 2010; Balcet el al. 2013). Furthermore, more intense 
investment was allocated to increase production facilities and networks within 
Mexico by both the US OEMs and independent suppliers, with Mexico becoming a 
significant car manufacturer within the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). The ‘Detroit 3’ (Ford, GM and Chrysler) invested heavily in Mexico, lured 
by the removal of tariffs, fewer trade union laws, membership of the NAFTA trading 
bloc and lower labour costs.10 This was reflected in how car production in Mexico 
rose from 8% in 1989 to 17% in 2009 of overall vehicle production within North 
America (see Figure 2.3), illustrating the mobility of western auto-clusters in 
response to the availability of cheaper production nodes through the reduction of 
trade barriers and legislation (Klier and Rubenstein 2010:342). Such plants are 
referred to as ‘Maquiladora plants’, located within Mexico, just south of the border 
but heavily integrated into the US supply chains. The maquiladora laws enabled the 
duty-free movement of commodities, so components can be imported to Mexico, 
assembled and then the final product exported back to the US or Canada (Klier and 















Figure 2-2: The Auto Valley, US  
The figure shows the development of new plant assembly plants clustering around a sophisticated infrastructure 
network that enables the efficient transportation of parts to final assembly with close proximity to US and 
Canadian markets.  
Source: Klier and Rubenstien 2010: 338.  
 
The example of the ‘Detroit 3' reforming and restructuring provides an insight into 
further cost-cutting strategies and reformation needed from other OEMs, who 
needed to fully utilise economies of scale in order to compete against the rising BRIC 
economies and meet the needs of cost recovery (Donnelly et al. 2005; Bailey et al. 
2010; Stanford 2010). The emerging economies in all of the trading blocs have 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright.This item has been 
removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be 










Figure 2-3: Light vehicle production among NAFTA countries 
Source: Klier and Rubenstien 2010 :341. 
 
Despite the shifts in production networks, the Detroit 3 still had structural problems, 
including technological and design deficiencies, high fuel consumption, and being 
burdened by accumulated losses from the 2008 financial crisis. Chrysler and GM 
were forced to seek a direct financial bailout from the US government (Klier and 
Rubenstien 2010: 343; Stanford 2010: 390). Furthermore, while financial support 
was focused on OEMs, support and incentives were given to the supplier chain 
manufacturers because the supply network now carried the burden of production. 
The restructuring of OEM production and supply chains has solidified the need for 
government involvement within the automotive industry as OEMs are incapable of 
making significant reforms without government aid (Stanford 2010; Balcet et al. 
2013). 
Plant relocation was not just restricted to shifting to cheaper regions within the same 
trading bloc; by the late 1990s, the new objective of western companies was to 
invest in establishing production lines in emerging economies. The lack of demand 
and typically high production costs has forced western OEMs outside their domestic 
base (Velso 2000; Stanford 2010). GM investment into China for example was aimed 
at exploiting this emerging market while also enjoying lower economies of scale and 
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is now a common strategy amongst western firms; for instance, Ford, Renault and 
Volkswagen invested in Brazil (states of Bahia and Parana), aiming at achieving 
similar results (Vargas da Cruz and Rolim 2010). Indeed, this shift has been so 
pronounced that the proportion of global car production of the G7 members fell from 
approximately 70% in 1997 to 48% in 2008 (Vargas da Cruz and Rolim 2010). The 
ever-increasing demand from India, China, Brazil and the Asian markets will 
continue to draw OEMs towards those regions (Velso 2000). 
 
2.2.2 The Post-war Boom and Deindustrialisation in the West Midlands 
Economy 
The West Midlands region covers the western proportion of the English Midlands 
area bordering Wales, consisting of the counties of Warwickshire, Worcestershire, 
and Staffordshire, Shropshire and Herefordshire, as well as the urban conurbation 
that is home to the UK’s second largest city, Birmingham, plus six other metropolitan 
areas: Dudley, Sandwell, Solihull, Walsall, Wolverhampton and Coventry. Historically 
the region gained much of its economic prominence through developments taking 
place as part of the nineteenth-century industrial revolution in the UK to become the 
birth-place of famous OEMs (ranging from Jaguar and Land Rover to confectionaries 
such as Cadburys) and becoming one of the most prosperous regions in the UK 
economy during the 1960s (Donnelly et al. 2012). As the UK lost its global 
manufacturing dominance to other emerging economies, the West Midlands in 
particular suffered from economic decline (similar to other OIRs). During the 1970s, 
the region experienced its lowest economic growth rate on record and in the early 
1980s experienced the highest unemployment rate in the entirety of the UK economy 
(Donnelly et al. 2012). 
 
The deindustrialisation of the UK economy and the industrial restructuring of the 
West Midlands economy had its roots in the post-war boom period that the UK 
economy experienced right up until the 1960s (Spencer et al. 1986). The West 
Midlands economy benefited from national reconstruction and the increase in 
international trade, and the West Midlands became the centre of UK manufacturing. 
During the 1951-61 period, employment within the region grew by 40% with UK 






1993). Two main factors enabled UK manufacturing to thrive during the post-war 
period: first was industrial and trade protection against other strong industrial nations 
such as Japan, US and other European nations; second, British firms still enjoyed 
commonwealth trading preferences within the international markets (Spencer et al. 
1986). Matthews (2007) however puts forward the argument that during 1950-73, 
British manufacturing productivity was slower than all of its main competitors and 
never overcame this deficiency, implying that there was a hidden ‘malaise’ within the 
UK industry that would result in long-term problems. The market protection that the 
UK enjoyed overshadowed potential flaws and weaknesses within the manufacturing 
industries. With the West Midlands region contributing up to 40% of UK exports, 
employment in manufacturing continued to swell, placing an over-reliance on this 
sector (Spencer et al. 1986; Bailey 2003). 
As explained above, the post-war period saw the West Midlands manufacturing 
industries become prosperous and maintain a strong position within the UK and 
international markets despite some structural weaknesses. This led to a situation 
where the West Midlands economy became reliant on a small number of industries, 
with 70.6% of manufacturing employment within four sectors. This prevented the 
regional economy from diversifying within the manufacturing sectors and constrained 
the supply chain of the local economy (Spencer et al. 1986).11 This eroded the skills 
base of the workforce, reducing knowledge transfers and technological development. 
The reliance placed on these few sectors would make the West Midlands economy 
vulnerable to changes in the global economy and international competition. The 
structure of the West Midlands economy from the 1960s onwards became so heavily 
intertwined with the performance of the national economy that in 1961 65% of 
employment in the West Midlands resided within manufacturing in comparison to 
39% for the rest of Britain (Haynes 2008). As the national economy began to 
deteriorate due to falling exports, the output of the West Midlands economy would 
reflect this, with manufacturing industries’ employment rates in the West Midlands 
region falling to 48.6% by 1978 (Spencer et al. 1986).  
Employment in the service industries remained stagnant from 1981-83; however, 
post-1984 there was sharp increase. In contrast, manufacturing employment 
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continued to decrease at a rapid rate, especially during the recessionary periods of 
1981-83. This is representative of several main drivers that were influencing the 
post-industrial economy: increasing outsourcing of producer services; specialisation 
of goods; the change in consumption behaviour towards services; and the decrease 
in productivity of the manufacturing sector in relation to the service sector (Rowthorn 
and Courts 2004:770). This is a further reflection of the post-Fordism shift within 
manufacturing with vertical disintegration/reclassification of activity that would 
previously have been grouped under a major manufacturer. The Thatcher 
government promoted market liberalisation and privatisation, which accelerated the 
shift in industrial sectors within the UK economy from traditional manufacturing 
sectors to service and financial service industries (Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show the 
large decline of manufacturing output). This would have implications for the British 
automotive OEMs adapting from labour-intensive mass-production systems and to 
competing in ever more global and liberalised markets (Mackinnon 2008). By 1984, 
12% of redundancies were in the automotive industry (Haynes 2008: 17), with British 
Leyland cutting employment from 27,000 to 8,000 workers in Coventry, and Chrysler 
also making large job cuts (Donnelly et al. 2012: 10). Unfortunately, despite the 
large-scale restructuring of the UK automotive industry and the large deductions in 
employment within the sector, the automotive industry would be subject to further 
restructuring processes that would hit the West Midlands particularly hard.  
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Figure 2-4: Manufacturing employment from 1971-1981, West Midlands. 
Importantly, Fig. 2-4 shows how the rapid decline of manufacturing employment came with the onset of change 
within the global economy. It highlights how the national economy undertook restructuring, diverting 
investment away from manufacturing. Source: Spencer et al. 1986. 
Figure 2-5: Manufacturing output from the UK and the West Midlands from 1970-2008.  
With automotive firms continuing to shed jobs and the UK government embracing neoliberal policies, domestic, 
UK-based companies primarily based in the West Midlands continued to suffer from poor productivity and de-
investment. Source: Donnelly et al. 2012. 
 
The emergence of the BRIC economies forced Western OEMs to adapt yet again 
and face new restructuring challenges. Western OEMs embarked on global 
regionalism in order to compete against this new global competition and initiate 
corporate alliances and consolidate production (Velso and Fuch 2004; Bailey et al. 
2010; Stanford 2010; Brandes et al. 2013). As brands are exchanged and firms 
integrate to improve design, increase production efficiency and ultimately increase 
market opportunities, ‘excess’ production facilities and clusters will be more likely to 
shut down (Stanford 2010). In particular, brands that are in the ‘middle’ will suffer the 
most due to the difficulty of maximising economies of scale, meeting the cost of 
recovery while maintaining adequate levels of output. Brands like Saab or MG Rover 
are particular examples – unable to achieve economies of scale across brands or be 
prestigious enough for the upper-end high value-added market. In due course, the 
ultimate impact of these changes within the automotive industry led to further plant 
closures. The West Midlands has continued to be subject to automotive restructuring 
through several more recent high-profile plant closures. The Jaguar and Peugeot 
production plants based in Coventry closed in 2005 and 2006 respectively, 
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amounting to 4,500 jobs lost; the final collapse of MG Rover in 2005 saw 6,300 jobs 
lost with further consequences for the supplier networks (Bentley 2007; Bailey et al. 
2008; Chapain and Murie 2008). 
Despite these set-backs, the West Midlands continues to be the centre of UK 
automotive production, although no longer having the dominant global position it 
once had. Car manufacturing continues to be important in the West Midlands; 
however, many of the iconic UK brands, as of 2015, operating under foreign 
ownership (e.g. Jaguar has been owned by the Indian manufacturer Tata since 
2008). Not all UK brands survived, with the last identity of British Leyland ending with 
the closure of LDV in 2009. Plant closures within the West Midlands had a 
considerable impact on the regional economy in terms of unemployment and 
decreased GDP as well as loss of identity in addition to the social implications 
associated with long-term unemployment. Understanding plant closures and 
resolving ways to overcome them are vital to restoring the social and economic 
prosperity of the affected regions. 
 
2.3 LDV: The Road to Closure 
The previous section outlined the West Midlands industrial restructuring that 
occurred from the post-war years up to the late 1990s and early 2000s. The 
prosperous growth witnessed by British Leyland during the Fordist post-war era had 
given it a great position within the British automotive market, with the West Midlands 
forming the core of British automotive production (Donnelly et al. 2005). The 
following section is broken into three categories, which explain the primary factors 
leading to LDV’s incapability of maintaining its competitiveness within the 
commercial vehicle market and what contributed to the closure of the plant in 2009. 
Firstly, it covers the heritage of LDV from the creation of Leyland and key events 
such as the national champion ethos instilled by the UK government. This 
establishes the firm’s structural transitions throughout its history and its implications 
on its corporate performance. Secondly, it discusses the implications of LDV’s 
history in direct relation to Leyland Trucks in the commercial vehicle market, showing 
the reasons why Leyland Trucks struggled to maintain market competitiveness. 






this relates to the unique production challenges of the commercial vehicle sector and 
its heritage that made LDV extremely dependent on foreign investment and more 
vulnerable to economic events. 
 
2.3.1 LDV’s Heritage: British Leyland 
The LDV brand came into existence in 1993; however, prior to that, the company 
had long enjoyed a strong national heritage with a strong connection to the local 
area of Washwood Heath. This was through LDV’s heritage as a part of British 
Leyland;12 indeed this lineage gave LDV a strong regional attachment despite its 
relatively small size in comparison to previous closures. British Leyland was a huge 
conglomeration of British automotive manufacturers (see fig 2.1 for timeline of LDV), 
at its height employing over 50,000 workers throughout the West Midlands region, 
symbolising the British automotive industry and the economic identity of the West 
Midlands (Donnelly et al. 2005). During the post-war boom, the UK government 
instigated a policy of creating national champions among UK manufacturers to 
maximise production capacity (Booth 2003; Matthews 2007).13 Through government-
led expansion, Leyland incorporated takeovers of other British OEMs, becoming the 
British Leyland motor company. However, this form of expansion nullified competitive 
attitudes among British manufacturing, instilling structural weaknesses and leading 
to poor product development and an inability to meet rising production costs and 
enter foreign markets (Womack et al. 1990; Bailey et al. 2008). Indeed, this 
government strategy made it easier for other firms to exploit the British market and in 
return make it harder for UK firms to compete effectively. This represents a key 
moment for Leyland in that established strong economic and political links with 
regional and national institutions and actors (regional production networks, labour 
unions and the national economy) but which in due course would create barriers for 
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Table 2-1: Timeline of major corporate events for Leyland and the creation of LDV 
 
 Year Company 
Name 






Leyland Public transport, (Petrol buses) Adapting to technology change 




Leyland Commercial vehicles 
(Vans) 
Government led funding for 
product development 











domestic vehicles, public 
transport 
(vans, HGV, cars) 
Expansion through forced 
corporate mergers of British 
automotive firms from the 










domestic vehicles, public 
transport 
(vans, HGV, cars) 
National and global economic 





Commercial vehicles (Vans 
and HGV) 
Decision to split the 
commercial vehicle arm from 
the British Leyland motor 





Commercial vehicles (Vans 
and HGV) 
DAF bought out Leyland trucks 






LDV Commercial vehicles (vans) Management buyout of the 
van division, after DAF entered 
bankruptcy. 
PLC 
1998 LDV Commercial vehicles (vans) Entered joint venture with 





2001 LDV Commercial vehicles (vans) A struggling Korean economy 
forced Daewoo to sell stake, 
another management buyout 
followed. 
PLC 







2006 LDV Commercial vehicles (vans) Sun capital sold LDV to the 









Sponsored by the UK government, large firms within the industry such as BMC, 
Austin and Morris expanded, absorbing a whole number of companies forming 
industrial national champions, and so the composition of the West Midlands 
economy changed from a wide range of small-medium enterprises to a small number 
of large state-backed firms (Spencer et al. 1986; Berkeley et al. 2005).14 Despite the 
best intentions of the UK government to reinforce British firms, this actually reduced 
the competitiveness of the manufacturing industries with the reduction in competition 
limiting innovation in design, production and flexibility to respond to new external 
challenges. Technological development is less likely to be endogenous; in addition, 
larger firms dictate prices to local suppliers, placing a greater emphasis on 
outsourcing from abroad for cheaper alternatives. The creation of large 
conglomerates fostered systemic weaknesses through the surplus in production 
plants, malaise in productivity, and counteractive internal competition between the 
various divisions of the company (Berkeley et al. 2005). The false ‘sense of security’ 
brought on by the post-war boom led to the overlooking of these structural economic 
weakness introduced by the shift to larger firms, creating significant challenges for 
manufacturing firms to adapt to the global economy. 
The oil crises in 1973 and 1979 highlighted the vulnerabilities of the UK 
manufacturing industries and the national economy, in line with the fluctuations of 
the global economy. British Leyland had to be nationalised in 1975 to prevent it from 
collapsing entirely. With the global economy going through further recessions, the 
need to control the rise of inflation became a priority over the need for full 
employment, resulting in increased redundancies from within the nationalised 
manufacturing industries (Fothergill and Guy 1990). Spencer et al. (1986) argue that 
the fall in manufacturing employment in the West Midlands during the late 1970s was 
                                                          
14 Berkeley et al. (2005) relate that this government encouraged growth in British Motor Leyland Corporation to 
compete with large US and Japanese firms such as GM and Toyota.  
ownership-
GAZ 
2009 LDV Closure Following the 2008 financial 
crisis combined with poor 
sales, GAZ was forced to sell 








due to the continuous poor performance over the previous decades and the 
economy failing to shift employment to service industries, leading to mass 
unemployment.15  
Continued poor productivity within automotive production encouraged development 
into other industries (namely financial services) and led to further disinvestment and 
restructuring within the automotive industry. From the Thatcher government of the 
1980s onwards, the UK instigated massive reform of British industry and the 
economy primarily through economic liberalisation; the privatisation of public 
organisations; the dismantlement of strong trade unions; and the opening of global 
trade markets. British Leyland itself was privatised in 1981, with the varying arms 
and divisions of the company being sold off. Leyland Trucks was separated from 
British Leyland giving it more independence to operate within the commercial vehicle 
market. The privatisation of Leyland Trucks was intended to improve the 
competitiveness of the firm; however, the legacy from British Leyland meant that 
many weaknesses remained. British manufacturing had experienced comfortable 
protection of trading markets in the form of commonwealth trade but as trade barriers 
were rapidly reduced, these lucrative markets soon went to competitors. The market 
protection meant that British Leyland’s global network was underdeveloped in 
marketing and producing vehicles, which in effect made Leyland trucks vulnerable to 
competing firms in the European market (Spencer et al. 1986). Spencer et al. (1986: 
117) highlight this underperformance in the European market, showing that Leyland 
sold only 7,204 units in 1975, so although Britain’s entry into the European Economic 
Community (EEC) had opened up new markets, British OEMs were ill-prepared to 
compete and exploit the new market opportunities effectively. 
2.3.2 Leyland Trucks within the Modern Commercial Vehicle Sector 
The European Union defines a commercial vehicle as: any motorised road vehicle 
that by its type of construction and equipment is designed for and capable of 
transporting, whether for payment or not: (1) more than nine persons, including the 
driver; and (2) goods and standard fuel tanks.16 The commercial vehicle sector holds 
a unique place within the automotive industry and many of the processes that occur 
                                                          







within the wider industry also affect the commercial vehicle sector but can also have 
different implications. 
The commercial vehicle sector is more intertwined with global and national 
economies through its relation to the rise and fall of the GDP. A rise in GDP 
represents increased economic activity and thus increases the need for additional 
logistical capacity to transfer goods, resulting in higher demand for commercial 
vehicles. Likewise, during economic recessionary periods, national spending and 
global trade decreases, lowering the need for transportation of goods, thus 
decreasing the demand for commercial vehicles. This has been experienced in 
Europe with demand for commercial vehicles falling by 20% during 2008-12 for 
example.  
This makes commercial vehicles more attuned to global market fluctuations and 
current economic conditions. However, the commercial vehicle sector shares the 
same weaknesses as the wider automotive industry. The high production and 
development costs, fluctuations in consumer demand, logistical costs and 
maintaining flexibility within the product line are all problems that the commercial 
vehicle sector suffers from. This creates a highly competitive sector, producing 
unique challenges in the commercial vehicle sector for OEMs, which have to engage 
in tough markets and adapt to fluctuating economic circumstances while also 
tackling the issues of cost recovery.  
Commercial vehicle giants such as Ford underwent restructuring programmes in light 
of the financial crisis and the downturn in economic activity by announcing the 
closure of the Genk plant in Belgium (announced Oct 2012); this was to have ripple 
effects for the UK production of the Transit van model. Soon after, Ford in 2013 
announced the closure of the Southampton plant to shift production of the Transit to 
Turkey, where labour costs are as low as £4 per hour. At the plant itself, an 
estimated 500 jobs were expected to be lost directly. The Ford Southampton plant 
closure exemplifies how even well-established plants and institutions (having 
produced over 2.2 million Transit vans over a period of 40 years) have become 
extremely vulnerable to the needs of cost recovery and adjustment to global market 






However, commercial vehicle manufacturers have been rationalising production 
since before the financial crisis and in the economic recession that followed it. When 
Leyland Trucks separated from British Leyland, it needed to adapt to the lean 
production system (LPS) to overcome the challenge of cost recovery and remain 
competitive. In recent years, this need to recover costs has become ever present in 
the commercial vehicle sector, with demand for commercial vehicles starting to fall in 
the major markets (Western Europe, India and China), in effect forcing 
manufacturers to begin investing in global production networks. Those companies 
that can invest in global platforms (and access local markets, develop better 
cooperation with suppliers, overcome structural deficiencies, and produce low-
emission vehicles) will secure a better long-term future (Figure 2.6 illustrates these 
points). 
Though Leyland Trucks had rationalised its production processes and adapted to 
lean production, it lacked the economies of scale and the more sophisticated global 
production networks of its competitors such as Ford, Vauxhall and Mercedes 
(Donnelley et al. 2012). The small size of Leyland Trucks in terms of its production 
and financial capacity always meant that the company was dependent on external 
sources for financial backing to develop its production technology, model 
development and expansion into other markets. This would lead to LDV having a 
succession of differing foreign ownerships that each attempted to sustain the 
company; the following section will explain how this chain of ownerships brought with 
it the complexities of being part of large TNCs. 
2.3.3 LDV’s Dependence on Foreign Investment: The Legacy of Failed 
Ownership 
When LDV seceded from Leyland DAF, the company’s financial capabilities were 
insufficient to support restructuring alone. This led to the company seeking joint 
ventures and partnerships to reinforce its finances. Though this granted LDV a 
rejuvenated lifeline that enabled it to continue for another two decades, it was not 
without problems and in essence still failed to provide LDV with a long-lasting 
solution. This process of ownership transition had its beginnings in 1987 when 
Leyland Trucks was taken over by Dutch firm DAF. Despite robust rationalising 
strategies, after six years Leyland DAF experienced financial difficulty and separated 






HGV (heavy goods vehicles) production. Following this, there was a management 






Figure 2-6: Challenges of Commercial Vehicle Sector 
This figure illustrates the strategies and diversification that commercial OEMs need to maintain long-term survival to overcome production challenges and adapt to the 
modern market and productivity networks. Source : http://www.scribd.com/doc/91245751/9/Realisation-of-economies-of-scale 15.01.2013 
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The DAF takeover of Leyland Trucks exemplified a key moment within the long-term 
process of decline, eventually leading to the overall closure of LDV, exposing a 
critical weakness of the company. LDV now suffered from being too small. 
Consisting of a single plant employing 1,200 employees, it simply could not match 
the economies of scale and more sophisticated supply networks (expansive 
networks that enable cheaper component sourcing and more cost-effective 
production) that its rivals Mercedes and Ford enjoyed (Bailey et al. 2008). This is 
crucial because the company now had little financial capacity to invest in new 
product developments while its competitors like Ford could inject massive investment 
into platform development (Bailey et al. 2010). While part of Leyland Trucks, the 
production and development costs could be sustained but as a smaller company 
overcoming these costs would be difficult. This forced LDV to embark on a 
succession of joint ventures and takeovers to substantiate the development and 
production costs with a partner/parent company. 
Under new management, LDV sought to further its product range and revitalise the 
company. In 1998, the company announced an ambitious investment project of 
£160m to develop a new line of vehicles (BBC 2012). This was to overcome 
production capacity limitations and to generate longer-term investment for the 
project. To enable this, LDV sold significant stakes in the company worth £25m to 
South Korean conglomerate Daewoo. The joint venture between LDV and Daewoo 
saw the successful development of the Maxus model that was to be released later in 
2004 (it was to be produced in Lublin, Poland). The joint venture was ended in 2001, 
mainly brought about by the Asian financial crisis that struck the South Korean 
economy acutely, compelling Daewoo to rationalise its corporate structure; this 
revealed the true instability of joint ventures with such large TNCs that are highly 
integrated within a national economy. LDV bought out Daewoo’s stake in the 
company and was able to buy the production rights to the Maxus model and continue 
its production in Washwood Heath (Telegraph 2012). Should the joint venture have 
lasted longer, the production of that model would have been initiated faster and been 
better able to exploit world markets, with revenues being recycled into new potential 







The failed joint venture with Daewoo left behind shortfalls in financing the product 
development of the Maxus model, with development costs running to £700m.17 The 
Maxus would turn out to be a bitter pill to swallow for LDV; it was not designed for 
the production capacities of LDV or the western markets of Europe. The design of 
the Maxus was developed in the context of the low labour cost production of Lublin 
Poland; simply transferring its labour-intensive production to the UK would not be an 
easy transition. LDV invested heavily in electric vehicle production in pre-empting 
legislative changes that were to occur in 2009, constraining further financing and 
development of the Maxus model.18 Competition for the Maxus was too strong from 
the Ford Transit, Mercedes Sprinter or Vauxhall Vivaro, all of which had more 
sophisticated designs and production systems to attune to regional specifications. 
LDV simply did not have the funds available to customise the Maxus for more 
specific Western markets demands or efficient production methods. The only way 
the Maxus model could remain successful for LDV depended heavily on whether it 
could be exported successfully to eastern markets where the design specifications 
were better suited.19 
In 2005, LDV went into administration; the American venture capitalists Sun Capital 
Financial Corporation bought a majority stake in the company, preventing LDV from 
closing. This highlights the weakness of LDV in the fact that it became too reliant on 
foreign investment to keep in line with its production costs let alone development, 
again highlighting the small size of the company preventing it from attaining financial 
self-sufficiency. This ownership by Sun Capital showed no promise of long-term 
development or investment but did maintain and continue existing development 
projects that were ongoing (i.e. the Maxus). However, Sun Capital, as venture 
capitalists, were only interested in turning a quick profit; the short-term investment 
was only to make LDV lucrative for a new potential buyer – not towards the 
development of new product lines or models. 
Not surprisingly, Sun Capital sold on the year after. GAZ took ownership of LDV in 
2006; the Russian OEM injected £25m into new product development. Under the 
Sun Capital ownership, the Maxus model had proved successful, winning the 
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commercial light vehicle award of 2005 and giving LDV the opportunity to sell abroad 
with confidence, and was ideally suited for the Russian market, hence the suitability 
for the GAZ takeover. LDV was also utilising the increase in demand for, and further 
developing, electric vehicles; the new Maxus model was ideal for adapting to the 
electric vehicle sector. This development would solve the short-term goals of 
securing market growth but would also secure the company’s long-term ambitions of 
gaining a foothold in the electric vehicle sector. However, once again another global 
economic recession would have reverberations in the automotive industry and for the 
company. The financial crisis of 2007-8 proved to be disastrous for the commercial 
vehicle sector, and with this recession in particular, the restricted finance for small 
and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) would reverberate through the commercial 
vehicle sector, influencing the decrease in vehicle sales. LDV in particular had a 
reliance on the local SME consumer base to generate sales revenues as this is 
where the brand had the strongest support. The restriction on financing would also 
influence SMEs’ ability to invest in electric vehicles. Furthermore, the parent 
company GAZ was financially unstable during this period as it was tied into a number 
of other industries strongly affected by the crash;20 with this financial safety removed, 
LDV was left in a precarious position of declining sales and financial constraints – 
LDV’s prospects looked bleak. 
Ultimately the chain of ownership failed due to a bad choice of investments on behalf 
of the parent company and LDV’s choice of joint ventures. Many of the parent 
companies had great structural problems of their own – such as DAF, Daewoo and 
GAZ – which made these TNCs financially unstable, encountering two problems: first 
the vulnerability to economic shocks and downturns which would always leave LDV 
susceptible to the mercy of TNC rationalisation; second the likelihood of maintaining 
long-term investment to continue product development and global network 
production would remain slim. This resulted in LDV simply not having the 
opportunities for investment and development that were needed to keep pace with 
the changing nature of the global automotive industry; LDV collapsed and 
subsequently closed.  
 
                                                          
20 Due to GAZ’s connections to the Russian steel industry, its owner, Oleg Deripaska, was forced to scale back 
many of his operations, resulting in some branches of his business becoming subject to rationalisation or forced 







2.4 Summary: LDV on a Failing Pathway 
This chapter has summarised the automotive industry context underpinning the LDV 
closure by detailing the various processes of change within the automotive industry 
that led to OEMs restructuring within automotive production methods. 
The transition from mass production Fordist methods to the more flexible post-
Fordist modular system witnessed OEMs turning away from reliance on traditional 
large production facilities and encouraging in further integration, with suppliers 
creating more sophisticated regional nodes of production. The further integration of 
global markets created further needs for restructuring towards the relocation of these 
regional nodes to developing economies to utilise cheaper labour. The implications 
of these processes on already existing regional nodes (e.g. Detroit US, West 
Midlands UK) were mass redundancies and the scaling back of production. This new 
era of more globalised markets and the ever-increasing challenges of production 
(e.g. the challenge of cost recovery) dictated how OEMs were to engage in markets 
and encouraged the use of platform-sharing and mergers/joint ventures to mitigate 
productions costs. It is within this context that LDV found itself unprepared to meet 
these varying challenges. 
Similar to the wider automotive industry, the commercial vehicle sector also had to 
overcome these restructuring challenges to keep pace within a very competitive 
market. However, due to a combination of its corporate heritage from Leyland DAF 
and how the Washwood Heath plant was situated within the regional production 
nexus, LDV embarked on a failing pathway that would eventually lead to the closure 
of the company. Within this pathway, there were certain opportunities or moments - 
both political and economic - where LDV and other actors could have intervened to 
avoid long-term decline.  
The chapter has covered several topics surrounding the LDV closure, describing the 
corporate history of LDV, and discussing how Britain’s political and economic 
situation in the post-war boom period created the national champion British Leyland. 
The post-war boom period of the British automotive industry overlooked many 
structural problems that resided within it, while competition from the global market 
only got stronger. As the global economy changed throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 







Midlands region in particular. In facing all of these challenges and transitions in the 
automotive industry, British Leyland failed as a national champion, while the British 
Leyland heritage continued to plague LDV in its more recent history and restrict it 
from becoming more competitive in the automotive industry. 
 
From 1991 when LDV broke away from Leyland DAF, LDV was in a precarious 
position. The company had lost a significant part of its research and development 
(R&D) capability, capital investment potential and sufficient economies of scale to 
sustain itself independently. This made LDV dependent on foreign takeovers and 
susceptible to geopolitical and economic events. As such, LDV was hit by a 
succession of economic crises – first the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and lastly the 
economic recession brought on by the financial crisis of 2007. The most recent 
parent company GAZ (Russian OEM) was forced to scale back its costs and pulled 
out of LDV in early 2009. Due to the economic uncertainties faced by the industry 
and governments, LDV failed to find another investor and financial backer. By the 
time of LDV’s closure following constant downsizing in 2009, employment had 
shrunk significantly to 900 workers at the Washwood Heath plant with a further 
estimated 4,000 employees under threat in the related supply chain. The Washwood 
Heath manufacturing plant had provided employment in the local area for over 40 
years, and a local ‘icon’ came to an end. 
 
The thesis continues by reviewing the literature around the Geographical Political 
Economy (GPE) of LDV and Washwood Heath, engaging in the wider topic of plant 
























Chapter 3: Geographical 
Political Economy and 







3.1 Theories and Topics in Relation to Regional 
Development 
The previous chapter discussed the automotive industry in the context of this 
research and established its relationship to plant closure and the economic 
restructuring of regional economies. The chapter further alluded to the economic and 
social issues created when economic institutions collapse, leaving serious issues for 
local and regional government. The subject of plant closures also brings to the fore 
the question of what factors, indicators or processes (or combination thereof) makes 
particular regions or localities more successful at generating strong industries and 
economies whilst other regions are susceptible to industrial decline and economic 
setbacks.  
The chapter aims to address this by reviewing the literature of regional development 
and economic theories, exploring the different aspects of economic discourse and 
regional governance, to comprehend what economic strategies or models have 
influence over policy decision-making and the ultimate economic direction of the 
regional economy. In this regard, the chapter will begin by discussing the theory of 
geographical political economy (GPE) developed by Pike et al. (2005). This theory in 
particular has significance within this thesis to develop the wider contextual issues 
surrounding economic events concerning the political and geographical relationships 
that lead up to economic events. Further to the GPE approaches, other economic 
approaches and theories also have value to extend the conceptual understanding of 
plant closure, and will be brought into the empirical research of this thesis. In this 
respect, the chapter will explore the role of evolutionary economic geography (EEG) 
continued by Boschma and Frenken (2006) and link these discussions with the more 
recent concepts of regional development through the notion of regional resilience 
(Dawley et al. 2010). 
The chapter then brings out these economic debates through direct examples of 
plant closure and labour market policy, through looking into examples of plant 
closure and examining the outcomes of the labour market policies. This in turn leads 
to discussion of the correct policy implementation (in the form of regional taskforce 







3.1.1 Introducing theories of GPE, EEG and Economic Pathways and 
Regional Resilience 
The evolution of regional economic development themes will now be discussed, 
beginning with the GPE literature. Pike’s (2005) research proposes that the course of 
a company’s future lies in certain critical ‘moments’ and events in which the company 
or related actors (organisation or institutions that have association with the company) 
can intervene and influence the company’s direction, ultimately determining the long-
term development of the region where a company is located. These ‘moments’ and 
‘events’ are dictated by the geographical, political and economic circumstances of 
that company in relation to how it produces and sells goods. It is through these 
principles established by Pike (2005) that the contextual research of LDV will be 
conducted.  
Other approaches such as Krugman’s (1999) new economic geographies (NEG) 
explain how globalisation of the world market increases the vulnerability of the local 
area through the introduction of more intense external competition and economic 
processes. In response, commentators have stated that regional economies have 
adapted through the clustering of industrial spaces and related labour markets to 
increase efficiency and output within those industrial sectors, thereby making 
regional economies more competitive on an international scale (Takatsuka 2011). 
Contributions from Boschma and Frenken (2006), Boschma and Martin (2007), and 
Cumbers et al. (2008) further this discussion through their conception of evolutionary 
economic geography (EEG). This approach aims to advance the thinking behind the 
NEG by blending a mixture of approaches and in comprehending the innovation 
cycles of corporate development adapting to the nature of the fast-paced modern 
world. EEG seeks to create a conceptual understanding of the economic landscape 
and the processes that occur with interrelated temporal and spatial aspects 
(Cumbers et al. 2008). 
All of these theories recognise the importance of space within regional development; 
however, the differences between the theories are the significance and priority they 
place between the actors, spatiality, history, economic and political institutions within 
those regions. Other factors like path dependency and the regional context all play 







Shuttleworth et al. (2005), the chapter continues this discussion in context with ‘real-
life’ examples that exhibit the processes and aspects mentioned above. 
 
3.1.2 Raising the Political Economy of Plant Closures 
The MG Rover collapse in 2006 indicated the closing stages of mass-produced 
automotive production within the West Midlands. The closure of LDV in Birmingham 
in 2009 represented yet another automotive plant closure within the West Midlands, 
signifying the end of mass automotive production in the region. The continuing 
closure and relocations of successive plants post-MG Rover closure (Peugeot 2006; 
LDV 2009) characterised more ongoing regional development issues, signifying 
underlying problems and the region’s inability to maintain strong economic 
institutions (Bentley 2007; Dawley 2014). However, the headline plant closures are 
all part of the ongoing development of the automotive industry, as already explained 
in Chapter 2, with the automotive industry itself experiencing radical changes being 
subject to globalisation and restructuring processes (Bailey 2007; Bentley 2007). 
This reveals a critical weak link in the West Midlands’ regional development over the 
past decade, exposing path dependency on a single industry (Hudson 2007; Neffke 
et al. 2011; Hassink et al. 2014). Following that, attention should be drawn to the 
regional actors and their role in preventing or limiting damage when plant closure 
occurs (Pike et al. 2010; Hassink et al. 2014; Pugalis and Bentley 2014). These 
actors consist of local social actors as well as political and economic institutions (at 
both the local and national level), all of which have a relationship to some degree or 
another to the plant closure and the outcomes of that closure upon the region 
(Mackinnon et al. 2009). 
Pike (2005) establishes the GPE framework in examining the North East’s 
experience of the closure of a research and development facility (R&DCo) in 1999. 
This instance represented a significant depreciation of the North East’s high-
knowledge and high-technology economy in what was an already struggling region in 
this sector. As Pike (2005: 94) describes: 
The economic and social costs of closure (R&DCo’s activities) were acute in the NE as it 








This suggests that the effect of the closure on the region depends on the type of 
closure itself in relation to the region’s overall economic activities and industrial 
structure. Though the plant closures within the West Midlands are of a very different 
nature and scale from those of R&DCo in the North East, it is possible to point to two 
similarities. Both regions suffered from high concentrations of unemployment from a 
long industrial decline, and both regions had lost traditional strong industries that 
provided significant employment and economic stimulus.21  
The GPE contribution that emerged from the R&DCo case study is that 
contemporary theorising about plant closures from an NEG theory perspective was 
insufficient to explain the needs of a rapidly modernising, changing economy (Pike at 
al. 2010; Hassink et al. 2014). Much theorising around closures often relates heavily 
to internal (plant) and external (macro-economic) factors. This thereby defines the 
closure and post-closure in its own terms without taking into account more intricate 
regional agents in the equation, such as social institutions and the spatial–historical 
context that are central to comprehending regional path-dependency relationships 
(Pike 2005; Pike et al. 2010; Hassink et al. 2014). Furthermore, the relationship 
between what is deemed necessary and the contingency of plant closure is often 
weak, resulting in the separation of the reasons behind closure from the local and 
regional impacts (Pike 2005). It can be argued that the place-specific character of 
public policy, institutional responses and political mobilisation contribute to overall 
resistance or response to closures, and hence the spatial differentiation in regional 
unevenness in regards to plant closure outcomes and future economic 
growth/recovery (Mackinnon et al. 2009). In this vein, Pike (2005) continues by 
building a political economy approach to the R&DCo case study by developing the 
‘relational’ aspect to the closure, basing this on Massey (1995: 104): 
...to conceptualise processes and relations. Objects are not simply given to analysis, but 
are themselves products, and must be conceptualised in such a way as to incorporate, not 
just their descriptive characteristics, but also the process of their production, the larger 
dynamic of which they are part. 
 
Here Pike (2005) analyses the closure by conceptualising it as a product of 
spatialised social relations and social processes taking place over a long period of 
                                                          
21 The North East specialised in ship building and coal mining where the West Midlands has been heavily reliant 







time. Space and place are then incorporated into theorising closures, thereby 
remaking the economic and social landscape in particular through the actions of 
social and economic agents. Understanding the historical aspects of the social 
relations of a region conceptualises the temporal transformation of closures (Pike 
2005: 98): 
The trajectory of social process of closure is unavoidable, shaped by its own historical and 
geographical evolution. 
 
Restructuring is then path-dependent between the actions and events within the 
region, reflecting the very nature of the region’s social and political-historical ability to 
direct the future of potential outcomes of closures. An important aspect of GPE is the 
comprehension of ‘moments’ within the closure process. GPE emphasises that 
closures are not sudden events; on the contrary, they are prolonged processes that 
experience relational changes between the organisation and the regional institutions 
and actors (Pike 2005; Hassink et al. 2014). For instance, Cumbers et al. (2008) 
explain how the importance of labour unions has generally been overlooked in their 
role of establishing production and that they have a significant role within the overall 
global production network. In this sense, labour is critical to value creation and 
ultimately towards productivity within the network. The ability of the labour unions to 
enact power and influence on work conditions or job security rely on the 
geographical and social relations they can draw upon (Cumbers et al. 2008). The 
importance to place here is the relationship between the macro-organisations and 
the local actors, in their capability to prevent or mitigate closures with emphasis also 
placed onto the local actors’ ability to rally together to form a coherent front 
(Mackinnon et al. 2009; Pugalis and Bentley 2014).22  
 
3.1.3 The Role of Evolutionary Economic Geography in the Debate: 
Carrying GPE Forward? 
Krugman’s (1999) NEG attributes the agglomeration and clustering of industries due 
to geographical and political characteristics of a particular region in terms of market 
proximity, location of labour and governance (Garresten and Martin 2010). Crucially 
                                                          
22 Such examples of these ‘moments’ can be to challenge corporate authority (Shareholder activism), prompt 
public support; develop innovative public intervention, or disperse the effects of the closure by closing a limited 







Krugman (1999) also implants the role of supply and demand within the regional 
cycle. Supply is mobile due to the increased mobility of labour and capital (Garretsen 
and Martin 2010). The location of workers depends on the location of firms, on which 
depends the location of capital, resources and demand. Frenken and Boschma 
(2007: 636) highlight the importance of space and time within this ‘geographical-
historical shift’: 
...economic geography is inseparable from economic growth processes, because spatial 
patterns emerge from processes that have taken place in the past. 
 
Takatsuka (2011) continues this line of research by following how the relationship of 
the labour skills pool and the market size influences industrial location. Research 
places importance on the size of the labour skills pool and the costs of entry and exit 
to that market in limiting the mobility of a particular firm or industry. The Takatsuka 
(2011) model is based on these arguments and highlights that the NEG models fail 
to show this relationship and that the agglomeration of skilled labour occurs faster 
than the location of firms. His research places a further emphasis on the role of 
regional policies and welfare in how economic geography determines the location of 
skilled labour. 
The emergence of EEG seems to present new ideas, at least on a conceptual basis, 
which may demonstrate how opportunities can be made and exploited in economic 
development policy (Frenken and Boschma 2007). The EEG perspective places 
greater emphasis on the role of spatial and temporal contexts in the evolution of 
firms, industrial production and agglomeration economics (Neffke et al. 2011). This is 
driven by the primary assumption that firms develop and evolve a set of firm routines 
that become embedded into the specific spatial context. These routines consist of a 
firm’s ability to develop organisational skills, the division of labour, the division of 
labour skills to maximise production and the utilisation of tacit knowledge within the 
firm with the right set of routines leading firms to become industrial leaders 
(Boschma and Frenken 2006:278). The evolutionary or ‘Darwinian’ aspect of these 
routines is that within an industry, there will be certain routines that promote growth 
and exhibit good practice whilst others will be negative and counterproductive; this in 
turn leads to a ‘survival’ of certain routines that continue to exist within certain spatial 







investment in R&D and firm networking, which in turn leads to an agglomeration of 
knowledge due to historical and spatial concentration of knowledge within the firm 
routine (Boschma and Frenken 2006:279). The EEG approach suggests that the 
emergence of strong firms that become industrial leaders and the creation of 
innovation are not due to ‘exogenous factors of production’, but developed over an 
extended period of time through the establishment of successful routines (Frenken 
and Boschma 2007). The firm’s actions then become embedded into the historical 
aspect of that spatiality, through its supplier networks, firm routines and domestic 
home loyalty, which then drive the evolution of that regional economy (Frenken and 
Boschma 2007; Martin and Sunley 2007; Neffke et al. 2011; Hassink et al. 2014). 
To comprehend the long-term implications of firm routine development upon a 
region’s economy, EEG incorporates the actions and motivations of individuals, and 
the firms in a historical and geographical context through three major strands that 
drive development within a region: technological change, via innovation and 
knowledge; the concept of linked path dependence in determining to some degree 
present circumstances; and the organisational routines built up over time, through 
the basis of competition between firms (Frenken and Boschma 2007). During this 
‘development period’, there exists certain moments when firm routines continue to 
advance innovation and technology or become trapped within outdated processes or 
routines (Martin and Sunley 2007; Neffke et al. 2011). In the case of MG Rover, the 
national champion ethos restricted the development of the firm’s routines, so when 
the firm was privatised it could not fully re-establish itself in innovative networks and 
competitive routines. A succession of takeovers prevented the endogenous 
development of innovation and restricted the evolutionary path of the region, 
increasing the future likelihood of plant closures as the necessary routines could not 
be generated. It can be seen that since EEG focuses on the ‘evolutionary’ aspects of 
economic development, as a theory it is able to expand and adapt other concepts, 
creating new avenues of approach to developing economic theory in understanding 
economic development, with its core principles trying to incorporate aspects of both 
NEG and institutional economic geography (Frenken and Boschma 2007; Garresten 
and Martin 2010); because of this the EEG theory has an emerging role (though 
somewhat fluid conception) to play in comprehending a region’s susceptibility to 







(2006:293) then frame how EEG analysis of economic development policy should be 
based on the relationships and interactions on three levels, the macro-level of the 
spatial system itself; the meso-level of the sector and networks that reside; and the 
firm routines that are established (see Fig 3.1).  
 
 
Figure 3-1: EEG Cycle of economic development perspective.  
This figure displays the relations between the economic factors of a region at different levels of aggregation. A 
future economic discourse for the region or firm can be created by understanding these factors and the role they 
play within that region. Source: Boschma and Frenken 2006:293. 
 
3.1.4 Using GPE and EEG to Conceptualise Plant Closures 
The reverberations of plant closures have been felt across many regional economies 
(particularly within developed countries) as embodied through the mass scale of 
deindustrialisation in the West. The ability of a region to successfully adapt or cope 
with these changes hinges dramatically on geographical and historical links to 
political or economic institutions (Mackinnon et al. 2009; Garretsen and Martin 2010). 
The ability of the region to foster the concentration of firms, stimulate innovation and 
work with related networks relates directly to the competitive state of that regional 
economy and the firms that exist within it, as Frenken and Boschma (2007: 637) 
state: 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright.This item has 
been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the 







Evolutionary economists start from the premise that firms rely on organisational routines in 
their productive and decision-making processes. Routines are built up over time and are, 
to a large extent, idiosyncratic to the firm. Markets operate as selection mechanisms upon 
the heterogeneity of routines among firms resulting in systematic differences in the growth 
rates of firms. 
 
The EEG approach places an interesting focus on the role of firms within spatial 
patterns of development and how organisational ‘routines’ can foster or hamper 
innovation capability alongside the role of regional actors/institutions to create 
industrial economic structures that further promote regional development (Hassink et 
al. 2014:4). The ability of the firm to maintain these standardised routines or 
establish new effective routines, developing for example the diversification of product 
lines or the establishment of good tacit knowledge networks, will result in the region 
being able to maintain that production (Frenken and Bochma 2007). The EEG theory 
suggests that should a firm not make efficient use of local assets or the local/global 
market, this will lead to restructuring and possibly closure within that geographical 
space. For example, regions that are locked in by path dependency and spatial 
factors or contexts create obstacles in a region’s ability to adapt to new routines or 
make current routines sustainable and will therefore lose production capacity 
(Dawley 2014). Arguably, this could be said of the West Midlands region. The ability 
of the region to stimulate the correct ‘firm routine’ determines the region’s industrial 
competitiveness within that industry. 
Foremost, the EEG theory enables the mechanisms of the state that are involved in 
shaping the evolution of the economic landscape to be recognised. However, the 
significance of unintended aggregate effects of the behaviour of individual agents 
versus deliberate intervention represents a factor for further EEG research (Cumbers 
et al. 2008). Within EEG theory, firms are not treated as isolated entities but almost 
as entry points for examining the development of aggregate spatial units like cities 
and regions. In this respect, Dawley (2014) breaks down how the generation and 
nurturing of firm routines can be promoted through the regional economic 
environment (policies and strategies, institutions and economic structures); through 
the advent of technological innovation; through knowledge generation and capture; 
and through networking capacity and industrial renewal (see Fig 3.2). Thus there is a 







macrostructures from lower level processes and broader socio-spatial structures and 







 Figure 3-2: Evolution of Regional Economies.  
The diagram shows the EEG perspective concerning how firms are attracted to regions and the evolution of regional economies within the different phases of 
regional development and processes that encourage firm routine practises. Source: Dawley 2014: 95 taken from Martin 2010. 
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Recent commentators on EEG such as Hassink et al. (2014) raise the point that 
despite being at the forefront of conceptualising regional economic growth, EEG still 
neglects certain key aspects that contribute to regional growth, and claim that EEG 
can be further advanced by utilising GPE and other economic principles (see Figure 
3.3). Through understanding that EEG remains a continually developing theory 
which can embrace other concepts to clearly identify what institutions are vital to 
economic activity, then EEG could become a more thorough and robust method by 
which to analyse regional growth. 
What can be learned from EEG and GPE is think more broadly about how to design 
a development growth trajectory that will enable an economy to become more 
resistant and adaptable in the future instead of being vulnerable and reliant on a 
limited number of sectors or industries. In the case of the West Midlands, the region 
has developed new employment through the actions of various regional actors and 
institutions such as the MG Rover Task Force; but it can be argued that it needs 
other agents to stimulate labour activity and development for the region. The EEG 
approach in conjunction with GPE thinking could help to create better choices and 













Figure 3-3: Relation of Economic Theories. 
The diagram shows the different associations between the EEG, NEG and GPE paradigms with additional economic theories. It demonstrates how the core structure of EEG 
can be furthered by embracing aspects of other theories. Source: Hassink et al. 2014: 6. 
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3.2 Plant Closure and Response 
The previous section established that regional development could be understood 
within its geopolitical and evolutionary economic setting. It posited an economic 
development policy framework into which an economic development policy can be 
created, aimed at suiting the needs of the region, while considering the historical 
backdrop of that region. The previous section discussed the importance of social and 
economic institutions created within the region and the role of space and time in 
guiding the region’s economic development. 
This section of the chapter will consider the differences in policy put forward as a 
reaction to what can be seen as plant closure. It examines case examples such as 
auto-industry closures MG Rover at Longbridge and Mitsubishi in Adelaide, and the 
shipyard closures at Swan Hunter, Tyneside, and Harland & Wolff, Belfast. These 
cases exemplify differing labour market adjustment policies in regards to the 
redundant workforce and the different outcomes of these policies in relation to the 
context of that closure. This section introduces key themes and philosophies behind 
current labour market policy research. These concepts concern the job 
precariousness debate (Armstrong et al. 2008), which suggests that workers with 
limited skill sets, once released from a stable job position, can find themselves 
trapped within cycles of unemployment. De Ruyter and Burgess (2003) and Bailey et 
al. (2014) reinforce this paradigm with the notion that certain demographic groups 
can suffer job precariousness, and, without significant government intervention, can 
become excluded from the labour market and job opportunities. Other key facets 
with regard to labour market adjustment, such as the importance of accommodating 
labour into job opportunities and addressing the issue of permanent income loss, will 
also be discussed in this review. 
 
3.2.2 The Economic Context in Policy Responses 
Labour market policy responses in the face of plant closures and the undertaking of 
adjusting the labour market is an important topic. Despite deindustrialisation being a 
long-term pattern of transition for developed economies (Danson 2005; Dawley et al. 
2010), dealing with the repercussions of labour displacement and the reinsertion of 






Western economies (Shuttleworth et al. 2005; Bailey et al. 2014). How various states 
on a national and regional level implement a policy response depends on the type of 
governance structure that they endorse and the capitalist ideal they adhere to. 
There are various forms of capitalism that ultimately underpin the types of economic 
development and labour policies used by different states to guide economic growth 
and respond to economic shocks (Dicken 2011:177):  
Neo-liberal capitalism - Market mechanisms are used to regulate all or most 
aspects of the economy. The state does not fully regulate and strategically 
plan the economy. Capital markets are decentralised, shareholder value being 
dominant, typified by the US and UK governments. 
Social market capitalism - This establishes greater collaboration between 
different actors within the economy with stakeholders beyond that of owners 
of capital. Examples of this are Germany, France and Scandinavia. 
Developed capitalism - The state plays a more central role (not usually in 
terms of public ownership). The state establishes economic strategic goals 
and industrial strategy, common in East Asian countries. 
Authoritarian capitalism - Highly centralised political system combined with an 
open market (but in a heavily controlled way). Typical examples are China 
and Russia. 
Dicken (2011) categorises the behaviour of states within their economic framework; 
since the financial crisis of 2008 and the continuing economic recession or 
stagnation that various countries are still experiencing, differences in terms of 
economic planning have been evident. However, as the structure of modern 
economies continue to change, primarily through industrial restructuring, this will 
influence the types of policy response and their outcomes, particularly within a 
regional context (Schillie and Yip 2000; Donnelly et al. 2005; Simpson 2012). 
The advent and evolution of neoliberalism within the UK and Western economies 
subjected old industrial regions (OIRs) like the West Midlands to extreme 
vulnerability given shifts in the market or global production networks (Bernard and 
Jenson 2007; Birch and Mykhnenko 2008; Pike et al. 2010; Gomez-Plana and 






markets, more expansive market opportunities, increasing foreign ownership and the 
changing nature of government spending in regards to protecting national industries. 
Streeck (2014) links the issue to the rise of neoliberal capitalist development and the 
need to restructure public debt. During the post-war period leading up to the 1990s, 
public debt increased rapidly through a combination of global economic crises and 
Keynesian economic stimulus programmes to protect national industries (Streeck 
2014). This resulted in a growing public sector to absorb the shortfalls in provision by 
the private sector economy; this meant that less competitive regions became 
dependent on select industries or the public sector for economic prosperity and 
growth. In such circumstances, public debt risks becoming too high, prompting 
governments to enact austerity measures23, becoming as Streeck describes a 
‘consolidation state’ (2014: 155); In combination with a highly mobile global financial 
network of private investors and the ‘super rich’, it becomes difficult for governments 
to invigorate investment and maintain industrial support. Consequently, when large 
firms are forced to restructure, production plant closures or job redundancies 
become inevitable. Local areas in particular are hit hard when the iconic symbols of 
their well-being and livelihood are dismantled. As such, the mobilisation of local 
social and political actors becomes vastly important in mitigating and then recovering 
from the shock resulting from the closure events (Pike 2005; Pike et al. 2010).  
 
3.2.3 Case examples of Labour Market Policy 
The following section explores different case examples of labour markets post-plant 
closure. The literature engages in discussion of the policy reaction to the closures 
and creates a discussion point, which leads to comparative analysis of the policy 
approaches. The case examples include the large-scale shipyard redundancies of 
Swan Hunter in 1993 and Harland & Wolff in 2000, in Tyneside and Belfast 
respectively (Tomaney et al. 1999; Shuttleworth et al. 2005). The Swan Hunter case 
incorporates the analysis of GPE aspects of closure in the overall outcomes; 
                                                          
23 The implementation of austerity-based economic policies is popular amongst developed economies in light of 
the financial crisis in order to restore confidence and robustness in international financial markets and 
international economic and rating agencies. This has resulted in huge reductions in government spending and 
future investment alongside slow wage growth. Whilst the effectiveness of austerities in restoring stable 
economic growth is disputed by economists and politicians, it has taken hold across the central political 
mainstream. Whilst this thesis does not argue the merits of austerity, it does recognise the impact that austerity 
has on the ability of governments and public bodies to channel investment and funding into driving economic 






whereas the Harland & Wolff example looks more into the employability issues of the 
redundant workers. Other comparative examples are the automotive closures 
sustained in MG Rover in Longbridge, West Midlands, UK and Mitsubishi in 
Adelaide, South Australia (Armstrong et al. 2008). The UK and Australian 
governments faced similar problems with the collapse of automotive plants that 
formed the core of the respective local economies. Both governments approached 
the issue differently and as such the labour market outcomes were distinctive despite 
sharing similar challenges. 
 
3.2.3.1 Swan Hunter Tyneside: Exemplifying the GPE of Labour 
Outcomes 
Tomaney et al.’s (1999) research into the Swan Hunter shipyard closure of 1993 in 
Tyneside presents a political economy perspective into closure, combining the 
issues of redundancy and the labour market. It highlights the importance of social 
structures and institutions within the local context and the historical development of 
that locality. Similar to the LDV situation (and that of many other British firms), the 
Swan Hunter case exemplified a long-running history of mismanagement from both 
the private and public sectors in maintaining international market competitiveness. 
Examples of the shortfalls were failing to keep up with technology developments; not 
accessing key areas of the market; poor government handling and management; 
and strong international competition (Tomaney et al. 1999). 
The closure of the Swan Hunter plant also represents the reluctance of modern UK 
governments to institute protectionist policies and the entrenchment of neoliberal 
ideals in restructuring the economy. Tomaney et al. (1999) note that while Swan 
Hunter was in existence there seemed to be ‘golden days’ for the Wallsend 
community, exemplifying that Swan Hunter’s presence was much more than 
economic, thereby bringing a sociological aspect to the situation. The regional and 
local governments and communities wanted to embrace these large firms, wanting 
protectionist strategies, in effect to protect their local economy and their identity. 
The atmosphere of economic depression at the time was exacerbated further with 
the local community already suffering from redundancies and long-term 
unemployment, especially among middle-aged men. The workforce itself consisted 






importance of age and the relation it has to barriers of employment (Shuttleworth 
2005). Furthermore, employers within the labour market seemed to neglect the 
development of skill levels required in shipbuilding production. In this respect, the 
workers suffered from skills dependency in that their established skills base had 
been so dependent on their place of work that they had become ‘unfit’ for the 
demands of the new labour market.24 The combination of these factors would lead to 
issues of job insecurity through the likelihood of shorter contracts and increased 
chances of wage reduction, with significant implications for the older workforce in 
their chances of remaining in the labour market. Further outcomes were that 45% of 
those that went on to employment or self-employment utilised their personal contacts 
and word of mouth in securing new employment, highlighting the importance of non-
official avenues to employment and the vulnerabilities of workers that have to rely 
solely on official avenues or assistance in accessing job opportunities. 
 
3.2.3.2 Harland &Wolff Belfast: Employability in a Neoliberal Market 
Research conducted on the closure of Harland & Wolff in Belfast in 2000 by 
Shuttleworth et al. (2005) continues the theme of large-scale high-profile 
redundancies. The authors place this research in the context of changing 
government attitudes to labour market policy. It explores how the neoliberal welfare 
to work and flexible employment strategies affect the re-employability of the 
redundant workforce (Shuttleworth et al. 2005). The issue of what employability 
actually means and its implications are discussed in exploring the roles of human 
capital theory and the development of personal skills traits. In this case, Shuttleworth 
et al. (2005) further highlight that due to the uneven nature of supply and demand 
side measures, personal skills development in adding to human capital creates more 
employability but at the expense of other sections of the workforce. Similar to the MG 
Rover and LDV circumstances, the Harland & Wolff workforce was mostly an older 
age group. The majority of the workers (53%) were over 45 years old, white, male, 
with many careers spanning over 20 years; furthermore, roughly a third of 
employees were classified as having no qualifications (Shuttleworth et al. 2005). The 
demographic of this workforce is vulnerable to the new demands of the flexible 
labour market. Re-employment among the workforce was good, with 67% finding 
                                                          






new jobs within six months. However, despite the relative success of the Harland & 
Wolff recovery, further implications of redundancy emerged such as decreases in 
pay in new employment and reduced job security. This study exemplified the need 
for more demand-side measures or local Keynesianism within the local economy to 
ensure job growth and to avoid underemployment (Shuttleworth et al. 2005). 
 
3.2.3.3 Mitsubishi, South Adelaide: Failure of Demand- and Incentive-led 
Strategies 
The closure of the Lonsdale Mitsubishi plant in 2008 made 1,200 people redundant 
in South Adelaide, Australia. The concentration of jobs within a relatively isolated 
local labour market made the closure even more significant and precarious for the 
local economy and the wider regional supplier base. Manufacturing represented 18% 
of employment in southern Adelaide (Beer 2008; Thomas et al. 2008). The federal 
and state governments created an AUS$45m (approx. £20m) fund to stimulate 
labour market expansion (Armstrong et al. 2008). Instead of concentrating on 
retraining ex-workers, the state chose to subsidise businesses to encourage the 
recruitment of new employees within the area to absorb the redundant workers 
(Armstrong et al. 2008). The failure of this approach was mainly due to the fact that 
subsidised grants did not result in employment in the most affected area, as many 
beneficiaries of funding were in Northern Adelaide rather than in the South. Only with 
the implementation of the Labour Adjustment Package did the Australian 
government begin to address the supply issues and employability factors of ex-
workers in the South (Armstrong et al. 2008). However, even this received heavy 
criticism due to its poor performance and mismanagement; many redundant workers 
found new jobs through ‘word of mouth’ rather than through the job services. This 
stressed the importance of efficient and effective labour market intermediaries in 
connecting ex-workers with new job opportunities (Benner 2003). Further federal 
funding was carried forward but the distribution of this funding remained firmly within 
the central authorities’ hands (Thomas et al. 2008). This could explain the lack of 
innovative local attempts to boost the labour market and stimulate job growth. 
The Australian government took a demand-led but ‘hands-off’ approach to tackling 






opportunities in the area. The Australian government’s insistence on minimal direct 
involvement – in effect devolving responsibility to businesses – to drive the recovery 
created a situation of isolation for the ex-workers, many of whom had long-term 
employment with Mitsubishi and no recent experience with the job market 
(Armstrong et al. 2008). Without giving enough attention to the supply problems of 
reintegrating labour, the Australian government strategy condemned ex-workers to 
underemployment, typically matched with low wages, minimal hours and short-term 
contracts. 
The underemployment problem within new job creation also meant that the skills 
shortage in the locality was not being addressed. This approach overlooked the 
political economy of the area, in that the social entrenchment of workers of Southern 
Adelaide was significant (Beer 2008; Mackinnon et al. 2009). The demographic of 
the workers was primarily a middle-aged group – usually people who were home-
owners and with strong family ties in the area. These strong centrifugal forces kept 
the search for new jobs to a very limited range as many families were unwilling to 
move to another area (Beer 2008). The Australian government failed to engage in 
the logistical issues of labour market displacement. Heavy reliance on private 
transport without establishing sufficient long-distance public transportation restricted 
the job recovery capacity of Southern Adelaide (Thomas et al. 2008). A greater effort 
to link the North and South Adelaide labour markets should have been made to 
counterbalance the under-efficiency of one labour market in order to stimulate 
sufficient greater employment. With all of these barriers and obstacles to finding new 
employment, over-reliance on the neoliberal open-demand model was bound to 
create imbalance in the recovery of Adelaide. 
 
3.2.3.4 MG Rover, Longbridge: Supply-side Measures, Adapting the 
Workforce 
The UK experience of the MG Rover plant closure in Longbridge creates a different 
standpoint concerning the labour policies utilised. To begin with, the UK had 
‘foresight’ in what was to come in 2005. MG Rover came under threat for the first 
time in 2000 when BMW decided to sell the company. After the Phoenix Consortium 
took over the plant and initiated restructuring strategies (which did invoke job 






restructuring in the West Midlands region through the embodiment of the first MG 
Rover Taskforce in 2000 to oversee the transition of ownership from BMW to the 
Phoenix Consortium (Bailey 2003; Bentley et al. 2008; Bentley et al. 2010; Bailey et 
al. 2014). 
The MG Rover Taskforce invested in regional suppliers who would be under threat 
from reduced production from the plant, but also set in motion new roles for the 
plant’s obsolete facilities and established new job-searching institutions. The final 
closure of Longbridge in 2005 severely degraded the region’s automotive industry 
with 6,300 jobs lost directly, and additional indirect job losses among suppliers 
(Armstrong et al. 2008; Bailey et al. 2008). Unemployment levels within the West 
Midlands and the Longbridge area prior to the closure were already higher than the 
national average, with levels reaching 24.4% and 16.8% respectively compared to 
13.9% nationally (Cowling and Isles 2005:1). The economic context of the closure 
granted the MG Rover Taskforce far greater political and financial backing; for 
instance, the funds granted by the UK government were in excess of £176m (Pike 
2005; Bentley 2007; Armstrong et al. 2008; Bentley et al. 2008; Thomas et al. 2008). 
The recognition that the economy needed growth in new sectors to revive its 
manufacturing base within the region prompted a stronger policy reaction (Bailey 
2003). The emphasis on granting regional institutions such as Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs) and Advantage West Midlands (AWM) responsibility 
over the recovery instilled regional vigour and localism giving greater precision to 
policy implementation (Fuller et al. 2002; Bailey et al. 2008; Bentley et al. 2010). This 
kind of regional outlook was seen as being vital to establish industrial clusters and 
knowledge networks in advanced manufacturing and other innovation/high-tech 
industries with the aim of having long-term industrial and economic targets 
(Lagendijk and Cranford 1999; Bailey 2003; Thomas et al. 2008). 
The MG Rover Taskforce 2006 displayed success in adjusting workers to the West 
Midlands labour market, creating flexible labour in the wake of the 2005 closure. The 
taskforce had dedicated £50m towards the development of skills (Armstrong et al. 
2008); this is highly significant in relation to growth in the public and high-technology 
sectors that require National Vocational Qualifications (NVQs) levels 3 or 4 (Cowling 
and Isles 2005). The Rover Taskforce had the biggest uptake by MG Rover workers 






(Bailey et al. 2008). Indeed, by 2006 approximately 63% of the workers had found 
re-employment (Department of Trade and Industry 2006). The vast majority (90%) of 
the ex-workforce over a three-year period had managed to find new employment 
(Bailey et al. 2014). 
To a degree, this case displayed the success of central government intervention in 
the form of taskforce intervention that could draw upon high levels of investment and 
agency capacity (i.e. the expertise drawn from the regional and local bodies that 
constituted the MG Rover Taskforce). However, the flexible labour market ideal 
brought with it the vulnerabilities of job precariousness and increased the likelihood 
that employees will have short-term contracts and be expected to re-engage in job 
searching. The flexible labour market makes certain demographic groups of the 
workforce more vulnerable to change, creating a preferential demographic based on 
their physical characteristics and skills base (Bailey et al. 2008). Thus, combined 
with any new employment generally involving lower-paid jobs, income from tax 
revenues and social development of the region will in turn decrease.  
 
3.2.3.5 Labour Market Outcome Similarities 
A common theme among these cases of plant closure is the vulnerability of the 
redundant workers to the ‘new’ demands of the labour market. Some workers have 
certain skill levels and demographic characteristics (e.g. being close to retirement or 
having lack of employment experience), which encourages individuals to leave the 
labour market entirely with their incomes becoming dependent on social welfare or, if 
able to re-enter employment, they suffer in terms of the quality of employment (Pinch 
and Mason 1991; Shuttleworth et al. 2005; Cook et al. 2013). The market-led labour 
market policy instils a ‘cut-throat’ attitude to labour reinsertion with many traditional 
industrial skills seen as inferior to service-based skills based on formal qualifications, 
reflecting the changes in sectoral demand and technology (Green et al. 1999; Green 
2003:309). This problem goes further as many workers that were employed in 
traditional industries have a stigma attached to them, creating more barriers to 
employment as job specifications continue to diverge from traditional manufacturing 
skills (Tomaney et al. 1999; Green 2003; Bailey et al. 2008). This can result in long-
term degradation of local communities and lead to unemployment among several 






the demographic of workers is much older, and therefore more susceptible to rises in 
younger workers with skills and qualifications that are more reflective of changing 
consumer wants, increasing their likelihood of prolonged unemployment (Green 
2003). Retraining while in employment is vital to ensure that a workforce has the 
capability to engage in the external flexible environment and have the skills that 
appeal to employers. The limitation of state intervention depends upon the level of 
warning of potential closure; the nature and circumstance of that closure must be 
assessed within that specific context. 
 
3.2.4 The GPE of West Midlands Framing Future Policy Response and 
Worker Experiences and Trajectories 
The GPE theory (Pike 2005) brings to the fore the local and regional social agents, 
recognising the political identity of the region in relation to plant closure.25 The way 
actors or institutions respond when important critical opportunities or ‘moments’ over 
the long term present themselves shows how successful the prevention (or damage 
control) of closures can be (Pike 2005; Mackinnon et al. 2009; Bentley et al. 2010). 
The West Midlands region seems heavily reliant on large central institutions 
combined with labour union movements that maintain a central core of employment 
and local solidarity typical of OIRs (Hall 2013; Bentley et al. 2010).26 In the case of 
the West Midlands, the creation of the MG Rover Taskforce was a clear-cut example 
of industrial policy invoking rapid multilateral mobilisation of political and economic 
actors to counter and stabilise the shock of the plant closure on the local economy 
(Bailey 2003; Hall 2013). The MG Rover Taskforce rallied local bodies and actors 
(such as RDAs, job services, supply management, local enterprises) to gain public 
and national recognition for the emerging crisis, thus gathering significant political 
and financial support for restructuring (Bailey et al. 2008). The political and financial 
support came at a cost, however, due to its multi-organisational structure and the 
strong political influence from the central government; this limited the long-term 
outcomes of the MG Rover Taskforce (Hall 2013; Bailey et al. 2014). The funding of 
the taskforce was distributed unevenly throughout the different tiers of government 
                                                          
25 By political identity, this includes cultural and historical references to the region. 
26 OIR: Old Industrial Region; examples in the UK would be regional economies that used to have heavy 








as the more local and third-sector agencies lacked the political capacity to contribute 
fully towards the taskforces aims (Hall 2013). This meant that the taskforce’s goals 
were short-term and neglected to nurture any local and longer-term initiatives. As the 
GPE nature of English regions changes, how future taskforces interact with local 
agencies will also change, reflecting the political, economic and social capacity of 
regional, sub-regional and local actors or institutions.  
When considering the GPE of a region, the organisation’s structure and ownership 
within that region make a significant contribution to that region’s political outlook and 
future economic direction (Bernard and Jenson 2007). The BMW takeover of MG 
Rover in 1994 was a critical and negative moment, as commented by observers 
(Bailey 2003; Donnelly et al. 2012). The organisational structure and routine of MG 
Rover was not compatible with BMW, and the goals of BMW within the auto-market 
did not effectively involve expanding MG Rover in the long term. Effective market 
restructuring therefore failed to materialise (Bailey 2003; AR online;27 Donnelly et al. 
2012). The MG Rover problem had never really been resolved by the time the 
Phoenix Four investment group took over in 2000 (however, it can be argued that 
this was never the long-term intention of the equity company); this again was a 
critical moment in the firm’s path (Bailey et al. 2010; Hall 2013). Indeed the possible 
closures of Jaguar during the financial crisis and the actual closure of LDV can also 
be seen as mismanagement by the foreign multinational company involved or the 
inability to reform to production processes emerging within the automotive industry 
(Bailey et al. 2008).28 What needs to be recognised is the role the firm plays within 
the overall production network (whether it be domestically or foreign owned); should 
the firm structure seem weak, this will ultimately lead to plant closure or restructuring 
(Bernard and Jenson 2007; Simpson 2012; Gomez-Plana and Latorre 2014). 
What GPE can lay bare is the potential vulnerability of a region’s development, as 
the choices made throughout the long term by the various actors or institutions 
(whether political or economic) can solidify the path dependency ‘lock-in’ of the 
region within limited industrial sectors (Martin and Sunley 2006; Glucker 2007; 
Mackinnon et al. 2009; Cook et al. 2013; Hall 2013). The inability to utilise key 
‘moments’ to break path dependency and recognise chances for new development is 
                                                          
27 http://www.aronline.co.uk/index.htm?whydbbrf.htm accessed 08.06.2011, article last modified 23.05.2011. 
28 At the time of writing, Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) was undergoing financial difficulties and looked to be on the 






the sign of a ‘failing’ GPE, thus setting in a long-term development trajectory that will 
inevitably involve plant closures of some form (Mackinnon et al. 2009; Hall 2013). 
Conversely, those regions that utilise regional institutions, innovative government 
bodies, and/or maintain a dynamic workforce to foster strong sustainable 
development are examples of ‘strong or successful’ GPE. Examples of this are 
regions such as the south east and London (in a UK perspective); they are able to 
preserve economic dominance and growth, despite the economic recession and the 
repercussions on the financial sector. 
Being able to understand these theories and processes and then apply them to 
regions suffering from plant closure remains highly important for the research in this 
thesis. The context of the LDV closure has its foundations within the GPE of the 
West Midlands. The region had the financial and political backing to ensure that the 
institutions involved in forming the taskforces were successful and was able to 
absorb the redundant workforce into the labour market, albeit at the cost of reduced 
income levels and the need to retrain workers. However, the political, economic and 
labour market contexts of the region were to change by 2010, conditioning the type 
of response that could be made by taskforces in regards to LDV. This would directly 
affect the post-closure experience and trajectories of the LDV workers; it is through 
the GPE ‘lens’ that the ‘LDV plant closure moment’ will be researched within this 
thesis, using GPE to form the basis of understanding when evaluating the policy 
response to the LDV closure, the actions of the LDV Taskforce and the subsequent 
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4.1 The Impacts of and Reactions to Economic Shocks 
of Plant Closure 
The previous chapter discussed relevant economic theories and their relation to 
plant closures, highlighting how given the tenants of the GPE and EEG theories the 
unique nature of each plant closure brings with it limitations and opportunities for 
policy response. However, what also must be taken into account are the varying 
degrees of impact that a plant closure has; depending on the type, scale and location 
of the closure, the economic shock will be different. This chapter will outline the 
varying degrees of economic shock brought about by plant closure and how this 
relates to the local or regional context. This part of the literature review will achieve 
this through explaining what economic shocks are and how they impact the people, 
place or economy in the context of the closure that took place. This chapter focuses 
on regional governance and economic development policy with the aim of ‘bridging 
the gap’ between the processes occurring within the automotive industry and the 
‘real-life’ implications on regional economies and local communities, building towards 
the aims of the thesis by discussing the topic of impacts on the workforce and 
examples of policy responses to previous automotive plant closures. 
 
4.1.1 Defining the Impacts and Economic Shocks of Plant Closures 
The level and severity of economic shock depends on the context of the plant 
closure. This is due to a combination of factors such as the size of the closure, the 
significance of the contribution to the regional economy made by the firm, 
demographic and geographic factors of the workforce in relation to the production 
plant, as well as the condition of the regional and national economies, the historical 
ties the plant had with the development of that region, and the condition of the labour 
market at the time of closure (Cook et al. 2013). 
An example of an economic shock is significant job losses through either closure or 
rationalisation of large commercial organisations or access to cheaper production 
networks (Simpson 2012; Cook et al. 2013). This can result from market forces, or 
be due to a strategic framework that the organisation has adopted, or even from 






public unrest or industrial strikes (Cook et al. 2013). Using this framework, it can be 
seen that the West Midlands region from 2000 onwards experienced a variety of 
themes in plant closures with shocks stemming from a range of causes or reasons 
(see Table 4.1). The first instance was the downscaling of production of MG Rover at 
Longbridge. In 2000, BMW, the then owner, decided to sell MG Rover to the private 
equity firm The Phoenix Consortium (Bailey et al. 2010). The primary reason for this 
was that MG Rover continued to make unsustainable losses, forcing BMW’s hand. 
Indeed, BMW were so desperate to shed the burden that the sale of MG Rover was 
made for the token sum of £10. However, the takeover would only delay the closure 
of the plant as later in 2005 MG Rover would cease production permanently at the 
Longbridge site. By this time, the plant had dwindled down to 6,000 employees but 
this still represented a significant number of redundancies for the West Midlands 
region. Bailey (2007) and Bentley (2007) show how further restructuring in the 
automotive industries led to further closures.  
The decision taken by Peugeot to close the Ryton assembly plant in Coventry was 
an example of ceasing production in favour of cheaper costs within Slovakia. Bailey 
(2007) explains the importance of automotive employment to the region as it 
accounted for 5% of employment and regional GDP leading up to 2000. The West 
Midlands automotive sector also provides the central hub for other automotive 
clusters and suppliers for neighbouring regions (Bailey 2007). In addition to the 
immediate shocks of the closure, more long-lasting implications can be felt 
throughout other connected supply networks. From this, it can be seen how the 
shock of closure can be exaggerated according to the level of dependency a region 
has on that particular industrial sector (Cook et al. 2013).29 
In the report by Cook et al. (2013), the authors discussed the main types of shock: 
business closure and rationalisation; regional lock-ins; and disasters/events. They 
also show how the shocks of closure have three separate definitive implications: for 
business, place and people. For Cook et al. (2013), business closure or 
rationalisation is typically driven by the need to cut costs to maintain 
competitiveness, which is the case with LDV and other plant closures covered within 
                                                          
29 A prime example of this type of industrial dependency was also experienced by Detroit. The city’s economy 
was heavily reliant on the success of the US automotive sector. The fluctuations of the automotive industry have 
direct consequences on Detroit’s economy. It is important for regional developers to diversify the region’s 







this literature review. This view encompasses the GPE approach (Pike 2005) in that 
it argues that there are key ‘moments’ and ‘events’ before the closure itself that allow 
for intervention of actors and allow opportunities to mitigate or alter the outcome of 
the overall implications of shock from closure. 
Table 4-1: Causes of Automotive Closure 
Listing a number of sources from which automotive plant closures can occur. Source: Adapted from 
Cook et al. 2013. 
Understanding how the source of the shock, the context and timing and the degrees 
of implication of the shock (business, place, people) all interplay should define the 
framework for the approach to be taken by the regional/local institutions (Cook et al. 
2013). Cook et al. (2013) continues this approach by defining the implications of 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright.This item has been removed 
due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be found in the 






shocks in terms of three distinct categories: business shocks and the effects the 
shock has on businesses and supply chains; people, and how the shocks affect the 
employment and lifestyles of those affected; and place-related, i.e. the overall effect 
on the local/regional economy and the more specific effects associated with that 
location (Cook et al. 2013). Understanding the type of shock and its implications is 
vital to ascertain the level of intervention needed from the government to mitigate the 
overall implications of such shocks and instigate new opportunities for growth and 
recovery. 
 
4.1.2 The Implications of the Shock for the Workforce 
The level of shock upon the workforce can have severe ramifications at an individual 
level. The personal shock to an employee’s well-being can be drastic as people 
come to terms with losing their jobs, particularly in manufacturing given that many 
workers have maintained the same job position/career for decades. The sudden end 
of steady income often causes financial instability for the individual, particularly in the 
long term (Weller 2012). Some redundancies are partnered with substantial 
redundancy payments; however, this is dependent on the condition of the firm and 
on the career position of the individual (usually higher wage earners are likely to 
receive higher payments). The irony behind this is that those employees with higher 
skills and redundancy packages typically have higher job mobility and a greater 
likelihood of finding new employment. Those that lose out the most tend be workers 
of lower technical skill ranges or skills that are too specific in respect of the firm and 
the related processes and job role (Weller 2012: 11). This in effect creates a 
polarisation of the workforce, isolating the less capable and adaptable individuals 
from new job opportunities. If the plant in question closed due to bankruptcy or 
insolvency then the redundancy payments are likely to be low or even nothing at all, 
leaving further financial problems for workers. Should the workers then find it difficult 
to gain new employment, then this obviously incurs further long-term financial 
instability. Addressing these two primary issues with regard to redundancy are 
pressing concerns for policymakers. There are other factors to consider when 
formulating policy to tackle the implications of shock on the workforce: the geography 






The role of geography has a significant influence on the level of shock experienced 
by the workforce and the wider region. The highly localised aspect of plant closure 
and the workforce demographic – particularly with regard to a higher percentage of 
low-skilled workers – makes the implications of closure so much more severe 
(Tomaney et al. 1999). Many manufacturing firms in OIRs are typically staffed with 
older, lower skilled workers that are more geographically concentrated and have 
lower commuting ability (Tomaney et al. 1999; Green 2003). This can lead to a form 
of polarisation with the more skilled workers having greater freedom of employment 
opportunities, leaving a concentration of an ageing workforce with outdated skills and 
knowledge leaving the labour market (Green 2003:318). Polarisation of labour also 
takes a gender bias with secondary industry restructuring affecting men primarily 
with more service-oriented employment opportunities being taken by women (Green 
and Collis 2006). The concentration of unemployment within a smaller geographical 
area has significant negative effects for the local economy and further implications 
for businesses. This creates a continuing cycle that further decreases job 
opportunities as the influx of unemployed people increases competition within a 
potentially highly volatile job market. Therefore, when considering the impacts of 
plant closure upon the related workforce, more insight should be taken into the 
localisation of social and geographical facets concerning the closure, with policy 
establishing more direct physical contact between the job search services and the 
affected workers30 (Tomaney et al. 1999; Shuttleworth et al. 2005; Bailey et al. 2008; 
Hall 2013).  
The demographic nature of the workforce exacerbates the problems of closure, 
especially when linked to the features of re-employability within the local labour 
market (Danson 2004; Shuttleworth et al. 2005; Cook et al. 2013). Again the MG 
Rover closure (likewise with LDV) provides a useful example of a workforce with a 
difficult demographic situation. The workforce consisted mainly of male labour 
around the 40s and 50s age group, the majority of them married, with relatively low 
or non-transferable qualifications and having a long employment history with MG 
Rover (Bailey et al. 2008). These features implant a strong sense of locality among 
                                                          
30 This term covers job search services by local government and private agencies. This ranges from clear 
information about financial aid and benefits payments available to the workers, to initiating direct 
communication between local employers and redundant workers; this is to immediately alert redundant workers 
to new job vacancies. Furthermore, it is important to include job training and skills development that recently 






the workers due to their social ties within the area, demonstrated through the 
concentration of workers (Cook et al. 2013). The density of the MG Rover workforce 
in certain areas was very high with the vast majority of the workforce located within a 
few local communities, with around 22% living in south Birmingham (Bailey et al. 
2008). These areas had also suffered greatly from previous redundancies, creating 
significant incapacity to adjust to job losses and economic shocks (Chapain and 
Murie 2008). Furthermore, the age and career history of the workers placed a great 
‘local’ reliance upon the MG Rover plant in terms of job security and prosperity. The 
collapse left many households with significantly reduced incomes (by an average of 
£5,610 in real terms by 2009) (Bailey et al, 2008). In addition to the much reduced 
salaries, such workers often suffered from underemployment problems due to the 
employment barriers that they experienced (Shuttleworth et al. 2005; Bailey et al. 
2008). This stems from a reluctance of employers to take on older workers as the 
costs of training are at higher risk.31 What can also be attributed to older workers is 
that their unawareness and lack of knowledge of the current labour market can put 
them at odds with the demands of employers. The associated stress of job transition 
and adapting to their current situation can bring further health implications that must 
be considered in any future policy in regards to this type of demographic 
(Shuttleworth et al. 2005; Bailey et al. 2008). 
The impact on the workforce can also be measured by how prepared the redundant 
workers are when engaging with and meeting the demands of job searching. More 
precisely, this refers to labour flexibility and individuals’ ability to meet the demands 
of modern employers or transfer to new industries (Weller 2012). The demands 
present in the modern flexible labour market encourage workers to be more multi-
skilled, and diverse in their range of skills so that they can be adaptable to 
employers’ needs (especially employers within the service industry). This includes 
proficiency with ICT skills, as well as good communication and customer service 
skills. For workers that have been on the production line for many years, many will 
be unlikely to have developed such skills and thus are likely to be less prepared to 
apply for common job opportunities where such skills are needed. Additionally, 
access to in-work training is often restricted for non-manual positions, further 
hampering employability amongst select groups of the workforce (Green 2003). 
                                                          
31 This is due to a number of reasons: proximity to retirement, increased likelihood of illness and increased 






The ability of redundant workers to move into new employment was also severely 
hindered by the onset of the financial crisis of 2008 (Bailey and Chaplain 2009; Oct 
2009 West Midlands Report; Jenkins and Leaker 2010). This was due to companies 
rationalising their finances in combination with banks being more restrictive on their 
loan policies, resulting in shrinking employment opportunities and increasing 
competition within the labour market. The West Midlands region’s employment rate 
was 70.3% of the working age population and employment fell by 55,000 in this 
period April 2008 (House of Commons West Midlands Regional Committee 2009). It 
can be seen that the financial crisis had a great economic impact upon the West 
Midlands region, placing a greater restriction on the ability of the LDV Taskforce to 
support the redundant workers to readjust. 
 
 
4.1.3 Shock to the Regional Economy 
The automotive industry was one of the core drivers of the West Midlands economy, 
providing demand within the market for local suppliers in addition to creating job 
growth (Bailey 2007; Bentley 2007; Bailey et al. 2008; Cook et al. 2013). The 
vacuum of job and market demand left behind by the closure had a constricting 
effect on the region’s ability to stimulate recovery; the massive influx of labour in to 
the market placed a great strain on job demand within the local area (Chapain and 
Murie 2008). This raises issues of the employability of labour, the boundaries of the 
local labour market and the responsibility of the state to provide welfare payments. 
Furthermore, the closure also meant the polarisation of labour; those of managerial 
and professional status have greater opportunities than the majority of workers 
(Green 2003; Bailey et al. 2008). Polarisation is also spatially linked; higher-skilled 
labour is more dispersed than lower-skilled labour, and created a sub-regional 
dimension to polarisation and impacts of closure (Chapain and Murie 2008; Cook et 
al. 2013). The new jobs created in the wake of any closure are likely to be of lower 
job quality and pay in comparison to the manufacturing jobs previously held, 
reducing future economic stimulation and growth (Bailey et al. 2008). 
This analysis reveals the economic and social problems related to economic 
restructuring from plant closure for a region like the West Midlands - a region that still 






The MG Rover case displays a good reactive policy by local governments and the 
taskforces (MG Rover Taskforce 2000 and 2006). They were successful in limiting 
the damage to the regional economy (via aiding the supply chain firms in the cluster, 
training schemes), thus establishing a framework or ‘institutional memory’ for future 
plant closure recovery (Bailey et al. 2008; Cook et al. 2013). 
The study of LDV will explore these factors further. The question arises: Has the 
institutional memory of the MG Rover closure been embedded into post-closure 
recovery policies for LDV? Do employability and policies concerning the LDV 
workforce consider the importance of local, social and geographical aspects? This 
thesis examines the importance placed on demographic characteristics in relation to 
job recovery ability and whether it was a high priority. 
 
4.2 Taskforce Responses during Regional Governance 
Transition 
Under the Labour governments of 1997-2010, the key act in regionalism in England 
was the establishment of regional development agencies (RDAs) to steer regions to 
become more competitive, stimulate innovation within developing sectors and 
establish strategic partnerships, as Fuller et al. (2002: 423) state, to ‘improve their 
institutional capacity and counter their economic deficit’. This shift did not bring 
political devolution or any form of federalism; however, it did give the regional 
agencies some economic freedoms to attract new forms of growth, direct investment 
and drive policy initiatives. 
 
4.2.1 Striving to Make Regions More Resilient 
The Labour government in 1997 was elected on the back of its emphasis on 
decentralisation (to a limited degree) to create regional economic localities or spatial 
units. This was in line with a stronger focus on spatial policy to address the economic 
and social problems brought about by deindustrialisation. The aim of this 
decentralisation was to secure development in all regions and reduce disparities 






The main positive attribute the RDAs brought to regional and local governance was 
their guidance on how to direct investment and funding towards economic strategies 
and policies (Fuller et al. 2002; Mawson 2009; Bentley et al. 2010). Over the ten 
years from their creation, the RDAs had arguably developed an institutional 
knowledge of implementing and directing economic development policies to 
continually strengthen, so as to diversify and increase resilience within regional 
economies (Simmie and Martin 2010). The West Midlands region is an example of 
this, namely through the actions of Advantage West Midlands (AWM: RDA) in 
response to the automotive industry restructuring and plant closure. With the onset 
of plant closures (e.g. MG Rover and LDV), AWM attempted to help adapt the region 
through taskforce strategies (and to increase resilience towards the closures 
experienced in the West Midlands). 
The period 2000-08 epitomised the continuing decline of the automotive industry 
within the region and drew a response from the government (Donnelly et al. 2012). 
An over-valued exchange rate, the continuing rise of South Korean and Japanese 
firms from the 1980s to 1990s, combined with the emergence of the Eastern 
European and BRIC economies, created robust competition against UK auto-
manufacturing (Womack et al. 1990; Berkeley et al. 2005). The stresses and strains 
of this intense external competition combined with changing consumer expectations 
and higher technological improvements placed rigorous demands on the production 
capacity of these firms and this manifested with the beginning of the end of MG 
Rover (Berkeley et al. 2005). The magnitude of this closure upon the regional 
economy was too much to be ignored, leading to the creation of the Rover Taskforce 
to mitigate the impacts of the shut-down. This instigated a sort of ‘taskforce trend’ 
within the region as the automotive industry continued to decline, in which further 
taskforces would be called upon. 
The RDAs had substantial experience dealing efficiently with plant closures, enabling 
the immediate locality to recover quickly. As stated, AWM was a prime example of 
this capability in the prelude and aftermath to the closures of MG Rover 2001 and 
2005, the Jaguar plant in Coventry in 2005, Peugeot near Coventry in 2006 and LDV 
in Birmingham in 2009, assisting with diversifying the automotive industry and putting 
in place the groundwork for the redundant labour force to be able to adapt (Bailey 






The Rover Taskforce of 2000 set in place regional policies, regional frameworks and 
networks that enabled the Rover Taskforce to react quickly to threat of the 
Longbridge closure. The Rover Taskforce led the initiatives to attract new investors 
to preserve the 24,000 jobs associated with Longbridge at that time. Although MG 
Rover lost some key assets and product brands, the Rover Taskforce was able to 
mediate the transfer of the company over to the Phoenix Consortium equity firm in 
May 2000. The negotiations of the Phoenix Consortium takeover did entail scaling 
back production at the Longbridge site, which resulted in 2,500 job losses (Bailey 
2003). Taking into consideration the magnitude of the entirety of MG Rover 
collapsing at this time and the impact on the regional economy, the Rover Taskforce 
was successful at diverting disaster. It demonstrated the potential of RDAs taking the 
lead in such events, a form of ‘bureaucracy management’, amalgamating several 
agencies together to synergise their strengths and their capacity at initiating 
successful economic strategy and policy to spur on future regional economic growth 
(Pike 2002). However, this came at the cost of MG Rover being subject to the private 
equity business model, which would see the long-term production capacity and 
assets of Longbridge put at risk for financial portfolio development for investor 
stakeholders (Bailey et al. 2010).  
The taskforce approach further reinforced the reactive approach taken by the central 
government by relegating the fate of Longbridge to private equity. Through these 
actions, Phoenix Consortium MG Rover had been saved, but only just, and was now 
subject to various asset-stripping measures and transfers made through various 
‘financial engineering mechanisms’. The Phoenix Consortium did not address the 
production capacity issues but in effect developed the ‘investor portfolio and value’, 
essentially leaving the Longbridge site to its fate (Bailey et al. 2010:17). When MG 
Rover was placed in administration in 2005, responsibility fell upon the RDAs to 
respond (Pike 2002). The ability of the RDAs to progressively develop regional 
policies depends on the economic and political context of the situation at hand, 
typically at its most prominent during economic or political crises and the role of 
taskforces in being able to react to plant closures. What was shown in the MG Rover 
Taskforce of 2000 is that finding a resolution can fail to address potential long-term 






burden of the public purse in the short term but only lead to more action being 
required at a later point, hence the MG Rover Taskforce of 2005.  
The main long-term implication of the Rover Taskforce was the recognition of the 
reliance of the supplier networks of the region and the desperate need to diversify 
and modernise. This prompted more sophisticated local funding programmes such 
as Accelerate, tasked with attracting additional funds from outside of the UK utilising 
EU grants. This initiated additional diversification programmes to promote the supply 
chain and utilise other opportunities within other sectors by providing support through 
financial aid and professional consultation (Bailey 2003: 75). This began the regional 
understanding and awareness of the vulnerability of the West Midlands automotive 
sector that started thinking on wider regional policies towards cluster generation and 
development. This was in combination with efforts at encouraging skills and product 
diversification among the supply chains and SMEs. These policy actions were aimed 
towards increasing the adaptability and resilience of the West Midlands region, 
reducing dependency on a select few industries or sectors (Dawley et al. 2010; Pike 
et al. 2010). 
Despite the success of the Rover Taskforce, continuing financial losses in the 
following years made the company unsustainable and just five years later MG Rover 
faced administration. It represented the largest corporate closure since the decline of 
the steel industries in 1980 (Bentley 2007; Bailey et al. 2008; Bailey et al. 2014; 
Chapain and Murie 2008). Furthermore, the combination of media attention 
surrounding the closure and the forthcoming national elections demanded a 
significant response from the government, enabling significant resources to be 
dedicated to readjusting the labour force (Bentley 2008). To this end, £150m from 
the national government and £68m from EU funding was injected into the MG Rover 
Taskforce Mk II (Cowling and Isles 2005). 
The second Rover Taskforce, which was set up in 2005, had exactly the same 
structure and approach as its predecessor, with AWM taking the lead over a board of 
local agencies.32 Though some attempts were made to find new owners, ‘the writing 
had been on the wall’ for some time and there was recognition that this time Rover 
                                                          
32 The LDV Taskforce consisted of Jobcentre Plus, Birmingham City Council, a joint employment investment 
co-coordinator (apart of BCC), Learning Skills Agency, Accelerate, Department of Work and Pensions and 






was ceasing for good. The Rover Taskforce then placed a stronger focus towards 
the recovery of the local area via directly engaging with the workers and suppliers of 
MG Rover (Chapain and Murie 2008; Bentley et al. 2010). In this respect, the MG 
Rover Taskforce was successful in engaging with workers to diversify their skill sets 
to remain competitive within the labour market and ease their transition back into 
work. 
The West Midlands region continued to suffer further setbacks with the 
announcement of the Peugeot and Jaguar closures (both plants located in Coventry) 
in 2006 with a further loss of 2,300 and 2,200 jobs respectively (Bentley 2007; 
Chapain and Murie 2008). These closures were smaller than in the case of MG 
Rover and attracted less media attention but, nonetheless, continued the declining 
trend of the automotive industry in the region and the continuing need to support 
redundant workers and suppliers within these sectors (Donnelly et al. 2012). 
To counter this industrial decline and respond to the financial crisis, a regional 
taskforce was set up in 2008, again headed by AWM; the aim was to devise policy to 
stimulate the economy through subsides to certain sectors to encourage further 
inward investment and job creation (House of Commons Regional Committee 2009). 
The taskforce adopted a similar pattern to the Rover Taskforce by setting up a 
support help-line for businesses and individuals affected by the various closures. 
Substantial funding was made available to offer loans for SMEs that were unable to 
access funds through normal financial services. Finally, offering practical support to 
businesses in severe distress, this regional taskforce headed and assisted with 
several training programmes and subsidies for businesses within the region. The 
taskforce also gave the regional government a stronger representation when 
opposing or voicing opinions in regard to national government policies or strategies. 
One major improvement made on the approach taken by the MG Rover Taskforce 
was more direct communication between the regional bodies both within and outside 
the taskforce. 
Overall, the taskforces within the 2000-08 period were more capable at dealing with 
redundancies. They had more financial resources at their disposal to enact the 
necessary policies and the incentives to aid the economy sufficiently to allow 
affected workers and businesses to readjust to the new economic situation. In 






strong focused leadership and political backing to mitigate the economic crisis. With 
stable regional institutions in place, regional governance was able to develop the 
right localised leadership when the economic conditions demanded it (Beer and 
Clower 2013). While operating at a regional level, the taskforces displayed a wide 
capacity to stimulate the regional economy and to diversify and adapt to new 
emerging sectors to reduce their dependency on the automotive industry and begin 
to show the true facets of achieving regional resilience (Dawley et al. 2010). 
 
4.2.2 The LDV Taskforce: In an Era of Sub-National Political Transition 
The Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government formed after the 2010 
election brought about a shift from regional-level governance towards a more local, 
sub-regional layer of governance through the creation of Local Enterprise 
Partnerships (LEPs). It was deemed that localism through the embodiment of the 
LEP system would better address the needs of lagging economic areas, providing 
more capable ‘regional’ governance considering the economic pressures brought 
about by the financial crisis and the recession. The LDV closure holds a unique 
position with regard to this shift in regional government. The closure of 2009 took 
place under the remit of the RDA structure but the ongoing longer-term actions that 
would usually follow taskforce programmes or policies would fall under the auspices 
of the LEP structure. 
The Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition’s main priority when entering 
government in 2010 was to cut the public debt and deficit, with every source of public 
spending coming under heavy scrutiny. The RDAs had significant amounts of 
funding with no direct political accountability; this gave the Conservative–Lib Dem 
coalition the ‘political ammunition’ to overhaul the RDA institutions in England.33 To 
replace the nine RDAs, some thirty-nine LEPs were set up in a complex sub-regional 
structure that combines local authorities and business leaders to drive investment 
towards rebalancing the English economy and attending to local economic needs 
(Henderson 2013). As will be discussed in further detail below, the ability of the LEPs 
to meet these ambitious targets would be hindered by the constraints placed upon 
                                                          
33 The RDA system was a New Labour ‘project’ and so went directly against the Conservative ideal. This also 







them primarily due to their complex geographical political nature and the competition 
for limited funds. 
The LEPs are constituted from a voluntary partnership between local authorities and 
businesses to drive and stimulate economic growth within their area in addition to 
shifting power to local communities, attracting investment and Iocal-focused 
investment (Bentley et al. 2010; Pugalis 2011: 8-9). The emphasis on the local 
aspects of the LEPs represented a shift in policy-thinking towards place-based 
strategies with any recovery policy strategies to be incorporated within the functional 
economic boundaries established within the LEPs. Within a theoretical basis, these 
place-based approaches were defined through the development of local assets and 
networks – development that corresponds with agglomeration economics with 
context-specific planning with ‘relational geographies as a means to informing scales 
of cooperation of policy development and governance’ (Pugalis and Bentley 
2014:562-3). The LEPs’ ability to support existing industries to stimulate further 
enterprise has been criticised by several contributors claiming that the LEP structure 
was/is too fractured, combined with a central controlled bidding process that 
promotes a ‘race for resources’ between authorities. The capabilities of individual 
LEPs was viewed as being too haphazard and leading to further centralisation of 
economic decision-making. Hildreth and Bailey (2014:242) reinforce these points 
and stipulate that the LEPs are contradictory in the application of these principles, 
primarily based on the fact of how LEPs define ‘functional economic areas’ and how 
they relate to UK governance structures; for example, London remains the highest 
priority in terms of investment, infrastructure planning and devolved decision-making 
yet this eclipses the LEPs’ remit. Henderson (2013:4) lists several contradictions that 
represent concerns about LEPs and their ability to conduct economic development 
policy successfully on a regional and sub-regional level. Firstly, the reduction in 
financial capacity: RDAs had an annual budget of £1.9bn between 1999/2000 and 
2006/07, whereas LEPs have no direct financial support but instead compete for a 
£1.4bn regional development fund with any additional investment being based on 
their capability to draw on private funding. It is clear that LEPs cannot make the 
same level of investment in economic development. Secondly, the division of the 
LEPs represents a form of divide-and-rule scenario where tiers exist between the 






funding outside of the centralised bidding process, the central government holds the 
‘bargaining power’. Thirdly, the fragmented nature of LEPs potentially incites 
confrontation over conflicting interests of business and civic leaders. Fourthly, the 
geographic and political fragmentation limits the available resources and assets, 
further reducing strategic planning. This potentially creates a sense of competition, 
with LEPs striving to out-do each other rather than cooperate in relation to the 
resources available (Henderson 2013). 
The RDAs provided scope for a more holistic perspective from which resources 
could be better directed from a more spatial and temporal strategic standpoint. The 
RDAs also had the international recognition for being regional governmental bodies. 
Furthermore, in relation to international funding, the LEP structure is also at odds in 
regards to EU regional structural funding, given that they are not regional scale 
bodies, resulting in further limitations to potential funding (Pugalis and Fisher 2011). 
LEPs will find themselves overburdened with the task of bidding for internal funds in 
addition to meeting international criteria for funds (Pugalis and Bentley 2013). This 
means that the success of LEPs is dependent on particular space-specific 
characteristics, for example existing businesses and associated networks or capable 
political and business leaders that can foster enterprise and investment (Mackinnon 
et al. 2009). Ultimately, this will lead to varying degrees of success among LEPs. 
Some LEPs will have the capacity to function in conjunction with neighbours, and 
through the synergy of their businesses be capable of attracting the right investment 
to stimulate growth. In contrast, some LEPs will simply fail, as they are unable to 
compete for state funding or attract the necessary private investment.  
The change in the political landscape was to have further implications for the LDV 
Taskforce. As mentioned in the previous section, AWM was the lead on several 
region-wide regeneration projects. The abolition of RDAs like AWM in favour of LEPs 
shifted the funding and capabilities of the LDV Taskforce, reducing wider regional 
initiatives and shifting the emphasis onto smaller local scale schemes (Bailey and 
Chapain 2009). The removal of the RDA also restricted the ability and resources of 
local agencies to continue projects already in progress – some projects depended on 
EU funding – and under the LEPs’ regime this funding aspect was under dispute 
(Pugalis and Fisher 2011). In addition, the Conservative government enacted further 






agencies, primarily through the reduction of available funding or the competence of 
their members. 
The skills and experience gained by the RDAs since their inception in 1999 has been 
dissipated. Over ten years, RDAs developed substantial experience in dealing with 
large-scale redundancies, specifically where to allocate resources to develop training 
schemes and aid packages to stimulate growth (Pugalis and Bentley 2014). The 
LEPs have had to start afresh given this loss of skills and experience. The RDAs had 
‘critical mass’ in terms of financial power, that could be drawn on to deal with a 
particular situation. In regards to the LEPs, this financial power is severely limited in 
terms of the overall funding available (Pugalis and Bentley 2014); additionally, LEPs 
have lost the ‘critical mass’ in directing funding, with the funds being distributed 
among the much smaller individual LEPs. As a consequence, the longevity of any 
policies put in place by the LDV Taskforce (including previous taskforces) will likely 
disappear.  
 
4.3 Chapter Summary – The Importance of the 
Economic and Institutional Context in Framing Plant 
Closure Response 
This chapter has discussed how previous taskforces had substantial government 
funding and regional guidance and leadership in place when engaging with the 
redundant workforce. The main difference when discussing the LDV Taskforce in 
comparison to previous taskforces was the limitations in ability and scope of the LDV 
Taskforce to enact policies and mitigate the impact of the closure upon the 
redundant workers. This limitation was directly attributed to the ongoing changing 
economic and political situation in which the LDV closure took place. 
The period from 2006-08 represented a major labour readjustment period for the 
West Midlands region following the automotive plant closures. Within that period, 
extensive funding was invested into relieving the respective job losses and driving 
employment through other sectors. The ability to sustain such large amounts of 
investment into future taskforce initiatives to enact successful labour readjustment 






in large industries (e.g. the automotive industry), this restricts ‘genuine’ new 
employment opportunities that utilise industrial skills and promote better job 
opportunities. This, in combination with limited financial resources, limits 
opportunities to overcome ‘demographic and skill barriers’ typical of the 
manufacturing workers when seeking new employment. Furthermore, structural 
changes to regional governance, namely through the introduction of LEPs, would 
further curtail taskforces’ approach and capability in promoting more far-reaching 
labour market-adjustment policies. 
Disbanding RDAs in favour of LEPs has been portrayed in much of the academic 
discussion as a financial and political centralisation restructuring rather than an 
improvement or continuation of the regionalism movement (Bentley et al. 2010; 
Pugalis 2010; Henderson 2013). As actions by the LEPs are curtailed by a far 
reduced budget and are constrained by central government in carrying out 
redevelopment projects, central government has drastically reduced the amount of 
funding for regional areas. The political structure set in place via the LEPs has 
reduced the policy capacity of regions (now sub-regions), further impeding future 
capacity and capability to react to plant closures or larger-scale redundancies. 
The thesis now turns to the methodology chapter. The chapter describes how the 
data concerning the LDV Taskforce was gathered, the relevant policy stakeholders 
associated with the various agencies and the training policies implemented by the 
taskforce. The chapter also discusses how research was conducted concerning the 
LDV workers; this concerns gathering demographic data, qualifications and 
employment data. The methods also include the collection of the LDV workers’ 
employment paths post-closure of the LDV plant to gain a more qualitative insight 
















Chapter 5: Research 
Methodology: 








5.1 Research Methodology 
This research aims to assess the impact of the LDV closure on the workforce, to 
understand their post-closure adjustment and to incorporate the diverse range of 
contextual factors of the LDV closure to interpret the reasons for the closure and 
gain a more comprehensive understanding for outcomes of the LDV workers. In 
accordance with this, the research follows an inductive approach with an interpretive 
methodology, allowing the findings and interpretation to develop from the findings 
without having a pre-disposed theory or hypothesis to test against the research. The 
research is thus influenced by the theories developed within the literature review that 
shape the research design and process and recognise that whilst experiences of 
plant closures can inform future responses, the contextual factors behind every plant 
closure makes them unique to each other and not a directly replicable process. The 
research methods further the analysis on the LDV worker outcomes and adjustment, 
more specifically understanding the impacts of closure upon highly skilled workers 
and their route to re-employment. Much of the previous literature has covered 
research and discussion concerning the impacts of closure and the re-employability 
of low-skilled workers. Also, the discussion covered aspects of regional development 
that noted the importance of maintaining high skills to match the changing needs and 
demands of the economy. The empirical research contributes to this field through 
developing worker trajectories of the highly skilled workers of LDV to ascertain if they 
are subject to the same employment barriers or experience unique difficulties.  
To collect the principal data, the research utilised a primarily qualitative approach 
with regard to the primary data, with an emphasis on interviews with key 
stakeholders of the LDV closure with surveys and interviews with the LDV workers. 
The secondary research was also primarily qualitative, consisting of academic 
research through developing the theoretical aspects as presented within the 
literature review, in addition to academic and government reports concerning plant 
closures with economic data summaries to support to the empirical analysis 
representing the quantitative aspect. The remainder of the chapter evaluates the 
research design, data sampling methods and reasoning, data collection methods, 
data analysis and approaches used for the research, placing them in the overall 






conclusion will be met. The chapter will however first discuss in more detail the 
rationale of the research methodology and approach to achieving the research aims.   
The rationale for the research design is aligned to the primary aim of the thesis, 
which is to investigate the impact of the LDV closure upon the LDV workers and to 
investigate the actions of the LDV Taskforce in response to the closure. As noted 
above, understanding and incorporating the contextual factors of the closure remain 
paramount to the data collection and analysis of the highly skilled worker outcomes. 
The research process diagram (see below) is representative of the various theories 
and topics that interplay to inform and guide the research process. To further 
reinforce the rationale of the methodology, the chapter will revisit the research aims 
developed in Chapter 1: 
● To evaluate the policy response and action taken by the LDV 
Taskforce following plant closure given the geographical and political 
circumstances of the LDV closure and to create a comparative insight 
between past experiences and contemporary reactions of taskforces. 
● To investigate how to integrate the regional institutional and 
governance structures that provide appropriate coordination and 
leadership structures for aiding re-employment and labour market 
adjustment. 
● To understand the impacts and shock of closure upon the workforce, to 
analyse demographic and geographic factors, in association with skills 
levels, and how certain characteristics of the workforce relate to the 
level of ‘shock’ individuals experience when pursuing new employment. 
● To inform future labour market policy and governmental strategies to 
resolve the impacts of plant closure. 
The interpretivist paradigm promotes a qualitative approach to data collection which 
is broken into two distinct stages, firstly comprehensive interviews with members of 
the LDV Taskforce and other stakeholders, which is informed by the secondary 
research. This directly relates to the first and second objectives of the research 
policy action taken on behalf of the LDV Taskforce to understand what leadership 
structures best promote recovery policies. From the literature review and discussion 






regional leadership structure, this methodology aims to identify differences within the 
LDV Taskforce in conjunction with the GPE factors that constituted that particular 
outcome. The second stage involved empirical data related to the third objective, 
with surveys and further interviews with the LDV workers informed by the data 
collection from the LDV stakeholders. This means that any assumptions and 
conclusions that are made arise from the research process enshrining the LDV-
specific context of the closure. Collectively, the two stages of the research 
methodology in combination with the analysis of the data should address the final 
objective and advance policy guidance for future plant closures. 
In respect to the theoretical understanding, the methodology acts as a means of 
transition from the understanding and conceptualisation of plant closure, which is 
encapsulated within the literature review, which corresponds to the top sections of 
the research process diagram (point 1 and 2 – see Fig 5.1). Research by Bailey et 
al. (2010), Bentley (2007), Bentley et al. (2010), Danson (2005), Tomaney et al. 
(1999), and Shuttleworth (2004) – all of which have focused on economic 
restructuring, deindustrialisation, the after-effects of plant closure on the workforce 
and labour market policy concerning re-employment – have strong relevance to the 
research aims of this thesis and have featured heavily within the literature review. 
Some research, in particular Bailey et al. (2010) and Bentley et al. (2010), concern 
other automotive closures within the West Midlands, which have even more 
relevance to the LDV situation.34 Their research covers similar geographic and 
economic contexts and labour workforce characteristics to that of LDV, including 
significant research on the UK automotive industry and global processes. With their 
research having such a strong link to this thesis, it was important to recognise their 
methods and approaches in order to gain a better understanding of how the 
redundant workers were impacted by the LDV plant closure. Their research took a 
more qualitative approach, focusing on methods that directly involve engagement 
with worker experiences, and investigating the actions taken by various local actors 
(e.g. local government agencies and policymakers). 
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Figure 5-1: Research Process Framework  
The diagram shows the integration and relationships of the various GPE issues related to plant closure. The 
numbered boxes show the research process and the theoretical development towards greater understanding 
of the LDV plant closure and the impacts on the ex-workers. 
 
 
The studies mentioned above have taken place at the time of economic prosperity, 
when access to funding and opportunities within labour markets were more readily 
available. This research methodology recognises the value of this approach within 
an interpretivist paradigm in order to investigate the intricate variables associated 
with the ex-LDV workforce, the policy stakeholders of the LDV Taskforce, and the 
wider contextual factors that influenced the policy response. This research reviews 
the prospect for policy response to plant closure in a time of economic recession. 
During the years 2008-12, the UK economy dipped into recession, adversely 
affected by the fragile global economy, increasing the potential for further job losses 
in the immediate future. From 2012, the UK economy stabilised and achieved growth 
(albeit low); however, this growth has come at the cost of stagnant wages and the 
adoption of more short-term contracts, with varying implications for different 
industries having an impact on the types of job opportunities available. During the 
post-closure stages of LDV, the UK economy was at its weakest. The economic 
conditions augmented the barriers to employment that the LDV workers faced due to 
demographic factors and skills sets, which would have increased the future 
difficulties of the LDV workers finding new employment and the type and quality of 
employment associated with it. 
The change in government implemented new directives, which resulted in the 
reformation of certain institutions related to labour market policy implementation. For 
instance, agencies such as Jobcentre Plus (JCP) and the Learning Skills Agency 
(LSA) had a change of remit and available funding to provide services. These 
agencies in particular have a strong role in implementing labour market policy 
programmes and thus have influence over the employability of redundant workers. 
The primary research consisted of investigating how their role has changed and what 
they are able to accomplish with the resources available Researching these 
government agencies was done through face-to-face interviews, the gathering of 
policy documents and analysis of as well as investigation of how their direct 
interaction with the LDV workforce contributed towards the qualitative dataset. The 
secondary research will consist of qualitative and quantitative elements to evaluate 






effectiveness or limitations regarding LDV workforce re-employment (Armstrong et 
al. 2008; Bentley et al. 2009). 
The overall purpose of adopting the methodology in this way is to add a qualitative 
dimension of research into economic development policy and labour market policy 
concerning plant closure. The interpretivist methodology aims to demonstrate the 
multi-faceted circumstance of plant closure and job recovery, such as the type of job; 
permanent or temporary; part-time/full-time work; pay and job quality; and method of 
gaining employment. All of these factors contribute significantly to identify 
employment trajectories amongst the LDV workers that demonstrated the long-term 
success or job precariousness of their re-employment and experiences and to 
understand their role when constructing labour market policy, which is the main aim 
and original perspective of this research. 
 
5.2 Research Process and Methods 
The structure and design of the research process was created in a way that would 
help inform, develop and guide the creation of questions in the following stages of 
the research process and enhance the contextual understanding in accordance to 
the interpretative methodology. Each stage of the research will contribute towards 
the understanding of the closure event, the policy and stakeholder interaction and 
the workforce demographic. Building on previous research conducted within studies 
of plant closure, for example Shuttleworth et al. (2005) and Armstrong et al. (2008), 
the research for this thesis adopts a qualitative approach. The research aims to 
investigate what happened to two primary groups, the LDV workforce and policy 
stakeholders to ensure comprehensive coverage of the LDV case and context of the 
closure. The research process was broken down into two primary stages (see Figure 
5.1). Stage 1 is directed at interviewing the policy stakeholders,35 to firmly locate the 
research within the context of the LDV closure. This involved establishing contact 
with the various stakeholders, these broken down into three categories:  
                                                          
35 This refers to ex-LDV executives, who although not part of the taskforce’s policy-making process, brought 
great insight into LDV’s history and what it had planned for future projects. This again promotes the importance 
of the contextual nature of the closure as these individuals could testify whether LDV was doomed to failure due 






1. The first group consists of the media contacts and members of local media; 
this group represents the first point of contact with the policy stakeholders and 
due to their extensive contacts and knowledge of the local area, they act as a 
form of ‘gatekeeper’ to this stage of the research. The researcher thought that 
this group could help direct the research to other points of interest to aid it in 
establishing further contacts among other stakeholders.  
2. The second group is the taskforce; this is the largest group among the 
stakeholders and provided the ‘core’ in regards to the research on policy 
initiatives. First, the research begins with an interview with the Primary 
Leader.36 Similar to the media group, this stage acted a ‘gatekeeper’, 
providing an overarching view of the policy and processes of the LDV 
Taskforce and providing further contacts with individual agencies that formed 
the LDV Taskforce. This interview was crucial as it provided key topics that 
were discussed in later interviews.  
3. The stakeholder group is the LDV management; this provided information 
about LDV and investigated their opinion of the events that took place. This 
will provide unique insights into the operation of LDV prior to the closure and 
how they perceived the support from local government and actions by the 
taskforce. 
Within Stage 1, for example, certain ‘gatekeepers’ were interviewed first; these initial 
questions were based on the academic research on plant closure response with 
these interviews designed to be ‘explorative’, that is, these questions did not focus 
on specific aspects but covered a broader range of topics to invoke discussion with 
the interviewee and generate a wider perspective on the LDV closure and the events 
before and after closure. Indeed, these interviews were vital to gain a greater 
understanding in order to interpret the differing factors that interplay within plant 
closure. The combination of the data and information gathered within the initial 
interviews with the ‘gatekeepers’ and emphasising key topics identified within the 
literature generated a set of major themes that could be discussed in the following 
stakeholder interviews. This enabled the remainder of the stakeholder interviews to 
have more precise goals so that questions were tailored to each individual 
stakeholder’s position and their direct contribution to the LDV situation.  
                                                          






The procedure and schedule for the Stage 2 part of the research began when the 
majority of the Stage 1 research was complete. This was to give time for the media 
appeal to attract the necessary LDV workers and for appropriate questions to be 
developed based on the preliminary findings of the Stage 1 interviews. After the 
survey database was created, a pilot of the telephone survey was carried out with a 
small number of the participants, so as to flush out any errors and to refine the 
questioning before proceeding with the remaining telephone surveys. After the 
telephone surveys were completed, the data was analysed for any patterns or trends 
to form the basis of the question design for the telephone interviews. The purpose of 
this stage of the methods was not to provide a final definitive answer but to further 
uncover and explore the unique set of circumstances behind the LDV workers’ 
employment outcomes. 
Stage 2 involved making contact with the LDV workforce and contacting individuals 
who would be willing to participate within the research. This was done through two 
approaches; first was to launch a media appeal to advertise the research to the 
general public and to stimulate interest amongst LDV workers; second, a contact 
database was used, which had been created by Coventry University when the 
Washwood Heath plant initially closed in 2009. This, in combination with additional 
contacts created through the stakeholder interviews of Stage 1, created a survey 
group. Telephone questionnaires were first initiated in order to gather information 
about the LDV workers (e.g. demographic, skill, wage, job search data). This was 
followed by in-depth telephone interviews with willing participants where more 
detailed information about their individual experience could be explored. At this final 
stage of the method, key interpretations of the data will bring to light what 
combination of circumstances lead to employment outcomes and what future policy 


















Generate survey group to 
conduct telephone research on 
LDV workers. 
Contact willing respondents from telephone 
to conduct telephone interviews.  
Expand contacts 
given in Stage 1. 
Launch media 
appeal. 
Initial analysis of the data: does it comply 
with themes developed in Stage 1? Does it 
bring new ideas? 
Stage 2: Research into the 
LDV workers 
Using this initial data set in combination 
with stage 1 data, develop in-depth interview 
questions for the LDV workers. 









Full transcription of all 
the stakeholder 
interviews. 
Analysis of the 
transcription generates 
themed discussion for 
Stage 2 research. 
Conduct interview 
with stakeholder – 
media. 
Initial analysis informs 
research of future topics and 
discussion, guiding future 
interview questioning. 
Furthermore, this expands 
stakeholder contacts. 
Conduct interview with 
stakeholder – Taskforce, 
primary leader. 
Again initial analysis informs research of future 
topics and discussion, guiding future interview 
questioning, especially into the more specific 
roles and impacts of individual agencies that 
constituted LDV. 
Conduct interview with 
stakeholder – Taskforce, 
individual agencies and 
LDV management. 
Can expand Stage 2 
contacts (LDV 
workers).  
Academic discussion and secondary data about 
LDV situation, West Midlands economic data 
and how media articles inform research. 
Figure 5-2: Data Research Process 








Table 5-1: Data Collection Methods 
The methods used at the different stages of the thesis are summarised and 
displayed in Fig. 5.1. Furthermore, it shows which research groups were studied and 









Gathering demographic data and 
employment trends on the local area and 
the LDV workforce. This also includes LDV 
corporate history.  
Gathering data on 
policy action taken, for 
example, money 
invested in job 
schemes and local 




Expand networks and contacts within the 
workforce. 
Expand networks and 








 Initiate dialogue to 
ascertain information 
about policy action and 
the reasons why 
policies were initiated. 
Gain data that was not 





Gather more precise data about individual 
cases and their problems finding 
employment. This follows the semi-indirect 
interviews; questions can be linked to 
policy action achieving greater insight. 
If needed, a second set 
of interviews may be 
established after 
contact with the LDV 
workforce. This will be 
aimed at uncovering 






Individual case studies will tackle the 
deeper underlying problems of re-
employability and highlight the personal 











The aim of using these methods is to gain a qualitative insight into the job quality, 
expectations and opportunities that were available to the LDV workforce post-
redundancy within a labour market. This aims to build towards the employment 
trajectories of the LDV workers that cross reference these factors to establish a 
thorough interpretive analysis of employability and re-employment. Further inquiry is 
conducted into the role of the LDV Taskforce (which consisted of bodies such as 
local government, RDAs and Jobcentres and examines policy interventions used to 
stimulate re-employment among the workforce). 
Secondary data sources provided background information regarding Birmingham’s 
economic situation pre- and post-closure of the Washwood Heath site. Media articles 
published around the time of closure (from 2009-2012) provided the first aspect in 
the secondary data. Primarily the media articles provided a ‘timeline’ of the chain of 
events that led to the LDV closure and the key actors and stakeholders associated 
with the company. This gave the research a ‘feel for the situation’, exploring the 
financial difficulties that faced the company and interventions made by various 
private and public institutions or actors. The media sources included the Birmingham 
Post, The Telegraph, The Guardian and BBC West Midlands. Journalists from the 
Birmingham Post and BBC West Midlands participated in the primary research and 
were an essential part of the ‘gate keeper’ interviews to lead to further policy 
stakeholders. The interviews with these journalists further explained their sources 
towards their publications, which informed the progression of the secondary research 
process. Secondary data documents consisted of local government policies 
documents and economic profile reports such as a Birmingham economic profile 
(June 2010 BCC); a profile of Birmingham’s advanced manufacturing sector (2010 
BCC); Birmingham’s local economic assessment (August 2011); and Birmingham’s 
socio-economic profile reports (2009-2011). One of the most important secondary 




force. With established facts gathered by 
the previous methods, questions have 
greater relevance with this stage of the 






provided by Birmingham City Council.37 These sources provided data on 
manufacturing growth; an economic profile and assessment of Birmingham; and 
economic trends and worklessness rates within Birmingham. Additional secondary 
data was gathered from the stakeholder interviews themselves that vary from maps 
illustrating the concentration of ex-LDV workers to explanations of projects and 
policies implemented (provided by the Birmingham City Council and Learning Skills 
Council respectively). 
Within the specific context of the LDV situation, actions taken by various government 
agencies will be examined. One major line of inquiry will follow Shuttleworth et al.’s 
(2005) approach, which highlights how the problems of redundancy are not solved 
by supply-side measures alone but are also influenced by demand aspects; they 
suggest that the local labour market plays an important part in the process and 
requires greater attention when establishing policies to deal with closures. In 
addition, Shuttleworth et al. (2005) raise the issue of personal attributes in respect of 
re-employability.38 The age of the workforce plays an important role in the 
employability of redundant workers and a strong emphasis should be placed on 
keeping these older workers within labour markets (Pinch and Mason 1991; 
Tomaney et al. 1999). These aspects will be explored within the LDV context, 
primarily through telephone questionnaires of the LDV workforce to analyse aspects 
of age, skills and experience and how they relate to finding new employment within 
the labour market.  
 
5.2.1 Investigating Policy Response to the Closure 
Stage 1 interviews focus on conducting face-to-face interviews with policy 
stakeholders involved with the LDV Taskforce. These interviews address key topics 
and issues (explained above) with which each particular stakeholder was associated. 
These interviews were 60 minutes in length to enable sufficient interaction and 
exchange of information. Importantly, these interviews were designed to engage with 
what the stakeholders did pre- and post-LDV’s closure, to ascertain their involvement 
                                                          
37 Data and government reports about the Birmingham local economy were accessed at: 
http://www.birmingham.gov.uk/birminghameconomy (23.03.2011). 
 







in the build-up to the closure and their relation to LDV. Then the data of the 
interviews is combined to construct a ‘fuller picture’ of the various links and 
relationships between stakeholders and show how the strategy for the closure was 
designed and implemented. This is the critical part in the data collection, concerning 
the event and the moment of the closure itself and analysing the LDV Taskforce’s 
policies and interventions. 
Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the primary method to engage with the 
policy stakeholders. This enables ‘free-flowing’ and expansive discussion of key 
issues while maintaining some guide on what topics need to be discussed, again 
indicative of the interpretive approach of developing the contextual factors and 
comprehending underlying factors. The importance of face-to-face interviews also 
involved the transference of grey documents.39 This provides the research with vital 
information, reinforcing the rationale of the qualitative approach taken. The 
limitations of this approach, however, were susceptible to circumstances that arose 
at the time because of political connotations. During the research process, 
government changes to the regional agencies (RDAs) resulted in some members of 
the LDV Taskforce becoming unavailable. However, a significant number of the 
taskforce members did participate in the study and this was supplemented by 
interviews with other key figures to support the data. 
Table 5-2 Policy Stakeholders Interviewed 
List of the participants interviewed for the data collection throughout Feb 2012–Feb 2013. 









Birmingham City Council 
(BCC): joint employment 












Jobcentre Plus (JCP) Taskforce Employer 
engagement 
manager with the 
                                                          
39 Grey documents represent non-public official documents. It must be stated that if the respondent handed over 
any documents but wished them not to be published or quoted, then the research abides by those wishes in 











Was Learning Skills Council 
(LSC); now Learning Skills 
Agency (LSA) 




Advantage West Midlands 
(AWM) 












































* Interviewed together: Zanny Lomas & Rob Beck; and John Adams & Mick Laverty. 
 
Due to the limited number of people that would have substantial expertise and full 
awareness of the policies used during the LDV Taskforce, the number of interviews 
was limited. In total, ten interviews were conducted among the members of the 
taskforce or other stakeholders. The people chosen to be interviewed were done so 
by first identifying their position and role within their particular agency but also their 






interviewed). The research gathered this information through past research on the 
MG Rover Taskforce and through the supervisory team’s knowledge of the topic, 
which entailed access to contact numbers and e-mail addresses through which initial 
contact could be made. 
 
5.2.1.1 Reasoning for Semi-Structured Interviews 
It is recognised that other interview techniques were available to engage the policy 
stakeholders; however, it was decided that the semi-structured interview would be 
the most appropriate method. This section details other methods available and 
discusses why semi-structured interviews were chosen. 
Fully structured interviews have an established set of rules and pre-set questions 
that must be repeated for every interview. In each interview, the researcher must 
maintain consistency in the form of questioning but also the behaviour in delivering 
the questions. The problem of utilising this method is that it neglects the contextual 
background of the position of interviewee. Areas of expertise between the different 
agencies vary considerably and so having identical questions would restrict the 
quality of the data obtained. For instance, while asking Rachel Eade questions (MAS 
– see Table 5.2) about how the LDV supplier networks might be pertinent, it would 
not be ideal to ask Phil Roocroft a similar question (BCC – see Table 5.2). 
Semi-structured interviews in comparison to structured interviews are flexible and 
less rigorous with regard to protocol. The researcher is not restricted to identical 
questions or behaviours for each individual. Questions were developed in advance 
for each particular interview (based on research into the agency represented by the 
interviewee and the academic origins as discussed in Section 5.2.2) with the aim of 
gaining information about particular topics on the basis that the policy stakeholder 
would have specialist and in-depth knowledge. By not sticking to a rigid structure but 
allowing respondents to develop a discussion on the LDV, this had the advantage of 
developing a ‘natural, free-flowing’ discussion involving facts and opinions that may 
previously have been left unvoiced; the semi-structured format enables respondents 
to be guided on key topics and in the examination of policies. However, the 
interviews maintained a similar structure in regards to discussing some topics with all 






and ensured that certain topics were discussed in detail to enable a more thorough 
analysis. 
Face-to-face interviews were deemed best due to the physical presence of the 
interviewer and respondent, predominately to allow more spontaneous questioning 
and interchange, which leads to the gathering of richer data and a more positive 
research experience. Indeed, this is vital within the interpretivist approach for the 
researcher to become ‘embedded’ within the research. In this initial stage, two face-
to-face interviews were conducted with BCC and the Birmingham Post, consisting of 
60 minutes and 40 minutes respectively. These interviews were very successful with 
both respondents proving to be great sources for information regarding the plant 
closure. Due to logistical problems, a face-to-face interview with BBC West Midlands 
was not possible; however, in its place a 30-minute telephone interview was 
arranged. The telephone interview was not as productive as the face-to-face 
interviews had been. Some of the immersive nature of the interpretivist method was 
lost. Furthermore, a weakness of the semi-structured approach is that it can 
jeopardise the interview if a respondent is not guided properly on the key topics. In 
this regard, the limitation was time, as the semi-structured approach lends itself to 
being directed to discuss issues that are not fully related to the research aims. The 
analysis of the interview data was through a grounded theory approach, beginning 
with open coding to set which themes emerged strongly from the dataset, then 
through series of axial and selective coding linkages between themes. Once themes 
and categories had been refined, it enabled the generation of a theoretical 
framework concerning the actions of the policy stakeholders (Travers 2001: 41).  
 
5.2.1.2 Question Development – Addressing the Gaps within the 
Literature 
The aim of this section is to explain the origins and development of the questions 
used within the interview process. The academic discussion on plant closure and 
labour market adjustment helped in the design of the research methods to be used; 
likewise, they directly informed the development of research questions used within 
the interviews both with the stakeholders and the LDV workers. The literature review 
highlighted that the research sought to investigate the vulnerability of LDV within 






company. This led directly to questioning LDV managers and local actors with close 
association (in particular the BCC) about the processes and constant changes of 
ownership of LDV. This would allude to the importance of regional agencies’ 
relationships in keeping certain local economic institutions alive and how decision 
making within certain ‘moments’ can alter the trajectory of that locale. 
Further questions were directed to broaden the research on the roles of taskforces 
within policy strategy and to ascertain if previous taskforce involvement in the region 
had created a level of path dependency on local companies and agencies to rely 
upon certain levels of government involvement (particularly within the West 
Midlands). This again underlines the legacy of taskforces but also the importance of 
social structures and development in that area (Tomaney et al. 1999). An additional 
aspect of the methodology was to establish the role of political significance in relation 
to the response of the LDV Taskforce to uncover whether the regional-to-local 
political transition hindered or improved the policy response. The questioning in this 
regard was designed to inquire about the suitability of the taskforce model within a 
much smaller local focus rather than in a larger regional perspective (typical of 
taskforces prior to LDV). Furthermore, it sought to uncover if the transition in local 
government (changing authorities in regards to economic development agencies, the 
change in available funding and responsibilities of individual agencies) influenced the 
overall outcomes of taskforce initiatives and policies directed at the LDV workers and 
their re-employment. 
Understanding the demographic of the workforce was also crucial in determining 
what line of questioning should be targeted towards the LDV workers. Previous 
studies (e.g. Armstrong et al. 2008) have demonstrated the importance of workers 
feeling isolated by a lack of government support and feeling that they were 
underemployed in their future employment. This directly relates to the LDV context 
and the aims of the research to identify the re-employment path of highly skilled and 
managerial workers. The importance placed on the research is to examine the 
impact on the high-skilled and management tier workers to extrapolate if their 
experiences reinforce or are unique to the findings of the existing research and 
literature regarding plant closures and labour adjustment. Given the economic 
situation at the time of the LDV closure, highly skilled workers may also be subject to 






altogether.40 The geographic distribution of the workers prevented a more cohesive 
reaction and isolated certain aspects of the LDV workforce. The research also 
assesses the role of ‘shock’ upon individual workers;41 for example, did the taskforce 
react appropriately in this regard or was the closure of LDV expected to enable 
workers to prepare and mitigate the level of shock experienced? 
 
5.2.2 Questioning the Impact on the Workforce 
The gaining of information about the stakeholders within stage 1 set the context for 
the questions aimed at the LDV workers at stage 2. First, a generic telephone survey 
was created with a mixture of closed and open-ended questions. The closed 
questions were designed to obtain numerical and statistical data about the workers. 
A combination of understanding the policy initiatives and strategies expressed by the 
stakeholder interviews contributed to the formation of the open-ended questions. The 
open-ended questions were aimed at gaining the experiences of the LDV workers in 
terms of how they received redundancy services and their experiences of the job 
market. The survey data were analysed to detect any commonalities or patterns 
between the various LDV worker responses, which fed into the development 
questions for more in-depth telephone interviews with the workers.  
Telephone questionnaire surveys and telephone interviews were the main primary 
methods used for gathering the data on the LDV workforce. The researcher had 
access to a small database created by Coventry University when the LDV plant 
closed in 2009. This database was the starting point through which further contacts 
could be generated by networking with the initial LDV workers. The research 
expanded the database through local media appeals through local radio and social 
media. This would appease the ethical concerns of ‘cold calling’ ex-workers who did 
not wish to participate in the research or who may have still felt aggrieved by the 
situation. The research contacted the workers in the database through telephone 
communiques; during these initial stages, further contacts were added through 
‘snowballing’, expanding the list of contacts generated through LDV workers 
                                                          
40 The economic situation during 2009 was a period of economic recession following the financial crisis. This 
created a situation of uncertainty amongst businesses and economists alike and discouraged businesses from 
expanding and employing new staff. Highly skilled workers also faced difficult periods as competition for new 
posts would be vastly increased. 
41 The term ‘shock’ in relation to recently redundant workers ranges through emotional distress, financial 






established in the database. During this phase, respondents were asked if they 
would like to continue with the research by taking part in telephone interviews lasting 
45-90 minutes.42 These telephone interviews were aimed at engaging the 
respondents in greater detail about their job search and career experiences after the 
LDV closure. It is through the telephone interviews that the qualitative data was 
gathered in an attempt to look ‘beyond the numbers’ in regards to the LDV workers. 
The aim of the telephone questionnaires was to create a bank of 60 or more 
respondents and to make the database statistically representative of the ex-LDV 
workforce. However, as the research progressed, the database consisted of 23 
respondents which proved too small and not statistically representative of the wider 
LDV workforce population. The analysis turned to using descriptive methods to 
display and discuss the data from which worker pathway trajectories could be 
constructed. 
There are several reasons for adopting telephone surveys rather than other methods 
such as internet or postal surveys that have similar representative and logistical 
advantages. While postal and internet surveys require less physical effort and are 
quicker to establish, they lose flexibility, as once the survey has been formulated it 
becomes a flat template that applies to everyone and is better used for a bigger 
survey group. As the potential research group for this research was small, the 
logistical demands of telephone surveys were well within the capacity of the 
researcher. Telephone surveys create direct contact between the researcher and the 
respondent. This allows for a fuller discussion of a topic, which in turn can lead to 
further networking and generate potential avenues of research or approaches that 
may have remained unidentified. 
The telephone survey questionnaires consisted of a rigidly structured format that 
could form quantitative data sets and be applied to every category of worker. The 
development of the questionnaire was based on the MG Rover worker survey (Bailey 
et al. 2008) supplemented further by the initial findings from the interviews conducted 
with policy stakeholders. The telephone questionnaire covered topics from workers’ 
demographic details, qualifications and skills, details of LDV job positions, 
experience/interaction with LDV Taskforce, experience of job search and feelings 
                                                          
42 The length of each interview depended on the willingness of the respondents to answer the questions with 






regarding current circumstances. The selection process for the interviews was based 
on two constrictions. First, after conducting the telephone surveys, it was logged 
whether the worker was willing to participate further in potential interviews. If yes, 
contact was re-established to arrange an interview. Second was the employment 
trajectory by which the individual was categorised was considered. This was to 
ensure an even spread of opinion and experience to create a more sophisticated and 
diverse range of data. The design of the telephone questionnaire went through 
several phases of development to refine the data collection process, and enable an 
overall better quality of data. 
 
5.2.2.1 Telephone Interviews 
As discussed in the previous section, the telephone interviews formed the qualitative 
aspect of the research concerning the LDV workers. As the telephone questionnaires 
were not sufficient to provide a stand-alone analysis of the workers further, more in-
depth research had to take place. In contrast to the telephone questionnaires, the 
interviews were semi-structured in design, based on various generic issues found 
among the telephone questionnaire dataset, with specific questions directed at that 
individual, based on important notes made among the telephone questionnaire. This 
enabled the interview to delve further into important issues raised both more 
generally, and more specifically on an individual basis. This led to rich in-depth 
qualitative data concerning individual experiences and opinions, particularly 
regarding help or training received related to interviewees’ direct circumstances. 
The telephone interviews were semi-structured with open-ended questions, with the 
formulation of the questions determined by analysis of data from the telephone 
surveys. This enabled further enquiry into certain trends or patterns that emerged 
from the survey data, while taking account of the workers’ individual circumstances. 
These interviews were qualitative in comparison to the telephone surveys, with the 
interviews lasting approximately 30-90 minutes and covering a variety of topics. The 
data revealed experiences of re-employment on a more personal level, uncovering 
what factors precisely related to successful or unsuccessful re-employment. 
Furthermore, the interviews engaged workers on what perceptions they had about 
their redundancy, how they felt in terms of their financial security and how this may 






workers expected to receive, and the government’s attitudes to providing support 
services in immersing redundant workers back into the labour market. The data 
gathered from the interviews shed light on how the ex-workers progressed from the 
plant closure, in terms of new employment, training courses or leaving the labour 
market entirely. Furthermore, this uncovered their personal perspectives and 
experiences and showed how this can differ between sections of the workforce (e.g. 
how production assembly staff compared to the management tier employees) to 
highlight what skills are vital in terms of re-employability. 
The purpose of the interviews was to illuminate how policies implemented by the 
LDV Taskforce actually affected and influenced LDV workers. The telephone survey 
identified the problems that the LDV workers might have faced and their eventual 
employment outcomes. The telephone interviews alluded to how these problems 
manifested in ‘real life’, creating a discussion regarding how future policy approaches 
taken by taskforces can be better directed towards more successful employment 
outcomes and trajectories of the LDV workers. 
The range of research methods available to conduct the research into LDV 
employees was hampered by the conditions of the research itself. The combination 
of the research aim and the logistics of the research prevented an in-depth 
quantitative approach in regards to the experiences of the workers. The logistical 
reasons are primarily tied in with the timing of the closure and when the research 
was conducted. LDV closed in June 2009 but this data was not collected until the 
beginning of 2012; this three-year gap meant that many LDV employees had moved 
on and become more difficult to contact. Furthermore, during this time the 
restructuring of government departments resulted in limited access to data sets. The 
geographical location of the LDV workers made physically communicating with them 
impractical. LDV workers were not concentrated in the local area but in fact were 
sparsely distributed around the Birmingham City district and surrounding wards. 
More crucially, data protection combined with the three-year gap created very 
difficult barriers to overcome in contacting ex-LDV employees and creating a 
significant database. 
The use of focus groups would have been a further option but after considering the 
potential risks and gains from this method, it was decided that it would be unsuitable 






method given the difficulty of direct contact with the former workers. Normally, focus 
groups provide a good logistical solution to grouping participants together rather than 
interacting with them individually (Flowerdew and Martin 2005; Clifford et al. 2010). 
Due to the geographic distribution of the ex-employees, arranging a safe and secure 
environment would have proved to be difficult and would have raised further ethical 
concerns. Focus groups would not be fully appropriate concerning the research 
aims, as they are better used for gathering opinions on a topical issue (Flowerdew 
and Martin 2005; Clifford et al. 2010).  
It is recognised that having a discussion about the implications of redundancy within 
a recession would generate useful insights. However, this topic may also be deemed 
sensitive to potential participants, as redundancy involves discussion about an 
individual’s financial problems, family obligations and difficulties finding employment. 
Where some individuals may be comfortable discussing this in a public forum, others 




5.3 Reflection and Limitations of the Data Collection 
Process 
The research methodology of the thesis is the exploration of the personal experience 
of the people involved in the LDV closure, while developing the contextual factors in 
the research. This was broken down into two segments, researching the actions of 
the LDV Taskforce, their limitations, opportunities, strengths and the interactions and 
experience of the LDV workers. All of these factors had to be considered and 
integrated into the overall research process and design. This required a qualitative 
approach to data collection, with support from numerical quantitative data sources. 
Because of the high concentration of qualitative data required for this type of study, 
data collection presented many challenges and obstacles in its collection. 
One primary example is that the research necessitated a great amount of human 
interaction between the researcher and the target subject group. In particular, the 
amount of planning and preparation involved in organising the interviews became 






establishing initial contact with the individual (usually through e-mail) to arranging an 
interview date was very time consuming, if successful at all. The time delay in 
arranging an interview can vary depending on the professional position of that 
person, e.g. the higher up in terms of their management position a particular 
individual is, the more constrained their time is, thus making interview opportunities 
more limited. 
The sensitivity of the line of inquiry and the data received from the interviews were 
significant barriers in conducting full data analysis in regards to both the LDV 
stakeholders and the LDV workers. LDV stakeholders could be reluctant to release 
‘full’ information regarding a policy or process without anonymity as this could affect 
their professional relations. In many cases, the LDV stakeholders were willing to 
discuss certain aspects of the LDV situation, even distributing documents with 
valuable information. However, they insisted that certain data remained hidden and 
not published in a public format. Therefore, while this has greatly benefited the thesis 
in understanding the problems surrounding LDV and progressing forward in 
engaging the LDV workforce, it has prevented a full validation of the findings. In 
regards to the LDV workers, the implications of the plant closure may have had 
direct and indirect implications for individuals’ lives in a physical, mental and 
emotional sense, which again may have prevented full disclosure from workers.  
Another problematic aspect was the time that passed between the plant closure and 
the research study. This may seem a trivial factor in light of the overall research but it 
has no doubt influenced the progress of the research. By the time the research 
started, nearly three years had passed since the plant closure; the LDV workers no 
longer shared a single point of contact (e.g. place of work) making tracking them 
down difficult. Furthermore, 2010-11 saw radical political change resulting in many 
changes in government agencies – for instance the abolition of RDAs in favour of 
LEPs and changes in sub-regional organisations (LSC to LSA, for example). These 
changes made certain officials in the government agencies inaccessible or difficult to 








5.4 Chapter Summary 
The aim of this chapter was to provide an explanation of the theoretical and empirical 
aspects of the research and to progress the topics discussed in the literature review. 
Much past research on this topic of closures has concentrated on the quantitative 
aspects of worker skills and qualifications in relation to employment opportunities. 
This research adopted a qualitative approach to create personal insights into their 
experiences and employability; the rationale is explained through the importance of 
the contextual situation of the LDV closure, placing importance on a qualitative 
approach to the study. The research design explains how by amalgamating the 
experience of the ex-LDV workers with the research on policy stakeholders, the 
methodology reinforces holistic understanding as it takes into account contextual 
factors of the impacts of plant closure.  
The thesis will now analyse the empirical research data. The analysis is split into two 
parts: the first looks at the closure of LDV and the policies initiated by the LDV 
Taskforce. The second analyses the data from the telephone surveys and telephone 
interviews with the LDV workers and assesses the level of success of the worker 









Chapter 6: Closure of 
LDV and the Actions of 







6.1 The Geopolitical Economy of the Washwood Heath 
Plant Closure 
This chapter will discuss the empirical data concerning the policy stakeholders43 (the 
LDV management; local government; and the agencies of the LDV Taskforce) and 
their actions pre- and post-closure. Chapter 7 will analyse and discuss the data from 
the surveys of the LDV workforce and assess the implications of the closure for the 
LDV workers and their experiences in the labour market. This part of the analysis will 
work towards establishing the ‘employment pathways’ of LDV workers. 
This chapter will begin by presenting the key findings generated from the research 
data gathered from the LDV policy stakeholders; media observers and 
commentators; and the ex-LDV workers regarding the LDV plant closure at 
Washwood Heath on 8 June 2009. The data presented here was collected over two 
years between February 2012 and March 2013. The primary methods of data 
collection consisted of face-to-face and telephone interviews with the LDV policy 
stakeholders. Using this data, analysis will discuss various topics around the closure 
and describe what actions the taskforce enacted to relieve the impact of closure. 
6.1.1 Establishing the Context of the LDV Closure 
Before delving into the precise actions of the LDV Taskforce, it is important to define 
the context of the closure itself in terms of the geopolitical and economic factors to 
highlight what may have influenced the process of the closure and the response that 
followed. Pike (2005) stresses that no plant closure can be branded as an average 
closure, as with each separate closure there are separate underlying ‘moments’ and 
‘causes’ for that particular plant’s collapse, which are interlinked with the historical 
and geographical factors embedded in that area, making each closure unique. Table 
6.1 illustrates the particular ‘moments’ and ‘causes’ that led to the LDV plant closure 
in Washwood Heath, linking those moments to the actions of local agencies/actors 
with the historical and geographical significance within the region. 
Table 6-1: The ‘moments’ and ‘causes’ 
List of the key events and outcomes of the plant closure concerning the Washwood Heath LDV plant. Adapted 
from Pike (2005: 100). 
                                                          
43 This represents individuals who had a key role in decision making either through the LDV taskforce, 






Moment  Causation 
Origins of Decline Declining profitability 
 Organisational marginalisation 
 Underinvestment 
 Weak productivity 
Closure Proposal and Decision Economic recession and weakening 
automotive industry 
Responses of Agents Collective ‘anti-closure’ campaigns  
 Individual and/or collective acceptance 
and/or resistance 
 Public policy and institutional intervention 
 Political lobbying (local, regional, national, 
international) 
Impact of Closure Employment loss 
 Lost income 
 Undermined regional and local prosperity 
Co-operation and/or Collaboration Management, workforce and trade union 
acceptance or collective 
mobilisation/resistance to closure 
 Planned rationalisation 
 Redundancy 
Dissolution Retraining effort 
 Demolition and site redevelopment 
 
In more detail, the moments as they apply to LDV are: 
 The origins of the plant’s closure have been attributed to four major causes: 
declining profitability; organisational marginalisation; underinvestment; and 
weak productivity (Donnelly et al. 2012). These ‘causes’ highlight the ongoing 
historical development of the Washwood Heath plant on the trajectory towards 
closure (Pike et al. 2010). The geo-political history of the West Midlands 
region solidified these underlying causes of closure and cemented LDV’s path 
dependency, relying on unstable ownerships that could not reverse these 
factors (Pike et al. 2010).  
 The closure proposal and decision was ultimately taken because of the 
recession brought on by the 2008 financial crisis. With the geopolitical history 






types of decisions due to being owned by foreign multinationals (Bernard and 
Jenson 2007; Birch and Mykhnenko 2008). Whenever an economic recession 
affected the parent company, LDV would undergo a period of transition of 
rationalisation and/or be sold to another TNC. As there was no political 
actor/institution (within the region or nationally) that would willingly support 
LDV extensively (for example by bailout loans or direct public ownership), 
sooner or later a recession would ‘kill-off’ LDV should a willing buyer not be 
found. Again, this illustrates the importance of political institutions and actors 
in their ability to dictate the course of certain moments during the course of a 
closure. 
 The response of agents and co-operation and/or collaboration is shaped by 
the geopolitical evolution of the region. Government industrial policy towards 
closure had shifted markedly towards a reactive stance rather than 
preventative, mainly through the creation of taskforces in the late 1990s. In 
effect, this determined the extent to which other actors could resist the 
closure, as the government’s priority would be to adjust the local economy to 
other growing sectors instead of supporting struggling sectors. 
 The Impact of closure had several implications for Birmingham’s local 
economy. The plant in terms of size was relatively small in comparison to 
previous closures (LDV directly employed 900 workers compared to MG 
Rover’s 6,000) so the impact of a concentrated workforce was minimal. 
Despite that, the closure of LDV would affect the supply chain (approximately 
4,000 workers). The issues of adapting the ex-workforce to the new labour 
market had two profound implications. The MG Rover research conducted by 
Bailey (2003) and Bentley et al. (2008) found that the majority of the ex-
workforce were able to find new employment but primarily through accepting 
lower wages and job conditions. Second, the demographic and skills sets of 
the LDV workforce forced some workers to withdraw from the labour market 
entirely due to their inability to remain employable in the eyes of employers. 
6.1.2 The Corporate Difficulties of LDV 
It is generally acknowledged that LDV struggled as a commercial vehicle brand, with 






nature of the closure. LDV suffered immensely from financial difficulties, which had 
implications on its product development capabilities. The length of time it took LDV to 
develop new model ranges had a dire effect on the company’s ability to improve its 
brand image and maintain a foothold in the commercial vehicle sector. This led to the 
company having a heavy reliance on the sales of old models.  
The fundamental problem, we had an old product line with the Convoy and Pilot which 
were well past their sell-by-date. Nick Schiller (Manufacturing Director LDV [1998-2004]). 
 
The company was already producing an existing vehicle which was very old ... We were 
involved in training schemes with what was the LSC (Learning Skills Council), ideally LDV 
wanted to sell the old vehicles to staff or the council and get any re-training programmes 
subsidised. Phil Roocroft (employment investment co-ordinator).  
The business plan changed significantly when the company changed ownership; the 
most radical change was the immediate halt of production of the old models and 
concentration purely on new model production. The Maxus model was the most 
contemporary design that LDV could produce; though superior to their older designs, 
LDV still did not match the production scale of strong competitors like Ford or 
Mercedes. The long-standing problems that LDV suffered further restricted the firm 
from continually developing new competitive models within the market and effective 
restructuring. 
The challenge was always that buyout [referring to 2003], couldn’t produce a business that 
had longevity, it could only sustain the Maxus product, not develop a new product. Nick 
Schiller  
Sadly, LDV was never big enough to compete with the larger companies like Mercedes. 
Looking back on it, how could they do anything different? Jon Griffin (Business editor 
Birmingham Post). 
 
The heritage of the Washwood Heath site and its location within a residential area 
prevented the site from being modernised to a more efficient form of production, 
without large significant investment. A key feature of automotive firms surviving in 
the modern automotive market was the ability to access growing markets (e.g. the 
BRIC economies). Although GAZ did invest in LDV, it failed to establish LDV in a 
growing market (i.e. Russia) or make up for the shortfall in technological costs, in this 
case the pursuit of electric vehicles (Donnelly et al. 2005; Bailey et al. 2008; 






The problem was the business; no matter who ran it, it could never generate enough 
money to develop a new product by itself. It wouldn’t be a viable investment as the volume 




Figure 6-1: The LDV Maxus, the Electric model 
Displaying the electric vehicle design source: http://www.ldv.co.uk/electric_maxus.aspx accessed 25.11.2013. 
 
LDV’s management still insisted that the company had a future despite its ongoing 
problems; it was thought that the electric vehicle project would have been able to 
uphold the company’s future and the management were adamant that demand was 
growing for the electric vehicle. The critical factor would be if investment could be 
found to sustain the project development of the electric vehicle maintained through 
the development of the modern Maxus model (Fig 6.1 displays the visual concept). 
I still believe that EV technology is ideal for commercial vehicles whereas it is more 
complex for domestic cars. But for depot to depot vehicles, which consist of the majority of 
LDV’s sales... should the business plan have gone forward then LDV would have had the 
potential to be the market leader in EV. Guy Jones (Marketing Executive of LDV [2008-
09]). 
 
However, there were also counter-arguments in favour of the commercial viability of 
the electric vehicle, mainly orientated around the electric vehicles’ ability to sustain 
LDV and provide adequate returns on investment. 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright.This 
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The credibility of LDV to solely rely on becoming the electric vehicle manufacturer of the 
UK would have been questionable... in 2009, we have run out of money, and we want to 
go into a market sector that isn’t really in existence yet, with new technology... with a high 
capital cost in the product. The biggest problem isn’t government agencies being 
awkward, but rather people and organisations saying that the electric project isn’t going to 
work and not credible. Nick Schiller 
 
6.1.3 Pre-closure Support from Local Agencies 
The current UK government stance on industrial support is more reactionary in 
nature, focusing on taskforces to provide relief for areas affected by plant closure. 
That is not to say that the UK government did not provide support for LDV; on the 
contrary, the government provided support for the company in the years prior to the 
actual closure. During the management buyout in 2003 stemming from the failed 
partnership with Daewoo, the UK government provided a financial grant to oversee 
the transition. 
As part of the Daewoo deal they were given a grant of £25m, this was based on the 
business plan we issued... The £25m grant provided other private equity and individuals’ 
confidence to invest into the business and carry the project forward. In that respect the UK 
was as helpful as they could be without breaking any EU competition laws. Nick Schiller 
 
Government support for LDV came from both national and local sources. As 
illustrated by the quote above, the national government provided significant financial 
aid to keep production within Washwood Heath. The local government provided aid 
in training subsidies and by giving LDV favourable terms in realising cash from its 
assets. 
We had support from LSC; there was re-training provided free of charge or heavily 
subsidised. So the local government were very helpful, they opened up an access bridge 
over the railway towards the back of the site. AWM did a very good deal on the price of the 
land. Nick Schiller 
The government was also active in providing support to LDV just prior to the closure 
in 2009 through government bridging loans and by acting as mediator to find a 
potential buyer for LDV. Furthermore, the government did its best to maintain 






BIS had a predominant role, they interacted with other potential buyers, particular the 
Malaysian firm Weststar. Guy Jones 
 
There was talk of the government buying vans but then they would have fallen foul of EU 
rules. The government did support them in the last few days via loans. (Peter Plisner 
Transport correspondent BBC midlands) 
 
6.1.4 The Economic Circumstances of the Plant Closure 
During 2009, when LDV was in difficulty, the financial crisis was at its zenith, and the 
UK government was under immense pressure to restructure and rescue ailing key 
sectors of the UK economy (namely the banking and financial sector). The condition 
of the global economy further hindered demand for imports, which had a drastic 
effect on the automotive sector. These factors constrained the government’s options 
regarding how to react to the LDV plant closure and the type of support that could be 
made available to LDV and its workers. The following extracts from the Stage 1 
interviews illustrate the economic environment of 2009 and show how this affected 
LDV, and indicate the actions taken by the various agencies. 
Whether the electric vehicle was a viable option or not, the main primary problem of 
LDV that still existed was the need for investment to continue production. This 
constant need for investment in the end made it vulnerable in difficult economic 
times when gaining access to finance either through loans or external investors was 
limited. 
Then the financial crisis hit, the planned investments were unable to be made and 
prevented from the business from getting off the ground in Russia... This had drastic 
effects on the plan. That all added up to mean the business was not comparable and 
ultimately led to the closure of the plant within the UK. (Guy Jones). 
 
When the recession came along the commercial vehicles were hit the hardest. This was 
also tied in with the Russian economy which went downhill. (Peter Plisner). 
 
In this particular recession credit has become extremely difficult to get hold of and 
automotive manufacturing is seen as high risk. (Rachel Eade). 
 
The combination of the fragility of the automotive sector during 2009 and the inability 






was to react to the closure. It was ultimately going to take a reactive response rather 
than direct intervention (e.g. significant financial aid), which effectively undermined 
the government’s (national and local) ability to fund the electric vehicle project. 
To invest in building a factory in this economic climate is a very tough decision, and is 
going to cost a great deal of money no matter how much financial inducements. Mick 
Laverty and Mark Pearce (AWM Chief Executive, AWM representative on the taskforce 
respectively). 
 
That was the key point (recession), at that stage all sorts of automotive suppliers were 
going bust. Jon Griffin (business editor Birmingham post). 
 
It would be unfair to say that the government ruthlessly left LDV to its fate and 
ignored the implications of the plant closure on the West Midlands economy. 
However, the difficulties that LDV faced in developing vehicles and maintaining 
finances undermined the security and longevity of any further investments. The 
amount of support provided over the years to LDV combined with the constraints of 
the financial crisis would have influenced government departments to consider post-
closure action and place confidence in the proven taskforce approach. 
 
6.2 The LDV Taskforce Response to LDV 
When GAZ announced that it was selling LDV in February 2009, numerous local 
stakeholders were on alert. These local stakeholders varied from the management of 
LDV and local authorities to the national government, with support from the local 
community and the LDV workers themselves. Each of these actors would try to 
influence the outcome of the closure in regards to their organisation’s remit and 
objectives.44 
The participant stakeholders that were interviewed fell into three distinct categories: 
first was the group that had a direct presence on the LDV Taskforce, comprising Phil 
Roocroft (BCC); Zanny Lomas and Rob Beck ([JCP]); John Adams (LSC); Mark 
Pearce (AWM); and Rachel Eade (MAS). Their knowledge in particular was 
extremely valuable, covering various aspects of the LDV Taskforce from their 
                                                          
44 For instance, the LSA had a priority of ideal retraining, whereas the labour unions wanted to ensure the best 






immediate actions upon closure announcement, plans to engage with the LDV 
workers, difficulties and challenges the taskforce encountered, and operational 
insights of the agencies both on an individual and collaborative level (Figure 6.2 
illustrates the LDV Taskforce framework). Furthermore, on an individual level, each 
participant/organisation discussed the problems that LDV were facing and socio-



























Figure 6-2: Members of the LDV Taskforce 
The diagram displays the key members of the LDV Taskforce in the light blue boxes. These represent the representatives of their relevant agencies, with other 
key members of their agency listed below. Neville Summerfield in the purple box represents the Chairman of the Taskforce. Underneath the chair, other key 
associates are represented who participated in LDV Taskforce board meetings but were not directly affiliated with the taskforce per se.  






The second group of stakeholders represented a media perspective of the 
closure, for example Jon Griffin (Birmingham Post) and Peter Plisner (BBC); as 
‘spectators/commentators’ on the event, they held no biased opinions towards 
the LDV closure and the actions that followed but also drew attention to local 
issues that were created by the closure. 
The third group represented individuals who had had a direct affiliation with LDV 
itself, such as Guy Jones and Nick Schiller (Marketing Executive of LDV [2008-
09] Manufacturing Director LDV [1998-2004] respectively); both brought 
differing opinions from members of the taskforce but also about LDV’s 
progression from the Daewoo takeover. Both executives had contrasting 
opinions from each other, despite their affiliation with LDV. Guy Jones gave a 
more positive opinion of LDV and stressed that more could have been done to 
save the company. Nick Schiller was willing to express more critical aspects of 
the problems that faced LDV and was more sympathetic to the government’s 
stance on letting LDV shut down. Nonetheless, both gave valuable information 
that offered different insights into the LDV closure and presented other 
discussion points about what else could have been done to possibly save LDV. 
 
6.2.1 Initial Reactions by Local Actors 
Ceasing production at the Washwood Heath plant was initially opposed by the 
workers in order to keep options open to LDV and provide more time to find 
financial backing.45 LDV’s management were adamant that the company still 
had a viable business plan, utilising the development of the electric vehicle with 
potential government legislation to support it, combined with potential in export 
markets for the Maxus model for emerging markets like Russia and SE Asia, 
and actively sought opportunities for a management buyout. The local 
authorities such as the council and emergency services continued to purchase 
LDV vehicles, thus maintaining some local demand (not enough to financially 
sustain LDV). Furthermore, the UK national government were encouraging 
                                                          
45 Production ceased at the plant in December 2008; this was well before the announcement of the actual 






development of electric vehicle and green technology production. With these 
supporting relationships from the local and apparently national actors/agencies, 
there was still a chance for the deciding ‘moment’ of the plant closure to go in 
favour of LDV. 
Much to the frustration of the LDV management, the company was set to 
embark on the electric vehicle project and yet the lifeline of investment had 
been withdrawn; however, despite the realities of the immediate financial 
problems facing LDV, there was much hope that the electric Maxus would 
secure the future of LDV. 
LDV can be a symbol of a low carbon, green manufacturing future that the 
government says it wants Britain to lead. Erik Eberhardson46 
The intention was for a management buyout led by Erik Eberhardson. 
Management requested that the UK government supply a loan of £30m to 
enable a takeover (Bailey and Clancy 2009). The UK government refused a 
buyout loan but offered a bridging loan of £4m in order for the LDV 
management to seek other potential investors. 
 
We’re almost ready to go, but we need the government to do its bit. Erik 
Eberhardson 
 
Although there was unwavering support from the management to keep the 
company operating, the central/national government was limited in terms of 
what financial support it could offer the troubled company.47 Local actors in 
Birmingham showed much greater conviction in trying to save LDV. The LDV 
workers were prepared to make sacrifices; they voted on a voluntary pay cut 
and accepted part-time shifts (Bailey and Clancy 2009). Cumbers et al. (2008) 
raised the issue of labour union significance within global production networks. 
                                                          
46Eberhardson GAZ chairman extract from: 
http://www.autonews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090223/ANE02/902230287 10.10.11 accessed: 
18.02.12 
47 The UK government was restricted to the level of state aid it could provide due to the European Union 






It is difficult to comprehend whether the unions of MG Rover, Peugeot or LDV 
had in fact any influence to discourage the closures but they could have had 
influence over employment rights, conditions and pay-outs. However, the extent 
of this varies and is dependent on the condition of the labour union and the 
company. 
The local government showed determination in its support of LDV with 
Birmingham City Council member Liam Byrne securing a bridging loan. 
Furthermore, many of the local public agencies continued to purchase LDV 
models in order to stimulate demand and provide much needed income. This 
demonstrates the strong attachment between LDV and local institutions and 
actors, illustrating the social and geographical aspects of the plant closure (Pike 
2005). 
In contrast, the central government showed a reluctance to get involved in 
supporting LDV in any great capacity compared to other national governments 
that have taken a more active role in supporting industries (Bailey and Clancy 
2009; Stanford 2010).48 One potential investor to rescue the company was the 
Malaysian group Weststar but it failed to raise the necessary capital for a 
takeover bid. After negotiating for six months with the government, trade unions 
and management, LDV was officially placed into administration and the site was 
closed. Many loyal supporters (local authorities and business within 
Birmingham) still argue that LDV could have been saved with the right financial 
backing, and that LDV still had a viable future, which raises a critique about the 
policy actions of central government and the links it has with regards to its 
support for industries. The reluctance of the UK government to intervene is 
reflective of the retrospective response to UK industrial restructuring, with 
preference towards adapting the labour market to other growing sectors, such 
as the service and finance sectors. 
 
                                                          
48 Stanford (2010) illustrates that while the UK government did offer incentive schemes to bolster demand 
(car scrappage scheme), unlike the US, it did not directly intervene to rescue companies, and left LDV to 






6.2.2 The Economic/Political Significance Shaping the Response 
The scale and nature of the LDV closure had implications for the capabilities 
and limitations of the taskforce itself. In terms of scale and political magnitude, 
the closure was less significant than other plant closures experienced within the 
West Midlands automotive industry, which in turn influenced the response. For 
instance, Birmingham City Council (BCC) took the chair of the LDV Taskforce 
and the RDA took on an advisory role. This structure immediately emphasised a 
local outlook to the strategies with the funding constraints that entailed (House 
of Commons Regional Committee 2009). Mick Laverty explains that AWM took 
a secondary rather than a leading role within the taskforce, and that the plant 
closure simply did not represent a significant closure in terms of the number of 
jobs at stake and therefore lacked political significance. 
LDV wasn’t significant enough in terms of size and the impact on the economy for us 
to take a lead. (Mick Laverty) 
 
The onset of the financial crisis and the ensuing economic recession increased 
the difficulty in drawing large amounts of financial support towards the 
response, resulting in significant differences in the funding available between 
the LDV Taskforce and prior taskforces. The MG Rover taskforce was able to 
summon up to £176m from various agencies and national government bodies, 
with the aim of supporting supplier networks, aiding ex-workers, with help also 
given to the local community (Bentley et al. 2010). The funding for LDV 
Taskforce was the combination of local agencies various funding schemes and 
projects that they had available to them. The BCC had the working 
neighbourhoods fund (£129,000 not dedicated to LDV); the JCP utilised the 
rapid response fund (individual funding of up to £10,500 for training); and the 
LSC had Better West Midlands (a fund of £12m set up in 2011 to aid all sectors 
and individuals in the West Midlands from which the taskforce could draw some 
finance).  
Unlike the Rover Taskforce, the funding was a lot lower due to the scale of the 







Because of the combination of the scale of the closure and the limited access to 
funding, the BCC, JCP and LSA played a more prominent role in the taskforce 
and had greater influence within the taskforce, with a greater say in the overall 
direction of strategy. 
 
6.2.2.1 The Shift from Regionalism to Localism, Reducing Taskforce 
Capacity and Resilience 
The coalition government in 2010 introduced radical change to the regional 
governance system by abolishing regional development agencies (RDAs) and 
replacing them with a sub-regional system via the local enterprise partnerships 
(LEPs) structure. The primary aim was to rebalance the economy towards the 
private sector with a locally driven approach (Bentley et al. 2010; Pugalis 2010). 
The ideal of ‘localism’ behind the LEPs is emphasised through the 
establishment of local boards consisting of local business leaders and council 
members to stimulate economic activity in areas best suited to their localities. 
However, LEPs faced much criticism because of the restrictions placed on them 
to conduct their affairs sufficiently on a sub-regional level, one being the 
competitive nature of funding access and authority boundaries, and the second 
being that LEP boards are not comprised of dedicated individuals but made up 
of quasi volunteers. This strengthens the position of the centralist government, 
hindering regional political autonomy, governance capacity and economic 
resilience (Bentley et al. 2010; Henderson 2013; Beer and Clower 2014; Pugalis 
and Bentley 2014).  
From 2009 onwards, regional institutions and governance ability started to 
deteriorate, and alongside the abandonment of RDAs in favour of LEPs, 
influenced the capabilities of the taskforce. Further restrictions were placed on 
funding and the altering of responsibilities for local agencies further hampered 
their ability to contribute to the LDV Taskforce. This transition period from RDAs 
to LEPs during the LDV closure combined to make the recovery from the LDV 
closure much more restrictive, enforcing limitations on the potential success of 






6.3 Critique and Analysis of the LDV Taskforce  
This section follows the categories outlined in Table 6.1 in discussing the actual 
actions taken by the local agencies/actors in terms of the response of agents 
and co-operation and/or collaboration and how they intended to influence the 
future course of the plant closure. Furthermore, it directs the discussion towards 
the major events and actions of the LDV Taskforce and places their actions 
within the context of the labour market adjustment of LDV workers. In this 
respect, the section alludes to what were deemed to be the successes of the 
LDV Taskforce and the achievements of the stakeholders. There are four main 
factors that characterise the LDV Taskforce; these were concentrated job 
service; the speed of the taskforce; institutional knowledge; and funding projects 
and schemes. The discussion will summarise the success of these factors 
through engaging in the context of the LDV closure itself while also drawing 
upon independent evidence and comparisons to other experiences. 
 
6.3.1 The Importance of a Concentrated ‘Job Service’  
A crucial factor in the taskforce was its ability to bring together the concentration 
of ‘job services’ and skills to one place or forum. As discussed throughout 
section 6.2, the LDV taskforce was able to summon together the various bodies 
and agencies to one place to provide a range of services; the BCC, Solihull 
Metropolitan Borough Council (MBC), LSC, the Pensions Service and HMRC 
were all available to offer services on debt counselling, benefit information, 
training advice and guidance, information on state pensions and tax credits 
advice. From a total of 810 workers, 662 utilised this service between 11 and 17 
June (Source: Phil Roocroft). The taskforce enabled the concentration of jobs 
and benefit services allowing redundant workers to quickly access services - 
headed by JCP at the site. 
JCP was at the forefront, because it went in very quickly and we spent a weekend 
on overtime taking on the bulk of people’s benefit claims so we acted within 24-48 







There were difficulties maintaining contact with the LDV workers, so to counter 
this a concentrated effort of agencies and services was created via a jobs fair 
on the 24 and 25 June 2009. This provided the ex-LDV workers (also open to 
non-LDV unemployed people) with an opportunity to engage directly with local 
employers or gain awareness of training schemes. The location of the jobs fair 
at Villa Park acted as a focal point which the majority of what LDV workers 
could access.49 
With the MG closure, we as the local authority, we made a joint collective decision to 
get a jobs event running ASAP, and we teamed up with JCP and all the other 
partners and about month and half after the closure we ran the jobs event over an 
entire weekend. Phil Roocroft 
 
The success of the jobs fair was praised highly by the BCC; through attendance 
at the jobs fair (3,000 people50), the jobs event also acted as an employment 
service, helping various LDV workers assess and improve their CVs. The jobs 
fair further stimulated LDV workers in the job search process and alerted them 
to the job opportunities in the area. The BCC did stress that job vacancies were 
available in limited numbers, typically orientated around firms with specific skill 
demands. In relation to the LDV workers themselves, the questionnaire data 
found that out of the sample size of 23 LDV workers, 17 workers were aware of 
the jobs fair event but of those 17 workers, only 7 attended. Table 6.2 illustrates 
the LDV workers’ opinions towards the job fairs services. The table shows that 
of the 7 workers, there was a strong negative response in regards to the 
services offered with only 1 worker demonstrating a good response to each of 
the four factors listed. Despite the good responsive action of the local 
government to establish the jobs fair to advertise job opportunities, in regards to 
the LDV workers the jobs fair failed to address some of the job search demands 
or needs. Though the sample size is small, it can demonstrate the more limited 
job opportunities given the economic situation at the time; in addition, it can 
                                                          
49 Villa Park is the football stadium belonging to Aston Villa FC. The stadium’s large capacity and 
accessibility to the wider area meant that it was an ideal facility to hold a jobs fair. 
50 As mentioned earlier, the jobs fair was not directly aimed at the LDV workers but at the wider area. 
However, with the closure of LDV, the event was brought forward to quickly accommodate LDV 






highlight how job services, training schemes and the encouragement of 
entrepreneurial activities may not address the primary concerns of redundant 
workers typical of plant closure. 
Table 6.2 LDV workers' opinions of 'Villa' jobs fair 
The table shows the opinions of the 7 LDV workers that attended the jobs fair. Source: LDV workers’ 
questionnaire. 
6.3.2 The Speed of the Taskforce 
The speed of organisation of the LDV Taskforce was a predominant feature 
mentioned by all of the individual members. This was due to several reasons, 
one being the knowledge of LDV’s prolonged struggle months prior to its 
closure; the second was the institutional knowledge that had been generated 
over the years through other taskforces. 
  
Figure 6-3: Excess LDV Output 
Image illustrating the high volume of unsold LDV vehicles. Source: birminghammail.net  
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The prolonged closure of the LDV plant in essence provided the relevant 
members of the taskforce with ample time to set up preliminary preparations for 
their responsibilities concerning the workers. The supply chain behind the LDV 
production was one prime example; Rachel Eade mentions how the supply 
chain had been starting to feel the effects of the LDV downturn. 
In the LDV situation LDV had been in a downward spiral, suppliers had been 
preparing for the closure as LDV had been falling behind on payments. The 
suppliers had started to decrease their dependency on LDV and diversify their 
market range. Rachel Eade 
 
The perception that LDV was a troubled company was also reflected in the 
relationship between it and the local council. 
We knew as a local authority that these issues were going on and that LDV was 
going into official receivership, we could see it for quite a while, we could see the 
cracks, IF they got the railhead, IF they got the marketplace, IF their vehicle sales 
had gone up. Phil Roocroft 
The speed and urgency of the taskforce response demonstrates the eagerness 
to initiate contact with the workers as quickly as possible in order to mitigate the 
impact of the closure. They knew that during these early stages the workers 
would be more focused on career change and training schemes. This speedy 
response can be attributed to the experience and knowledge in dealing with 
redundant workers from previous plant closures (MG Rover taskforces of 2000, 
2006). 
 
6.3.3 The Institutional Knowledge of Taskforce Agencies 
The institutional knowledge that was ‘imprinted’ on the agencies involved 
contributed towards the fast reaction and organisation by the LDV Taskforce. 
Rob Beck from JCP explained that many of the members within JCP had been 
a part of previous taskforces, such as the MG Rover Taskforce. They had 
experienced staff that had dealt with similar situations. 
A lot of the good practice that had been developed in the MG Rover collapse was 






involved with that taskforce were also involved in the LDV situation continuing their 
experience. Rob Beck  
 
This experience and knowledge in understanding the issues and problems 
behind significant redundancies emphasised the need for a quick reaction from 
JCP and other members of the taskforce. After LDV went into administration on 
8 June 2009, JCP established a phone hotline; and BCC, Solihull MBC, LSC, 
the Pensions Service and HMRC (Her Majesties Revenue & Customs) had a 
presence on the site by the 11th. These remained at the site until the 14th, 
demonstrating the speed in engaging the LDV workers before the contact with 
the workers became more difficult. 
Rapid Response fund and training schemes offered by the JCP and LSC was vital to 
be a unified front/service to the workers. Zanny Lomas (senior employment and 
partnership manager) 
 
Zanny Lomas also noted the openness and cooperation between LDV and JCP 
and also good cooperation between the local authorities, all of which resulted in 
quick decisive action from JCP. 
The JCP team were key to all aspects in terms of delivery, due to their experience of 
dealing with these situations and their ‘on the ground’ knowledge. Phil Roocroft 
 
All of the agencies involved had substantial knowledge and experience of 
dealing with plant closures. They were decisive in engaging with the LDV 
workforce, registering the workers for job services and benefits claims, and 
getting the workers logged into the JCP system. Furthermore, the experience of 
the MG Rover closure taught the BCC the need for a jobs event to stimulate 
workers interacting with job opportunities. In this regard, the taskforce was 
successful in dealing with the short-term and immediate implications of the 
closure and beginning the course of re-employment for workers. The ambition 
of the taskforce and their ability to implement more sophisticated long-term 







6.3.4 Funding of the LDV Taskforce 
Due to the limited access to national central funding, the LDV taskforce had to 
utilise a diverse range of funding schemes initiated by the individual agencies to 
support the overarching projects and strategies created by the LDV Taskforce. 
The LDV Taskforce was intuitive in overcoming some of the financial shortfalls 
of the LDV recovery; however, there were often trade-offs for gaining the 
acquired funding, adding conditions to how funds could be implemented. While 
some investment schemes such as Accelerate (run through the Chambers of 
Commerce and utilised by MAS) did have objectives to assist certain sectors 
affected by the closure in order to adapt and diversify (such as the supply chain, 
local businesses and dealership networks), the limited funding available 
prevented them from having a primary role. Agencies such as the LSC, JCP 
and BCC had access to funding from already established projects. The 
extensive use of local funding schemes established by the BCC and JCP was 
essential to promote any training programmes, these funding schemes being 
primarily the Working Neighbourhoods Fund (WNF) and the Rapid Response 
Fund (RRF). 
The WNF was a funding programme initiated by BCC to identify local 
companies that were facing difficulties and were threatened with job losses. The 
WNF would support these companies financially to maintain some staff wages 
for a short period but this was limited to very small companies. In the LDV case, 
the company was beyond saving in terms of the capabilities of the WNF, but 
funding was then put in place to support any training opportunities and then 
used to track workers through their stages of re-employment. 
There were issues of local companies being threatened with having to cut jobs; to 
counter this, the WNF was established basically was there to identify opportunities 
where local communities could be supported. Phil Roocroft 
 
LDV received £129,000 from the WNF- first week post closure offered advice 








However, the WNF was a significant programme initiated by the BCC with a 
total fund of £114m from 2008-11 aimed at helping all struggling areas of 
Birmingham. Nonetheless, the WNF funded the jobs fair event at Villa Park that 
was semi-directed towards the LDV workers. The main advantage of the WNF 
is that it could be put into action very quickly in response to closures. Despite 
the WNF having significant resources, it seems that only a minimal amount was 
dedicated to the LDV situation, drastically limiting the potential of any training 
programmes. In this regard, it seems that the WNF was very ‘situational’ and 
could potentially provide substantial financial support but that this is dependent 
on how critical the BCC rated the situation in the wider context of Birmingham 
overall. 
The RRF was a financial package offered to employers of a firm that had gone 
into administration; workers could apply for those funds for various training 
schemes. Zanny Lomas stressed the importance of getting to the workers 
quickly before they ‘dissipated’ (for example going on holiday) or get ‘locked in 
the benefits trap’ (long-term worklessness); this enabled the JCP to maximise 
the services available to the ex-workers. 
The Rapid Response fund really enabled a wide range of services from debt advice, 
transport issues, job search and training opportunities, which was a major 
advantage for the workers. Rob Beck 
 
The funding for training for instance is predicated on largely 28-34s unemployed, if 
you’re a redundant worker with notice you are not eligible for benefit, but you are 
entitled to the redundancy fund. Zanny Lomas 
The main advantage of the RRF was that it was transferable across local 
metropolitan boundaries and allowed instant access for LDV workers regardless 
of their home constituency; given the wide distribution of the LDV workers, this 
was especially useful (see Figs 7.10a and 7.10b). The RRF provided monetary 
support for those workers who would not qualify for other benefit payments. In 
comparison to the WNF, the RRF was more universal and accessible to the 
individual worker. 
The majority of the funding for any training schemes coming from the LSA was 






bigger, more regional-wide training programmes. Many of the training 
programmes were long established by the LSC, so the taskforce was able to 
expand these training programmes immediately to encompass the LDV workers 
(in this example Better West Midlands). 
The Learning skills council (LSC) were involved as they provide a lot of funding into 
the process. Phil Roocroft 
 
European Social Funding (ESF), we were able to be quite flexible with the training. 
The money and provision came from the LSC. John Adams 
 
The support package (project)51 was put in place; Unity (trade union) was the 
organisation that ran the project ‘Better West Midlands’. So it was an LSC contract, 
using our money utilising ESF funds. John Adams 
 
What is also important to note is how the timing of the closure affected the 
funding resources of the taskforce. Although the LSC did provide funding 
through funding networks established in previous years, ‘fresh’ funding was 
limited. This was due to the government restructuring of the primary agencies 
that had been BCC, JCP and the LSC. The roles and remits of the JCP and the 
LSC (not the LSA) had changed. In particular, their targets and capabilities have 
changed significantly, reflecting the cuts in public spending. The LSC had a 
primary role in leading and funding training projects such as Better West 
Midlands. The Better West Midlands programme is a redundancy scheme 
funded by the European Social Fund (ESF), initiated by both employers and 
employees at the announcement of redundancies. The Better West Midlands 
scheme offered employment skills training advice (CV writing, job searching), 
funded skill training and business start-up advice (whereas the LSA simply 
directed local authorities on how best to utilise existing funds and took a more 
advisory role). Similarly, the BCC local authority has undergone spending cuts, 
thus their ability to install long-term projects has been severely handicapped. 
                                                          
51 The support package initially consisted of £5m in 2006 but was then increased to £7.7m in 2007 when it 






As the local authority we have come under huge amounts of cuts, within this 
environment of government reform, if LDV happened today we wouldn’t be able to 
respond in the same sort of way. Phil Roocroft 
 
The funding situation of the LDV Taskforce represents two contrasting aspects. 
First is the ingenuity and competency of local agencies to make use of existing 
funding networks to set in motion training schemes, individual monetary 
assistance and develop localised employment opportunities vis-à-vis the RRF, 
WNF and LSC projects. This addressed the short-term impacts of the closure 
but it must be stressed that these training schemes and employment 
opportunities were limited, given the economic circumstances. This also reflects 
the second aspect of the taskforce – its inability to sustain long-term or more 
sophisticated training opportunities for the LDV workers. Though there were a 
number of funding schemes available to the LDV workers, many of these were 
not dedicated to the LDV closure alone and had to be used in conjunction with 
other local projects; in general, the more money available to a fund scheme or 
project, the more responsibilities and obligations that particular scheme or 
project had. So while LDV could make use of several funding projects, it could 
not access the same levels of financial support and strategic independence that 
was given to the MG Rover closure. Phil Roocroft reinforced the difference in 
the funding available, when he revealed that just £129,000 was made available 
from the Working Neighbourhoods Fund (WNF), which had to cover the entire 
local area of Washwood Heath and not just the LDV site. 
 
6.4 Chapter Conclusions: The LDV Taskforce 
Reaction, Lacking Grounding 
The years 2000-08 set in place the ideal institutional structure for the West 
Midlands to respond to economic crises. This period also represents the 
paramount regional governance abilities to respond effectively to economic 
crises. The RDAs to some degree had given regional economic authorities 
some economic freedoms, albeit with a complex and restrictive set of 






governments and attract investment (Fuller et al. 2002). During 2007-08, 
funding for RDAs amounted to £2.3bn through myriad government sponsors 
(Pugalis 2010: 398).52 With their experience of successful taskforce 
approaches, the differing local and regional agencies within the West Midlands 
had developed an understanding of how to cooperate with each other. Through 
the leadership of AWM, they were able to synergise their resources and 
capabilities within a taskforce framework.  
Again, like MG Rover, attempts could have been made to diversify the LDV 
supply networks and develop the skills of the LDV workers to enhance the 
product quality and added-value, and progress the company. A further 
opportunity had presented itself in 2005 when LDV faced administration: the 
question arises here regarding why a taskforce intervention was not initiated. 
LDV was ‘saved’ at that point by the American capitalists Sun Capital; however, 
this type of takeover was nothing more than asset management and 
restructuring rather than a long-term investment. Whilst LDV executives did 
proclaim the success of the taskforce approach in handling the situation, it 
insisted that a proactive response was required to have a more meaningful 
impact: 
Government can’t help businesses full stop, there is no looking at the bigger picture, 
how can we better protect jobs? Not suffer the cost of job losses. I think that process 
is poor. 
 
I think we have got better at dealing when the company fails, the taskforce was 
brilliant, things like that. So no intervention pure reaction ... The government always 
seems to have their hands tied to prevent proactive action. Interview transcript with 
Guy Jones 
 
This is not to say that the local government did not offer aid at all. Indeed, in 
2003 financial aid was given to LDV in the form of a £25m grant with AWM 
buying the Washwood Heath site.53 BCC did interact with LDV to slow the 
                                                          
52 AWM in particular spent £1.84bn during its tenure. 
53 Providing that LDV retained production of the Maxus van within the UK, AWM agreed to purchase the 






decline of the company through the purchasing of vehicles and training 
schemes for the workforce to assist LDV (Cook et al. 2013): 
Ideally LDV wanted to sell the old vehicles to staff or the council and get any re-
training programmes subsidised. Interview transcript with Phil Roocroft 
 
This aid provided some short-term assistance that LDV needed to gain stability 
and attract further investment. The BCC also instigated longer-term 
infrastructure development connecting the Washwood Heath site to HS2 (Cook 
et al. 2013).54 Unfortunately this intervention had no coherent strategy or 
longevity behind it, and there was no substantial or thorough attempt to engage 
in the sweeping changes the company and the workforce needed. The local 
stakeholders did what they could to aid LDV and it does raise the issue of who 
is responsible for monitoring the health of companies and the economy. In this 
case, without taskforce intervention prior to the main closure itself, there was 
only so much that could be done. 
The policy fault lines were evident well before the closure itself. There may have 
been interventions prior to the eventual closure that could have had significant 
positive implications for LDV. The Rover Taskforce (2005) had the groundwork 
set in place by its predecessor, the Rover Taskforce (2000); in terms of 
diversifying the workforce and supplier network, this development groundwork 
was missing in the case of LDV. What did continue from the MG Rover 
Taskforce was the institutional knowledge of the agencies involved and so 
methods of best practice were carried forward, mitigating the shock factor of the 
closure (Cook et al. 2013). However, within the local agency (in particular the 
JCP) functions had changed drastically. This would in due course have 
consequences for the capabilities and potential of the LDV Taskforce’s success 
and for re-employment opportunities for LDV workers, particularly over the long 
term. 
                                                          
54 High Speed Rail 2 is the planned high-speed rail connection between Birmingham and London. With 
the intended development of the Washwood Heath site, HS2 had the potential to increase the logistical 
capability of LDV, meaning greater access to markets. However, these plans were always in their 
embryonic stage and failed to develop beyond the medium term and did not have any major effect on 






6.4.1 The LDV Taskforce – Excellent Start but Lacking Longevity 
When the announcement of the firm going into administration was clarified, the 
LDV Taskforce kicked into action, the primary distinction being that the 
taskforce was headed by the local government BCC instead of AWM. This 
instinctively placed the LDV Taskforce lower down the political ‘pecking order’, 
thus limiting its financial capabilities and shifting the nature of the taskforce to a 
much more local scope and limitation to its strategies. This would result in the 
LDV Taskforce relying much more on the individual actions of the various 
agencies rather than having a long-term strategic plan. This more localised 
scope, in combination with the political restructuring of public agencies, 
influenced how the LDV Taskforce was able to operate, which then emphasised 
the taskforce’s ambitions towards more short-term rather than long-term goals 
(Hall, 2013). 
The question arises regarding how whether the LDV Taskforce got off to a good 
start. One main feature of the LDV Taskforce was the ‘institutional knowledge’ 
that each of the individual agencies could utilise in implementing the actions 
and policies of the taskforce. The agencies within those taskforces soon 
developed an understanding of what the best practice was to relieve those 
affected by the closures in the best way possible. Over the years, this 
understanding was developed and by 2008 the agencies became very proficient 
in dealing with these situations (Cook et al. 2013). 
A lot of the good practice that had been developed in the MG Rover collapse was 
refined and put into use for the LDV closure. Furthermore, a lot of the people 
involved with that taskforce were also involved in the LDV situation continuing their 
experience. Source: Rob Beck 
 
With the experience gathered over the years, great emphasis was placed on 
speed, engaging with workers as quickly as possible to achieve two primary 
goals: 1) to familiarise redundant workers with the out-of-work benefits and 
training funding schemes available to them; and 2) to encourage workers to 
begin searching for work or training to get them out of unemployment as soon 






redundant workers from entering long-term unemployment cycles, as the longer 
it takes for successful re-employment, the higher the likelihood of damaging the 
individual’s employability and the potential for permanent unemployment 
(Shuttleworth et al. 2005). This has the further positive note of reducing the 
strain on the benefits system. 
The institutional knowledge also extended to how various programmes and 
schemes were funded and initiated by the agencies and in many ways 
represented the more positive attributes of the LDV Taskforce (Cook et al. 
2013). The leading agencies of the taskforce, JCP and the LSC, were prime 
examples of this institutional knowledge in practice. JCP had established the 
RRF; this fund was aimed at the employer so that moneys allocated towards the 
employer can be filtered down to the redundant workers. The benefits of this 
funding were that it was cross-boundary and also circumnavigated the benefit 
restrictions for redundant workers.55 The RRF also engaged with the employer 
in discussing what skills were present within the workforce so that JCP could 
immediately relay these skills to consultancy firms. JCP engaged with workers 
claims quickly in keeping to the quick engagement strategy that was adopted. 
The claims were taken on the weekend of that week on Washwood Heath ... So we 
kicked into operation quickly and the JCP became the ‘foot soldiers’ during that 
week having face to face contact with the employees. Source Zanny Lomas 
The LSC had created the network support56 programme back in 2006 in 
recognition of the auto industry’s difficulties in the local area. This programme 
was quickly put into place for the LDV workers that wanted to develop their 
skills. The LSC further recognised the need for workers to gain ‘recognisable 
skills’ for employers. Instead of just promoting GNVQ courses, the LSC would 
link skills training directly with a job opportunity. So, for instance, if an employer 
created a job position orientated around the use of a specific piece of 
equipment, machinery or job role, the LSC would offer training for those 
particular requirements [sourced from LSC interview]. The LSC accentuated 
                                                          
55 Restrictions on benefits were placed on the age group 28-34 who had been given redundancy notice. 
The information regarding the RRF was taken from interviews with JCP. 
56 The network support programme had initial funding of £5m in 2006 with a further £2.7m injected in 







that the choice of training opportunities should remain with the individual and 
that it should not encourage skills training within manufacturing sectors, to 
clearly verify to LDV workers the vulnerabilities of remaining within these 
sectors and explain the likelihood of future vacancies.57 Finally, the LSC 
appreciated how geography produced differing job demands among the various 
local Birmingham boroughs (Shuttleworth et al. 2005). To address this, the LSC 
contracted out training programmes to local colleges as these institutions could 
better direct training to local demands. To further exemplify the institutional 
knowledge on a local level, BCC utilised the WNF to get quick access to funding 
for the LDV workforce (Cook et al. 2013). With the multitude of closures within 
the local authority area, the BCC made it a priority to create a job fair quickly; 
again, speed was key to instigating job searching among the redundant 
workers. 
The initial success of the taskforce in mitigating the immediate impacts of the 
LDV closure lay in the institutional knowledge of the agencies involved. This 
knowledge and experience had developed a method of good practice, engaging 
with the workers to get them quickly into the benefits system and active within 
the labour market to access the various funding schemes and programmes to 
best effect (Cook et al. 2013). However, a lot of what has been discussed 
focuses on the short term, neglecting the potential long-term difficulties workers 
may face. In this respect, the actions of the LDV Taskforce overlooked the 
employment pathways of the LDV workers, which created the disconnected58 
feeling between the workers and the taskforce reaction. 
 
6.4.2 Summary of the LDV Response 
The LDV Taskforce approach was orientated along the same structure as the 
MG Rover Taskforce. The focus of the taskforce was to synergise the local 
                                                          
57 This view of the LSC was contrary to that of the JCP and local authorities who preferred skills training 
to be more focused on skills in manufacturing. This is testament to the LSC’s institutional knowledge, 
knowing the vulnerabilities of sectors within the economy and allowing the individual to find 
opportunities. 
58 This disconnected terminology is explained in the following chapter as the data from the LDV workers 






agencies to provide the most effective assistance to the workers through 
training schemes and to ensure financial stability to promote job searching or 
engaging in retraining. However, the taskforce’s long-term ambitions were 
hindered by several factors: the organisation and focus of the taskforce (with a 
concentration of resources and strategy within a select number of agencies); 
the political and economic context (the economic recession reducing job 
opportunities and taskforce funding); and public sector restructuring (reducing 
the capacity of the primary agencies). The LDV Taskforce simply did not have 
the ideal set-up to continue the same level of support in the same manner as 
previous taskforces. There was strong emphasis on quick interaction and 
engagement with the workforce, which was achieved through the extensive 
experience of the agencies that made up the taskforce. The combination of 
taskforce priorities and past experience had encouraged a short-term focus on 
the recovery which was very successful but incapable of sustaining a longer-
term strategy and approach. 
To provide long-term assistance to workers, more attention could have been 
paid to the identification of employment trajectories among recently redundant 
workers. There are long-term implications from redundancy shock that affect 
workers through a combination of demographic traits, skills and job roles, career 
history and progression with their personal knowledge of the labour market on 
an individual basis (Cook et al. 2013). The workers that are most at risk are 
those who are skill-dependent, with qualifications/skills that are not easily 
transferable and those of an older age group with limited training opportunities 
(Green and Collis 2006; Cook et al. 2013). The importance of understanding an 
individual’s job history and job search exposure is not to be underestimated 
(regardless of skills level); if an individual’s only job experience has been within 
the same firm (typical of manufacturing and industrial workers in OIRs) then 
more sophisticated aid needs to be made available (Green 2003); in effect, 
better analysis of employability amongst redundant workers can mitigate the 
shock to the most vulnerable (Cook et al. 2013). Part of a longer-term 
restructuring process involving local actors is overcoming restrictive 






unemployment for more susceptible individuals (Cook et al. 2013). In this way, 
workers’ potential employment pathways can be better identified leading to the 
right type of help, whether that be training into a new sector or specifically into a 















































7.1 The Context of the LDV Workers: Introducing 
the Worker Trajectories 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the empirical data collected and offer 
interpretations in relation to achieving the research aims of the thesis. This 
analysis chapter will develop the concept of ‘employment trajectories’ among 
the LDV workforce. The ‘employment trajectories’ designations are used to 
cross-examine characteristics of the LDV workforce, such as employment 
history both at LDV and post closure, demographics, geographical distribution 
(commuting distance), skills & qualifications and established networks, to build 
some understanding of the employability of such characteristics within the 
labour market. This helps comprehend what synergies/combinations of factors 
contribute to or diminish or enhance the employability of certain groups of 
workers, with a focus on highly skilled workers. Finally, this analysis can be 
used to help develop or suggest labour market policy recommendations and 
discussions. 
The worker questionnaires were used to establish the categories into which the 
LDV workforce was placed.59 The categories cover geographical location, 
wages (while at LDV and in current employment), skills, age, period of 
unemployment and job satisfaction. The worker interviews aimed to insert 
qualitative insights into the discussion to conceptualise the various employment 
trajectories of the LDV workers. The number of telephone interviews was limited 
to eight due to the number of participants who were willing to proceed further 
with the research. However, these interviews gave great insights and in-depth 
data concerning the re-employability of the ex-LDV workers and contributed 
towards the ‘worker trajectories’ analysis. 
The chapter then moves on to discuss the empirical data in more detail and 
explain the employment trajectories and employment pathways amongst the 
LDV workers after the plant closure. This will cover such factors as the jobs they 
obtained, the sector in which their current job resides, and the length of time 
                                                          






unemployed before attaining their current employment. Before discussing these 
facets in further detail, this chapter will first firmly establish what is meant by the 
term employment trajectories per se with reference to the LDV workers, before 
setting out the initial actions and prospects that faced the workers within the 
context of the LDV closure. 
The primary research uncovered that many high-skill and office-tier 
management workers of LDV experienced difficulties finding re-employment 
post-LDV – employment barriers usually associated with lower-skilled workers. 
However, in contrast, the research also showed that there were other highly 
skilled office-tier workers of similar qualifications who were able to overcome re-
employment barriers and demonstrate high employability. The research 
developed the term of employment trajectories as a means to identify and 
categorise what factors or reasons were behind the successes or difficulties of 
the re-employment outcomes amongst the highly skilled workers and to 
establish the basis from which the analysis could begin. Table 1.1 displays a 
breakdown of the ex-workers that participated within the survey, showing some 
demographic data and a brief overview of their employment history. Table 7.2 
exemplifies the initial outcomes of employment amongst the workers before the 
analysis builds towards the worker trajectories to integrate all of the aspects 


























Table 7-1: Characteristics of Ex-LDV workers by contributing factors 
Main contributory factors of the employment trajectories in conjunction with LDV workers’ skills, 




Age  Highest 
qualification 


















11-20  3 weeks off after the closure 











1-5 From 2009-10 Skoda 
dealership. 










20+ Remained at LDV for a 2-
month period post closure to 
help processing. Unemployed 
for 18 months. 
 Jan 2011-March 2012 leisure 
and tourism manager. 
Automotive 
(SAIC, HR) 




















F 44 Level 2 
security 
Logistics 20+ Been a part of NEC security 
after LDV closed. 
Service 














6-10 Left labour market for 18 
months. 
7 months at Decoma from 
mid-2010. 
Then had 6 months at a 
Chinese engineering firm. 










create own business. 




1-5 Two part-time jobs from 2009 
to Jan 2013. 
Then one of the part-time 
positions became a full-time 
contract. 
JLR 




20+ Unemployed during 2009. 






K 44 GCSEs On 
Production 
11-19 Unemployed during 2009. 
Small part-time job during 
2010. 










20+ Oct 2009 started voluntary 
work Coventry airport 2009 for 
a 10-month period. 
Then June 2010 multi-part. 
Automotive 
supply chain 
M 30 HNC Vehicle 
evaluation 
engineer 
6-10 Contracted out engineer later 
years of LDV. 
 After closure became 
unemployed for 4 months. 








11-19 Unemployed from June–Dec 




O 48 City and 




20+ Multi-part trucks logistics for 3 




P 59 BA degree Sales 
director 











11-19 Unemployed for 3 months. 









6-10 None Retired 




6-10 Left June 2008 and was able 















20+ Initially retired but re-entered 
market after 6 months. 







U 54 NVQ lvl2 Supervisor 11-19 None Food supply 








W 27 University 
degree, HND, 
HNC, NVQ 





11-19 6 months unemployed after 
closure. 






From the characteristics shown and the initial breakdown of the questionnaire 
data, there are six main employment outcomes that have been identified. For 
each of the employment outcomes, there are five main variables that contribute 
to defining employment outcomes: qualification level, experience of the labour 
market, new employment within the automotive industry, outcome of 
employment, and method of gaining employment. These main categories have 
been chosen for several reasons. The qualification level establishes the 
employment expectations of that individual when re-entering the labour market. 
Typically, those with higher qualifications should be able to adapt successfully, 
whereas those with lower qualifications would find gaining new employment 
more difficult.60 Second, job seekers’ experience of the labour market defines 
how the individual progressed in their job search. Third, their employment within 
the automotive industry would indicate if the individual was able to continue to 
utilise their skills and experience developed in LDV and remain on a similar 
career path. Fourth, the type of employment they attained, such as a permanent 
contract, would illustrate the quality of their employment, for example a more 
                                                          
60 By this, the author means finding employment that the individual deems satisfying and financially 
rewarding/substantial. Workers that found it difficult to adapt will be those individuals who did not finds 






secure source of income and job conditions; and finally, the method the 
individual utilised to find their current employment is also considered.  
The next step is to continue the discussion through using employment 
outcomes of LDV workers and to establish the main factors and indicators that 
contribute to the worker trajectories and relate specific labour market policy. 
Section 7.2 will assess how successful the workers’ post-LDV employment was 
by looking into the levels of pay, job satisfaction and type of employment. 
Section 7.3 continues the discussion through reasons behind the employment 
outcomes of the workers not explicitly made clear from the questionnaire data 
but drawing from extracts of the interview data. The chapter concludes through 
bringing the key aspects of the data together through the employment trajectory 
concept to illustrate potential vulnerabilities and strengths of highly skilled 
workers, and if findings can be applied to other plant closure situations. The 
analysis proceeds onto further contextual information about the LDV workers so 
as to give ‘grounding’ to the worker outcomes and construct towards the 
employment trajectories. 
 
7.1.2 Length of Career at LDV and Experience of Redundancy 
This section looks at the length of career of the workers at LDV (Figure 7.1) and 
establishes how workers are reliant on certain skill sets, which were 
fundamental during their position at LDV. A second important factor about the 
length of career spent at a single company is how it alters the individual’s 
personal experience and perceptions61 in interacting with the labour market. 
Should an individual have spent a significant time within a single company, then 
the experience they used to gain a job at the start of their career will more than 
likely become ineffectual in the modern labour market. The evaluation includes 
the worker’s career within Leyland in addition to the years of service within LDV. 
The reason for including Leyland was to recognise the shared corporate history 
and the integrated organisational structure between the companies. This 
                                                          
61 The term experience and perceptions refers to the workers’ interaction with the job support services, 
their application processes and their perceptions of what are considered ideal skills and qualifications for 






corporate integration enabled staff to be transferred between the companies 
very easily, utilising the same skill sets for a similar job role. Indeed, the 
companies were so heavily integrated that many workers considered their 
career at LDV as an extension of their career at Leyland, even when LDV 
became a separate entity after the management buyout in 1993. 
 
Figure 7-1: Histogram of years of service within LDV/Leyland 
Source: Primary data collected via the telephone surveys. 
 
Years of service were divided into four groups: 
 1-5 years - Junior members of the company in terms of service, having 
more recent experience of the local labour market and being potentially 
more flexible to change. 
 6-10 years - More integrated into the company and attuned to the 
demands of that particular job role. However, still has a good knowledge 
and experience of the modern labour market. 
 11-19 years - Represents a significant period of time at the company. 
Experience generated throughout that time period becomes more 
specific for that company or job role. 
 >20 years - Majority of working career spent at the one company. The 






orientated; however, will have little or no working knowledge of the 
modern labour market outside the company. 
Figure 7.1 exemplifies that the majority of the respondents had dedicated a 
large part of their working careers either at LDV and/or Leyland. The largest 
group (8 respondents) had over 20 years’ service; the second largest group (7 
respondents) had 19 years within the company, indicating that many employees 
had been at LDV for a considerable time. The group of 6-10 years (5 
respondents) represents the third largest group. Finally, those workers that had 
been at LDV for 1-5 years were the smallest group, consisting of 3 respondents. 
This might show that the company’s labour force was not growing during the 
later years prior to closure, except to recruit specialists to perform certain roles 
(such as executive positions or highly specialised manufacturing skills).  
When combined, the two largest groups (that is 11-19 years and >20 years’ 
service with 15 respondents) demonstrate that a substantial proportion of 
respondents have spent a significant amount of their working life within the UK 
automotive manufacturing sector. The automotive sector had become a 
vulnerable sector within recent decades (up to 2010 at least), with the strongest 
growth in the regional economy occurring in service sectors such as health, 
education and financial services (Donnelly et al. 2005). Therefore, many LDV 
workers will have developed skills, qualifications and expertise that are firm-
orientated and not in demand by the growing sectors of the labour market. 
These skills are very job-specific and have become reliant on certain sectors of 
the economy expanding or performing well. For example, the mini revival of the 
British automotive industry (primarily JLR production remaining in the West 
Midlands after the Tata takeover) does present a limited opportunity for LDV 
workers to remain within the automotive sector. On the other hand, the other 
potential outcome could lead to some individuals becoming underemployed, 
accepting lower wages, unfavourable contracts and lower job security 







7.1.3 Skills and Qualifications of LDV Workforce 
Before evaluating the skills and qualifications of the workers, the characteristics 
of the workers must be clarified. Figure 7.2 shows that the majority of the 
workers interviewed (12 respondents) were employed in the office tier, ranging 
from human resources, sales and marketing, to IT and product development 
departments. Only three respondents worked directly in a manufacturing 
department of LDV. Lastly, eight respondents worked in departments that were 
included in the ‘other’ category, which covers: load bay, warehouse, paint shop, 
used vehicles, logistics, press shop, quality assurance and budget control. 
These departments can be split into several categories with each demanding a 
separate set of skills. The load bay and warehouse would fall into the more 
labour-intensive skills. The manufacturing department would be labour-intensive 
but involve an intricate mix of industrial skill sets and experience that may not 
be recognised by the wider labour market. The paint shop and press shop 
would require more specialist industrial skills and qualifications generated 
through apprenticeships offered by manufacturing companies. The used 
vehicles department demands more intense experience and knowledge about 
the commercial vehicle market and LDV combined with sales expertise. Finally, 
quality assurance and budget control fall under the office management tier 







Figure 7-2: Departments where LDV respondents worked 
Source: Primary data collected via telephone surveys. 
 
There is a varied range of departments with a differing range of skills and demands 
that those positions require, but the majority of the respondents would be classified 
as ‘white collar’ workers, with qualifications that are representative of these types of 
workers. Figure 7.3 displays the qualifications of the respondent showing typical 
qualifications of a majority ‘white collar’ data set. Typical departments that would 
constitute white collar would be human resources, sales and marketing, information 
systems and finance. Although these different departments have been branded 
together as ‘white collar’, each of these departments require different skills to 
manage these job roles efficiently. These departments represent a significant 
proportion of the workers considered to have adaptable skills within the labour 
market, and this is exemplified by the levels of qualifications displayed below (see 
Figure 7.3). The remaining departments consist of manufacturing (three 
respondents), product development (four respondents) and ‘other’ (eight 
respondents). These departments still represent a significant proportion of workers 
from the white-collar departments who have varying skill sets, demands and needs 






The majority of the respondents have academic qualifications; two respondents have 
five GCSEs at grade C or higher, eight respondents have a university degree 
qualification or an equivalent level of qualification, and finally, two respondents had a 
postgraduate qualification. Figure 7.3 shows that 12 respondents had academic 
qualifications that demonstrated the high level of skills among the survey. City & 
Guilds, Part 1 City & Guilds and NVQ qualifications combined totalled ten 
respondents. The ‘other’ qualifications presented by three respondents consisted of 
the following: Smith Certificate, Level 2 Security and NVQ Warwick University. None 
of the workers stated that they had no recognised qualifications, meaning that if they 
had left secondary education with no qualifications, they had developed recognised 
qualifications through their career at LDV/Leyland. This illustrates that other 
departments that are considered labour-intensive do actually demand qualifications 
and skill sets that encourage the training of those workers to meet their job roles. 
 
Figure 7-3 Qualifications of the respondents 







7.1.4 The Age Factor within Employment Trajectories 
The age of workers (within the data set) is predominantly that of an older age 
group, with the predominant age groups been between 40 and 49 and between 
50 and 59, with ten respondents and nine respondents respectively. The 
smaller age groups were the younger group of 25-39 and the near retirement 
age of >60. The average age of an LDV worker was 48, reflecting the older 
manufacturing workforce. These age groups are typical of firms in 
manufacturing, having older employees than firms based in retail or marketing 
sectors. The study of the Harland and Wolff closure by Shuttleworth (2005) 
found that 53% of employees were over 45;62 similarly MG Rover’s workers 
were also aged between 40 and 54 (Armstrong 2006).63 
 
Figure 7-4: Age of Employees 
Source: Primary data collected via telephone surveys. 
 
These age groups were chosen based on the following: 
 16-24 - Very young, just entering the labour market, typically have few 
qualifications or have begun training/apprenticeships. Still in a vulnerable 
position as to their lack of experience or skills. 
                                                          
62 Harland and Wolff was a shipyard based in Northern Ireland which closed in 2000. 






 25-39 - Still of a young age group, may have developed skills, 
qualifications and experience that are desirable to employers but remain 
adaptable to new labour market demands. 
 40-49 - Mature age group, offer a large amount of experience that can be 
in high demand. Skills and qualifications tend to be more specialist but 
still offer a high attraction to employers. The level of specialisation can be 
a hindrance or advantageous depending on whether the individual’s skills 
are recognised qualifications. 
 50-59 - More mature age group; the weakness here is that these 
individuals are likely to be specialists within their skill sets, qualifications 
and experience thus becoming inflexible but again dependent on job type 
and sector; furthermore, they are approaching retirement which may put 
off potential employers. 
 >60 – Workers in this age group are more likely to find re-employment 
more difficult. Although the default retirement age (DRA) has been 
abolished and replaced by the Employment Equality Regulations (2011), 
which enforces protection against age discrimination, potential employers 
may be deterred from investing in retraining into new job roles as they 
are so close to leaving the labour market.  
The age of the employees plays a significant part in determining the 
employability of the individual within the labour market. As discussed in Chapter 
2, the UK government’s labour market policy is attuned to a neoliberal stance, 
demanding that labour be more flexible to the demands of the economy 
(Danson 2005; Birch and Mykhnenko 2008; Dicken 2011). This requires 
individuals to have skills and personality traits that are deemed more flexible 
and adaptable to market circumstances. Typically, younger individuals are 
better able to adapt and learn skills that are ideal for consumer-led economies, 
in which the service sector is the primary employer. From this perspective, 
younger employees are a better investment; they can develop their skill sets to 
the demands of the firm, having lower wage demands with the potential to 






Conversely, individuals that are of an older age group tend to have had a longer 
career within a single firm. This means that while they have developed 
specialist skills and experience that make them proficient in that job role, sector 
or firm, it actually makes them more inflexible within the current labour market. 
The compatibility of older workers is an issue as some may potentially be 
disruptive in a new company.64 The major contrast between the younger and 
older age groups is the factor of diminishing returns, from employing and 
retraining the worker to when that worker may potentially leave the company 
(i.e. an older worker retiring). Younger workers in this sense present better 
returns on investment in training than an older worker. 
However, this is also dependent on their job role and the type of skills 
demanded within that role. As discussed earlier in this section, Figure 7.4 
demonstrates that the primary age groups from the telephone surveys were in 
the 40-49 and 50-59 age groups. This will mean that the factor of age in 
employability for these workers will have a stronger significance and will be 
related to other traits and skill sets that they possess in terms of finding 
employment (Pinch and Mason 1991). The role of age will carry varying 
degrees of weight with the different employment pathways. Age will have a 
detrimental effect on those workers with low skills or unrecognised skills 
because if they are nearing retirement, the scope to retrain these workers is 
limited, making diminishing returns higher for potential employers; this is 
demonstrated through the findings. 
03.01 What were your thoughts and concerns when you were made 
redundant? 
... Financial concerns were the main thing but also worried about my age; I had gone 
over 50 and worried how this would affect my employment opportunities. (Transcript 
from worker U). 
 
06.01 Did you try to seek a permanent position with Land Rover when leaving 
LDV? 
                                                          
64 Older workers may be ‘set in their ways’, which can disrupt the company working culture of that firm. 
However, the opposite can also be true; the experience and skills brought in may be ideal and they may 
‘hit the ground running’ within the role. Ultimately this depends on the personality of the individual to be 






I applied several times after I left LDV but didn’t get through the online application 
test. I think it’s down to my age, although they will never say that. They only have a 
certain percentage of people of a certain age group on the track because it’s a very 
physically demanding job. (Transcript from worker G) 
Workers G and U (see Table 7.1) became very reliant on the manufacturing 
industry to maintain their employment status (i.e. levels of pay, similar job role). 
Likewise, workers on the other end of the spectrum that have highly specialised 
skills could also be vulnerable, depending on their age. To bring in individuals 
with high skills and experience can be expensive for companies due to the 
wage demands combined with the prospect of that individual being close to 
retirement. 
 
7.2 The LDV Worker Outcomes: Key Factors and 
Indicators 
The analysis now turns to evaluate workers’ trajectory outcomes after plant 
closure. This will include analysing their employment history post LDV, the 
types of employment secured, salary fluctuations, job satisfaction, job quality 
and potential job stability. These factors all contribute to the perceived job 
quality of their new employment. This chapter will present the findings 
concerning these factors from the data gathered from the workers; it attempts to 
conclude what outcomes have emerged. This will allude to what factors have 
precisely influenced certain employment outcomes within the LDV context, 
which are expressed further within section 7.3. 
7.2.1 Employment History After LDV Closure 
Workers’ employment history assesses the type of work that job seekers have 
found in comparison to their previous position at LDV. This will cover factors 
such as utilising existing skills and the level of retraining to maintain a similar 
career path or – if their new jobs are different – whether they actually require 
completely different skill sets with considerable retraining or significant 
readjustments. Three of the respondents interviewed were forced out of the 






were close to retirement, so it is no surprise that age played a dominant factor 
in their ability to stay in the labour market. Interestingly, seven respondents 
stayed in the labour market and had only one job post the closure of LDV. The 
largest group, 13 of the respondents, managed to stay in employment but had 
more than one job. 
Table 7.2 displays the employment history of the respondents that remained or 
returned to the labour market after the closure of LDV. There are examples of 
workers who had long-term spells of unemployment before returning to work. 
Many workers had gaps in their employment immediately after closure, ranging 
from three to 18 months. Many of these individuals also engaged in different 
jobs once they re-entered the job market, with reasons for this varying from 
company restructuring, unsatisfying work and, most commonly, the need for a 
permanent position. This could reflect the instability of the local economy during 
2009, the lack of suitable job vacancies in terms of stable, well-paid jobs and 
predominately more part-time vacancies, forcing redundant workers to engage 
in more ‘erratic’ job patterns. 
Table 7.3 shows the workers who left the labour market via retirement or 
redundancy but then returned to employment. In this situation, the respondents 
decided to make use of their redundancy pay and take time off from work. 
Initially worker T wanted to leave the labour market permanently and retire but 
then re-entered employment to keep mentally active and stimulated. By 
contrast, worker H deliberately took substantial time away from the labour 




















Table 7-2 Employment History of Workers who Retained Employment 
LDV workers who had a long period of unemployment, engaging in more than one job before entering 
current employment 
Designation Age Current job 
title 
Jobs prior current position Reason for job 
ending 
W 44 Forklift driver 6 months unemployed after closure. 
Jan-March 2010 Working for UK mail. 
Company 
restructuring 
J 59 Workshop help Unemployed during 2009. 




K 44 Production 
operative 
Unemployed during 2009. 
Small part-time job during 2010. 
Currently at JLR car park patrol. 
Wanted a 
permanent job 
Q 47 Account 
Manager 
Unemployed for 3 months. 
 Then from Sept 2009 multi-part trucks. 
N/A 
M 30 Test validation Contracted out engineer later years of 
LDV. 
 After closure became unemployed for 4 
months. 
Then joined Tata November 2009. 
Wanted a more 
permanent 
position 
C 46 HR manager Remained at LDV for a 2- month period 
post closure to help processing. 
Unemployed for 18 months. 





N 42 Manufacturing 
advisor 
Unemployed from June–Dec 2009, then 








Table 7-3: Individuals Returning to the Labour Market  
LDV workers who decided to leave the labour market via retirement or redundancy but then returned to 
employment 
Designation Age Current job title Jobs prior current position Reason for job ending 
L 61 Procurement 
manager 
distributor 
Oct 2009 started voluntary work 
Coventry airport 2009 for a 10-
month period. 
Then June 2010 multi-part 
Initially wanted casual 
work but offered a more 
permanent position.  
H 53 Paint engineer Left labour market for 18 
months. 
7 months at Decoma LTD from 
mid-2010. 
Then had 6 months at a Chinese 
engineering firm. 
From 2011 was spurred on to 
create own business 
Wanted a more 
permanent job. 
Travelling to work 
become too expensive. 
T 61 Exam invigilator Initially retired but re-entered 
market after 6 months. 
From 2010 worked for 
Warwickshire council part time. 
N/A 
 
Table 7.5 displays the workers that were unemployed for a short period (fewer 
than four weeks) after the LDV plant closure. This table shows another varied 
set of employment paths for the LDV workers. Workers F, S and A were the 
only workers that were able to leave LDV and enter their current employment 
after LDV. Workers S and A held senior positions within the company and 
through their skill sets adapted more easily after the closure of LDV. Workers I 
and G moved into part-time work after the closure; worker I in fact had two part-
time jobs over a four-year period. Worker I’s employment history demonstrated 
a dynamic employment trajectory with a high degree of employability, being 
able to move to multiple positions, losing two positions through company 
restructuring before his current employment. The reasons why these two 
workers in particular were forced out of their jobs were due to their employer 
companies either restructuring or closing down. Workers O and B in contrast 
had stable employment and found permanent employment contracts 






Table 7-4 Employment History  
The table lists LDV workers who spent little time unemployed after the LDV closure and engaged in new 
employment quickly.  
 
Designation Age Current 
job title 
Jobs prior current position Reason for job 
ending 
I 38 Product 
associate 
Two part-time jobs from 2009 to Jan 
2013. 
Then one of the part-time positions 
became a full-time contract. 
Company 
restructuring 
F 44 Storage Been a part of NEC security after LDV 
closed. 
N/A 
O 48 Network dev 
manager 
Multi-part trucks logistics for 3 years, 1 






S 55 CEO Left June 2008 and was able to find 
employment immediately.  
N/A 





B 42 Business 
centre 
manager 
 From 2009-10 Skoda dealership. 
From 2010-11 Peugeot dealership  
Did not like the 
work environment 
A 43 IT 
management 
3 weeks off after the closure got into 
current employment. 
N/A 
W 27 Manufacturing 
engineer 
Out of work for 1 month after the closure. 
Then in 2009, 9 months with V 
installations. 
Had 3-month gap in 2010, and then spent 







Table 7.4 again reflects the unstable nature of the economy during 2009 and 
the problems that workers suffered from in finding stable long-term employment. 
Even though the local economy provided employment opportunities for the 
workers, Tables 7.3 and 7.4 both demonstrate that a majority of respondents 
either had extended periods of unemployment or uncertainty or went through a 






Respondents to the telephone survey show that through various employment 
routes, which may have involved long periods of unemployment, they managed 
to obtain long-term employment contracts and what would seem to be long-term 
stable employment. These employment trajectories will have been the result of 
the accumulation of the chain of economic shocks in the region, reducing 
employment opportunities, compounded with employability barriers that some 
workers faced in such a demanding labour market. Figures 7.5 and 7.6 
complement Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4, illustrating how many of the workers were 
able to maintain employment within the automotive industry. 
Figure 7-5: Sector Employment Post-LDV 
Bar chart showing the job sectors where workers entered into current employment  


























Figure 7-6: Production Line Worker Breakdown 
Display of current job sectors of workers that worked directly on the LDV production line. Direct 
production line workers are: E, G, H, I, J, K, M  
















Figure 7.5 shows that half of the workers managed to maintain employment 
within manufacturing in the automotive industry. As mentioned previously, the 
majority of the workers were from the management tier. Figure 7.6 displays LDV 
workers that directly worked on the production line and what job sectors they 
currently work in. In this context, it can be seen that out of seven workers, five 
were able to maintain employment manufacturing the automotive industry. The 
question arises whether these workers benefitted from the previous taskforce 
intervention, which provided support to other manufacturing sectors and what 
factors contributed to making these workers able to remain in relevant 
automotive manufacturing sectors. Did these workers rely on more personal 
initiative or network contacts to secure these manufacturing positions or was it 
due to the type of support they received? What it does suggest is that, despite 
some workers sharing similar skills and positions, some workers are distinctly 
better able to ‘navigate’ the labour market, leaving a portion of vulnerable 
workers confined to more negative path trajectories and outcomes, bringing into 







7.2.2 Types of Employment Post-LDV Closure 
This section evaluates the types of employment that the LDV workers moved 
into after the plant closure. Their current job is compared to their employment at 
LDV. Two important facets will be considered. First – is the current job similar to 
their position at LDV? Table 7.1 shows that workers C, H, I and K found 
employment within automotive manufacturing with firms such as SAIC 
(Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation), JLR, Rolls Royce and Plastic 
Omnium Automotive respectively, utilising their skills gained at LDV. Worker W 
is no longer within the automotive industry but is still able to continue their skills 
development and experience from LDV. Workers E and R are retired, although 
E did retain a minor part-time job. Worker G has moved from production 
operative to care work. Lastly workers D, H and P have become self-employed 
consultants within their professional field. 
Figure 7.7 takes the analysis further by illustrating the similarity of skills utilised 
in their current job position to that of their position within LDV. The workers were 
split into five categories, each representing the degree of change for re-
employment for the workers: 
 Exactly the same role: this identifies workers that were able to maintain 
their career path and have a smooth transition back into re-employment. 
 Very similar role using many of the same skills: this group consists of 
workers that have managed a smooth transition into new work with little 
retraining and using their previous LDV experiences and skills in their 
new workplace. 
 Slightly different role but using same skills: the workers have had to 
adapt by getting a different role but are able to utilise pre-existing skills 
acquired at LDV. 
 Different role using a few of the same skills: this represents a significant 
change in employment. Workers have been forced to adapt to their new 






 Completely different role: embodies a major change in career. The 
individual has undergone retraining or even undertaken new 






Figure 7-7: Job Role Similarity to LDV Position 
Showing the similarity of roles (i.e. the role itself and the skills utilised at both companies) between 
workers’ current employment and their position within LDV  
Source: Primary data collected via telephone surveys. 
 
From Figure 7.7 it can be established that the majority of the workers have 
different roles within their current employment from their positions at LDV. 
When combining the three groups that have different roles, a total of 13 workers 
have found re-employment outside their established career path. Despite that, 
14 of the workers are still able to use pre-existing skills from LDV. This is mainly 
because the largest group falls in the third category ‘Slightly different role but 
using similar skills’. This is accounted for by the fact that the majority of 
respondents fall into the management tier of LDV (see Figures 7.2 and 7.3); 
these workers will have changed their positions and their skills have been 
adaptable within the labour market. Furthermore, the second largest group, with 
five respondents, was in a ‘very similar role, using many of the same skills’. By 
cross-referencing with Table 7.1, where it was shown that not only managerial 
staff were able to transfer their skill sets, workers H, K, J, and M from 






employment by staying within a similar role. It is interesting to note that only two 
stated that their new role was identical to their position at LDV. 
There are, however, contrasting examples within Table 7.1 that display 
individuals from both the manufacturing and managerial departments who found 
work in completely different roles using either few or no skills from their LDV 
career. Examples of this are workers A, L, G and P; these workers came from 
various departments –budget control, product development and manufacturing 
respectively. This shows that the employability of an individual worker is not 
fully dependent on the particular department in which they worked at LDV or 
even purely on the skills they possess. Rather there must be other factors that 
influence employability and have altered their employment pathways to their 
current employment. 
 
7.2.3 Level of Retraining Among the Workers 
Some LDV workers achieved some of their qualifications during their 
employment at LDV. Figure 7.8 displays a total of 13 workers of whom 56.5% 
reported that they attained their qualification level while working at LDV. Though 
not a large majority, it highlights how many of the workers’ skills and 
qualifications were dependent upon the functions of LDV. This, in combination 
with their years of service (see Figure 7.1), reinforces their dependency on that 
single institution and that particular job role. A further nine workers (39.1%) 
embarked on retraining after the closure of LDV. This indicates the importance 
of re-training to increase employability, particularly for individuals with 
substantial careers within industrial sectors (Shuttleworth et al. 2005). Workers 
with long careers at LDV will certainly desire re-training schemes as the ‘value’ 
of the qualifications and skills they have developed at LDV will deteriorate as 
demands fluctuates within the labour market (Shuttleworth et al. 2005). The 
geo-political and economic situation besetting the West Midlands, 
encompassing the post-financial crisis recession and continuing process of de-
industrialisation, has been further exacerbated by problems dealing with an 
influx of labour with similar skills, which has intensified competition for jobs in 






Figure 7-8: LDV Worker’s Qualification Achievement  




7.2.4 Financial Situation Post-LDV 
With the majority of the LDV workers interviewed back in full-time employment, 
the question arises concerning what their levels of pay were in comparison to 
their positions at LDV, and what the financial implications of the closure were for 
the workers. Figures 7.9 and 7.10 compare workers’ levels of pay in their 
current employment to their wages at LDV. Figure 7.9 groups the wages into 
ten bands ranging from <£10,000-£50,000 with a further two groups: ‘No fixed 
amount’ and ‘Refused to answer’. These wage brackets were based upon the 
MG Rover study report (Bailey et al. 2008) as this covers both the lower paid 
(minimum wage) and higher paid spectrum (executive pay). Importantly, there 
are two other options: ‘no fixed amount’ represents those that have become 
self-employed and cannot prove their income; and ‘refused to answer’, which 
represents the ethical requirements of the research as some individuals 
deemed this information too sensitive. Interviewees must be given the option of 









Figure 7-9: Income of LDV Workers 
The chart shows the current income levels of the LDV workers pre- and post-LDV’s closure (current, i.e. 
at time of interview). Source: Primary data collected via telephone surveys. 
 
 
From Figure 7.9, the highest wage bracket was >£50,000 including both the 
LDV and current employment wages. This is due to the high proportion of 
management-tier workers within the data set. The main trend from Figure 7.9 is 
that the numbers of respondents within the higher wage brackets decreased, 
with wages ranging from £30,000 to >£50,000 (excluding £40,000-£44,999). 
This illustrates that the level of wages within the new employment found among 
workers is generally lower. However, there are five workers that maintained the 
highest >£50,000 wage bracket; there was only a slight drop in the £45,000-
£49,999 bracket with an increase in the numbers in the £40,000-£44,999 
earnings from one to four workers. However, there was an increase in the 
number in the lower wage brackets and in the ‘no fixed amount’, and there was 
a decrease within the medium wage brackets (£15,000-£39,999). Typically, the 
manufacturing sector pays above the average wage level (£26,200)65 and this 
                                                          
65 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/8909797/Average-salary-falls-3pc-in-face-of-high-






drop in the medium wage could represent a shift in employment from 
manufacturing into service sector jobs for those particular workers. 
What can be gathered from Figure 7.9 is that the higher earners at LDV 
(£40,000-£50,000) have been able to maintain higher-quality work and pay in 
their new jobs. However, earnings for those workers within the lower-medium 
wage brackets (£15,000-£39,999) have decreased while other lower wage 
bracket earnings (<£10,000-£29,999) within some of the new employment have 
increased their pay. The ‘No fixed amount’ brackets have also increased, 
showing that some of the new employment has become less financially stable, 
representing those taking on self-employment to maintain income. This shows 
two extremes of employability among the LDV workers: those that are able to 
adapt successfully and maintain similar levels of income or even increase 
wages, and those that are pressured to accept employment with lower incomes 
and/or lower wage security. 
Despite the fluctuations in income levels, Figure 7.10 shows that 13 workers are 
in a position to save money. Figure 7.10 also shows that seven workers stated 
that they were able to keep their incomes level with their costs, with a further 
three workers stating that their new incomes were falling short of their 
outgoings. This again represents the extremes of employability: those that have 
improved their position will have been able to gain higher-quality, well-paid 
employment, while those that are worse off were more dependent on LDV to 
provide that stable income. This then leads onto the quality of employment, job 





















Figure 7-5 Household Financial Situation 
Bar chart displaying household financial situations after LDV closure 






7.2.5 Job Satisfaction of Current Employment 
To understand the quality and stability of the current jobs that the LDV workers 
have obtained, job satisfaction is an important factor. Should job satisfaction 
remain high, this should increase the long-term prospects of the new job 
position. Additionally, it can show how successfully they have been reintegrated 
into the labour market (e.g. are they utilising existing skills? do they feel valued 
in their job?). 
The job satisfaction of workers who took part in the telephone survey was 
measured in three ways. First, the respondents were asked (i) how satisfied 
they were with their current employment; (ii) how the job compared to their 
employment at LDV; and (iii) what reasons in particular influenced their attitudes 






said that their current job was better than their role at LDV. The second largest 
majority with five respondents also stated high satisfaction. Combined, four 
respondents declared a negative response, with two respondents saying that 
their satisfaction was about the same or that they were not sure. Figure 7.11 
therefore sends a clear signal about positive satisfaction with re-employment; 
however, this may simply represent the relief of finding stable employment after 
a turbulent period of job seeking. Furthermore, the difficult period at LDV in 
trying to sustain the company may have brought additional stress to the workers 
which might not be experienced in their current role. However, a number of LDV 
workers did state that while working at LDV there was a sense of ‘community’ 
between the workers and that this sense of community ‘belonging’ had been 
lost; this view was shared among those who felt satisfied as well as among 
those who bore negative opinions. Indeed, many LDV workers still keep in 
touch long after the closure; this highlights how some workers become reliant 
on certain economic institutions in providing not only employment but some 
form of communal identity (Pike 1999; Tomaney et al. 1999). 
Figure 7.12 workers’ opinions on their current employment. The largest group of 
11 respondents demonstrated that their current employment was a position that 
they liked and could foresee themselves doing in the future. Interestingly, the 
second largest group with six respondents stated that they view their position in 
a negative light but can foresee themselves remaining in it. This contradicts 
Figure 7.11 in that overall, four of the workers gave a positive response and four 
gave a negative view; yet in Figure 7.12, 11 workers declared a positive 
reaction with a further six giving a negative view. This again could be 
representative of the feeling that the positive reviews given in Figure 7.11 show 
relief from anxiety. Last, the smallest group of three workers state that they view 
their current job as a stopgap. This implies that the majority of workers feel 
‘settled’ in their current job, regardless of whether they feel positively or 
negatively towards their job, with only a minority who are still active in pursuing 
different career paths. Figure 7.13 breaks this down further through 
demonstrating the reasoning behind the attitude that workers place in their 






Figure 7-11: Job Satisfaction 
Bar chart displaying job satisfaction of LDV workers in their current employment 




Figure 7-6: Attitudes on Current Employment 
Pie chart displaying LDV workers’ opinions on their current job (negative/positive) and regarding the 








Figure 7.12 presents the reasons behind workers’ attitudes regarding their 
current job position. They were divided into three groups and their responses 
are explained in turn: 
 Jobs they do not like but can see themselves doing in future – This 
represents the group of workers that are unsatisfied with their current 
work but are content to remain within that job. The dominant negative 
factor was the level of pay of the current job. Employment within 
manufacturing offers higher wages than a national average. This in 
conjunction with the economic recession means that a drop in wages is 
to be expected and contributes significantly to an individual’s anxieties. 
What supplemented this further was that many workers also felt that the 
quality of the work influenced their attitude, including the nature of the 
work itself, working hours, and the working environment. This is reflective 
of the argument about how the quality of employment and adapting to 
these new circumstances has become a negative experience for the 
workers post-plant closure (Pinch and Mason 1991; Shuttleworth et al. 
2005). 
 Jobs they like and see themselves doing in future – This represents the 
group who had a successful transition from leaving LDV and are now 
happy in their current position. The primary factors behind the positive 
reactions were the work itself and the working environment. From this, it 
can be argued that these particular individuals were able to find jobs that 
best utilised their skill sets and experience so that they were easily 
‘incorporated’ into their new role. The level of pay was the second most 
dominant factor – only three workers stated that this contributed to their 
attitude towards employment. This could reflect either that the quality of 
employment is more important than the level of pay or that the levels of 
pay among these workers is high enough not to cause any anxiety and 
not be a major concern. 
 Stopgap until next job – This group represents people that have 






elsewhere. This group was the smallest group with only three workers 
stating that they were in a ‘stopgap’ position. There were no-dominant 
factors as to why this was, but an even spread of reasons include: work 
suitable for lifestyle; the work environment; and uncertainty of income. 
These reasons represent how these workers in particular are still 
adjusting and that their current job does not meet the demands of their 
personal life or their expectations of employment. 
 
Figure 7-7: LDV Workers’ Reasoning for Attitudes Regarding their Current Employment 
Bar chart displaying LDV workers’ reasoning behind their current attitudes towards their employment. 




The analysis can establish that the majority of the workers from the data set 
have adjusted and reintegrated into the labour market. With only three 
respondents (see Figure 7.12) still declaring that they are in a stopgap position, 
the majority of the workers, 17 in total, have been able to find long-term stable 
employment. However, six of the 17 workers who declared their long-term 
attitudes towards their current employment as ‘did not like’ declared the primary 






of hours, and work/life balance all contributed but remained secondary to the 
level of pay. This highlights the importance of how certain types of workers are 
more likely to find themselves in jobs which lead to lower levels of job 
satisfaction and quality. 
 
7.2.6 Worker Employment Outcomes Summary 
From the sample survey, workers displayed some job precariousness in post-
LDV employment, with the majority, 13 workers, having more than one job, with 
a further three workers leaving the labour market altogether. This shares similar 
patterns with the MG Rover closure in which the MG Rover workers also 
experienced precariousness within their employment, with multiple job positions 
with significant gaps of unemployment (Chapain and Murie 2008). This sense of 
precariousness was illustrated through the reasons why these initial jobs ended 
such as company restructuring, the need for a permanent position, and non-
ideal contracts. The study by Chapain and Murie (2008) stressed that the level 
of unemployment among the MG Rover workers was similar to national 
increases and decreases. This may account for the numerous jobs that the LDV 
workers had to undertake, as the frailty of the national economy at the time of 
the research resulted in employment being less secure in general. 
Where the LDV research showed some deviation in terms of employment 
outcomes from other studies was financial outcomes. Most studies show a drop 
in income but this research actually demonstrated an increase in wages post-
LDV (Figures 7.10). This represents the higher proportion of higher-skilled 
workers among the data set. However, the highly skilled workers did share a 
similar sense of precariousness during their employment transition; this is more 
likely with manual/industrial-based skills (Green 2003). Workers within the very 
high management tier did not share this ‘vulnerability’ in overcoming short-term 
barriers to more fulfilling long-term employment.  
The data also raises interesting questions about job satisfaction among workers 
within a time of economic hardship experienced during job transition. There was 






initial shock and hardship of the LDV closure. Many of the office-tier workers 
and more skilled workers that had settled within their post-LDV positions did find 
themselves with greater financial security. Once attaining financial security, the 
individuals in this case could ‘relish’ the other aspects of the position that the job 
had to offer such as work environment or the work itself (Figure 7.13). Those 
who have not adjusted as successfully find these factors to be a stronger 
detriment. There were some unique examples of workers being unable to 
maintain the same career without having reduced financial security or more 
unfavourable job conditions. The likely outcome is that workers that managed to 
gain employment quickly would have a positive experience, as they can ‘exploit’ 
this initial employment to develop networks and secure their financial needs, 
and then use this initial employment as a ‘springboard’ to seek further job 
positions that better utilises their skill sets, and obtain a job role similar to the 
one they originally had at LDV, thus maintaining or increasing wages they 
previously had at LDV. The parallel to this is that workers with a more negative 
experience will be likely to have had prolonged periods of unemployment and 
been forced to embark on less rewarding career paths than that of LDV. What 
the research does further emphasise in line with other studies is the short- and 
long-term impacts of redundancy and the importance of monitoring long-term 
career progression. What the employment trajectories analysis intends to 
decipher is what factors separate workers with a ‘successful’ readjustment 
experience from those with an ‘unsuccessful’ experience.66 The chapter now 
turns to extracting the reasons behind these outcomes to reveal whether there 
were any unique facts that influenced LDV workers’ employment outcomes. 
 
7.3 Reasons Behind LDV Worker Employment 
Outcomes 
To continue with the discussion, the chapter now turns to exploring the reasons 
behind the worker outcomes and the factors that precisely contributed to certain 
                                                          
66 The definition of ‘successful and ‘unsuccessful’ in this regard refers to the quality of employment and 






segmentation among LDV workers. This aspect of the discussion draws 
primarily from the worker interview phase of the empirical research in order to 
gain more substantive insights and qualitative reasons for the outcomes. These 
interviews revealed the common problems or barriers that existed when the 
workers re-entered the labour market and what caused the varying degrees of 
success that the workers found in their post-LDV employment. The main topics 
that the interview phase of the research wanted to pursue were the issues of 
employability and what support was received from the taskforce in this respect.  
 
Table 7-5: Employment Characteristics, Outcomes and Pathway of Interview Sample  
Employment characteristics (qualifications, period of unemployment) and outcomes (automotive-
orientated employment, semi or permanent contract), and pathway (method of employment of the LDV 
workers) of the LDV workers that participated in telephone interviews.  
 
It was the objective of the LDV Taskforce to alleviate some of the issues that 
workers may have faced in terms of employability and other forms of 
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to the closure and responded quickly to the closure itself. In particular, JCP 
made it a priority to engage with LDV’s workers and encourage them to sign on 
for jobseekers’ allowance benefits payments as quickly as possible at the local 
Washwood Heath jobcentre. This had two major aims. First, the plant at 
Washwood Heath acted as a focal point for the LDV workforce and thus acted 
as an interface for which JCP could engage with as many of the workers as 
possible. Second, getting the workers to engage in job searching and securing 
short-term finance is paramount to the success of re-employment (Bailey et al. 
2008). These actions did indeed help the workers in the short term but lacked a 
long-term impact.  
7.3.1 Understanding the Labour Market 
Understanding or having recent experience of the labour market is paramount 
to navigating it and attaining employment quickly. Many of the workers 
interviewed had extensive careers at LDV and had no or very little experience of 
finding new employment. This would prove a crucial factor in their ability to 
attain a position quickly post-closure or their likelihood of having to endure 
longer spells of unemployment. 
For instance, worker V had spent 20 years on the store forklift, joining LDV from 
an apprenticeship scheme; he had no experience of applying for other posts or 
job positions: 
03.00 Was that your only career, did you have any jobs prior to LDV? 
I went into LDV from the government training scheme from school. Then I got moved 
from the production line into the warehouse and stayed there ever since. I was 
happy as the pay was OK, basically twice what I’m on now. (Transcript from 
telephone with worker V) 
 
Again, worker U had spent a long time with the company: 
01.07 Did you have any other job positions outside of LDV? 
No, worked purely at Leyland/LDV. 
 
01.41 Moving onto your experience of redundancy, what were your reactions 






Horrific. Mainly because of the way the company collapsed, it wasn’t dealt with very 
well despite the writing had been on the wall for some time. I had some knowledge 
through the union side of things, so for me it didn’t come as that much of a shock. 
So in the back of my mind it was always there, but you were with some people who 
were in denial, you tend to bury your head in the sand but when it happened it was 
horrific. I had no experience of being in that position before, 19 years within a 
company is a long time. (Transcript from telephone with worker U) 
 
Worker D had limited experience of job hunting, being a member of senior 
management in a position with high academic qualifications who had only 
worked for one company prior to LDV and experienced a huge ‘shock’ when 
redundancy came: 
03.55 What encouraged you to join LDV in 1997? 
Well to be brutally frank, I joined my first employer at the age of 19, before I went to 
university. I worked at a variety of roles. But it was the only company I have ever 
worked for and in 1997 it was taken over by CIEDE and then rebranded and 
became Invensus (rail engineering). 
 
11.18 What was your experience of your recent redundancy? 
So although I had ‘extended’ employment by most means and that my job loss 
wasn’t a surprise, there was still a sense of shock and what do I do now? 
Compounded with the ongoing recession and coming up to Christmas. Given the job 
that I do, knowing was hiring at that sort of level, especially not near Christmas. 
(Transcript from telephone with worker D) 
 
The three workers mentioned here had a significant period of unemployment, 
yet in terms of their qualifications and position within LDV, workers V and D 
contrast greatly. What these workers do share, however, is a long career at 
LDV or with one other company. 
Worker I on the other hand had been at LDV for only four years and had recent 
experience of redundancy from the MG Rover closure: 
00.20 Could you describe your career at LDV and how you progressed through 
the company? 
I went there from 2005 when I was made redundant from MG Rover. I was on the 







01.14 How was your first job transition from MG Rover to LDV? 
I was out of work for 10 weeks when I was applying for jobs. 
 
01.37 So did you have much experience of JCP? 
Most of the jobs I applied for I did via the JCP website, all I did was to sign on and 
collect my payments for those 10 weeks. 
 
02.02 Moving onto your redundancy at LDV, what were your reactions and 
feelings to being made redundant there? 
... For me I had gone through that process 4 years earlier, I didn’t suffer from denial. 
I was asked to stay on and help with selling off the business assets. I declined that 
because I had got myself another job in the meantime. 
I had two part-time jobs which I have since left now. Now I’m working for JLR in 
Solihull. I left one of my part-time jobs in December, the other part-time job called 
Pepper and Fuch became full-time in January. Then I left there in April, starting my 
full-time job at JLR. 
 
05.27 How did you move onto a new job so quickly? 
I knew the manager of the place and when the vacancy came up I asked her directly 
on a personal basis and I got the job. The pay was enough to cover my costs so I 
took the job opportunity. (Transcript from telephone with worker I) 
 
Worker I moved on quickly from LDV, having recent experience of job searching 
and understanding how best to access the labour market. 
 
However, contrary to worker I, worker O had spent 33 years within Leyland/LDV 
and was able to move on quickly. 
02.23-How could you describe your career/experience at LDV in terms of your 
career development? 
I did my apprenticeship at Jaguar Land Rover then moved to Freight Rover in 1988. 
I was also within the group, then it was bought out by Leyland DAF. 
 
12.41 When LDV declared your job had been lost, what was your first port of 
call? 
Firstly, I went to sign on at the JCP with my colleagues during the first weekend after 






that there was an opportunity for multi parts (providing logistics for LDV) and that I 
should apply for the role. (Transcript from telephone with worker O) 
The main factor that separated workers I and O from the other workers D, U 
and V was their ability to utilise their networks to gain new employment. If we 
expand worker O’s career within LDV, it can be seen that he made several job 
transitions within the company. 
 
02.23-How could you describe your career/experience at LDV in terms of your 
career development? 
My starting role was on the engineering fitter tester rig. I progressed into a quality 
role, and then I became manager of production and performance and managing 
projects making sure they meet the required quality. I did that role for 5 years and 
was happy but wanted to move into after sales engaging with the dealer network. In 
2000 I became manager of dealing with the after sales role among the dealership 
network. (Transcript from telephone with worker O) 
 
Because of his position within the dealership network, he was able to expand 
his professional networks outside the company. When LDV collapsed, worker O 
was able to exploit his tacit knowledge of the labour market and therefore 
access ‘hidden’ job opportunities. Likewise, worker I had established contacts 
outside of LDV before the company collapsed. Perhaps due to his short career 
at LDV, he did not become reliant on that institution and made better efforts to 
remain aware about other employment activities outside of LDV. 
This is where workers D, U and V differ; they had spent many years within one 
specific part or department of the company with their particular job role not 
enabling them to expand their network outside of LDV. These workers then 
developed an over-reliance on LDV to provide for their employment 
opportunities. 
Other external agencies can also be utilised to ascertain employment, as the 
evidence from worker N demonstrates: 
06.35 What was your previous career before LDV? 







07.20 What brought you over to LDV from Rolls Royce? 
Rolls Royce at the time was going through a lot of changes and I was a part of 
specialist project team. So with Rolls Royce looking vulnerable and an air of 
uncertainty, LDV had a project manager position vacancy. 
 
11.29 You have had a lot of success in navigating the labour market. 
Up to that point yes. 
 
11.55 Does that differ then from your recent experience? 
Yep. The recent recession has made opportunities difficult ... I took some insurance 
to provide myself with a safety net ... That kept me afloat for 12 months. The 
insurance company also attached personnel to help me in my job search. They gave 
me days ‘review’ with a local job search agency (NOT JCP) and showed me what 
the process is and get a better understanding. That gave me a bit of shock, showing 
me what applications failed and why. The covering letter is vastly important, the 
preparation into the job and demonstrating what you could bring to the job was vital. 
 
16.41 You learnt this through the insurance policy you took out? 
That was them ensuring what you’re doing in terms of applying for the job (getting 
you in touch with the agency), what skills you specifically bring to the job. The 
insurance company suggested that I change the CV format from a chronological CV 
to a job orientated CV, focusing on your skills rather than your history. That was the 
best piece of advice I ever got. From that I gained two interviews immediately. 
... Interestingly the guy who was conducting my interview was previously one of my 
suppliers at LDV. (Transcript worker N) 
 
Worker N had two major job positions before LDV, and his qualifications and 
experience provided him with a smooth transition during times of economic 
prosperity. However, he developed his external networks through his job 
insurance company. Worker N’s insurance granted him financial security and 
also gave him vital advice regarding job searching and applications. This gave 
him a great advantage in the labour market. 
19.56 Did you ever use the JCP for job advice? 
Yeah I did, I am appalled at the people that mainly use the service ... I utilised the 
terminals to look for job offers. I found the staff very receptive but very little they 
could do, the majority of the applications I made through my own initiative. 







This quote from worker N again emphasises the importance of a wider 
understanding of the labour market, either through knowledge of the labour 
market itself (successful previous job transitions) or external networks. Worker 
N admits that the JCP offered little help. For many of the workers, this would be 
their only source of advice for job searches. Indeed, many workers stated how 
ineffectual the JCP was in helping them with job hunting and CV advice. 
14.12 Referring to JCP 
During which time they were utterly, utterly useless, they simply aren’t geared up to 
help senior executive types. Bearing in mind I might be a senior executive but I have 
only ever had two employers in my whole life. No idea how to market myself... 
(Transcript worker D) 
. 
So you had the JCP engage with your job search? 
Yeh, to a point, but they didn’t offer real assistance. I managed to get a job off my 
own back. 
. 
06.58 So what did they do to help you precisely? 
From what I can recall nothing! They offered training opportunities that were to no 
benefit for me and were out of context. Just very basic training. (Transcript from 
worker U) 
 
It is therefore not just a matter of length of time within a company that can 
influence an individual’s understanding of the labour market but the type of role 
and the position that worker has had within the company. If a worker’s role is 
more exposed to external factors and they are aware of activities outside the 
company, that worker should be better prepared for job searching. 
 
7.3.2 Geographical Factors of Workers and LDV 
Geographical factors were also influential in the workers’ adjustment to life post-
LDV. Concentrated unemployment can repress growth and opportunities within 
an area as the influx of redundant workers can overload demand for labour, 
making re-employment more difficult (Chapain and Murie 2008). This, partnered 






the workforce, and workers’ willingness to commute to find employment outside 
their immediate locality, showing the level of flexibility in worker outcomes.  
Figure 7.14 displays the geographical distribution of the LDV workers at the 
time of the plant closure in 2009. The distribution of the workers is not primarily 
concentrated around the immediate location of the plant in Washwood Heath 
(ward B8 on Figure 7.14), with 29 workers registered living there; however, it is 
the joint-sixth highest concentration of workers among all the wards. The main 
feature of the worker concentration is a ‘crescent’-like distribution, using ward 
B8 as the centre point. The distribution spans from the north of the map from 
Walsall, flanking down the eastern districts towards Solihull to the east of 
Birmingham. The northern and eastern districts have the strongest 
concentration of workers, with Walsall containing 37 workers (third joint-highest 
concentration) and Solihull with 123 workers (the highest concentration). The 
neighbouring wards around B8 (Washwood Heath) such as B23, B24, B25, 
B33, B34, B36 have numbers ranging from 26-43 workers; these areas are the 
suburban wards of Birmingham. 
Similarly, the areas to the west of Birmingham such as Sandwell and Dudley 
have 28 and 21 workers respectively – again showing high concentrations. In 
comparison, the inner-city wards of Birmingham have a much sparser 
concentration of workers, with wards B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B10, B11, B12, 
B15, B18, B19 having numbers as low as 1-3 workers. So from this initial 
evaluation, the majority of LDV workers lived within the suburban areas of 
Birmingham and commuted into work, and were thus likely to search for future 
work within a similar commuting distance, which demonstrates considerable 
mobility. This reinforces the GPE dimension beyond the immediate area of the 
closure, not only by access to work but also access to public services that can 
help in retraining or job searching. This can explain why some workers felt that 
JCP services were inadequate as the range of service would vary according to 






Figure 7-8: Geographic Distribution of LDV workers 
Map displaying the distribution of LDV workers around Birmingham and the West Midlands area. Ward 
B8 is Washwood Heat (highlighted on map), the location of the LDV plant.  
Source: Birmingham City Council, taken from the policy stakeholder interview. 
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Figure 7-9: Birmingham City Wards 
Corresponding map to 7.14 displaying the Birmingham city wards.  
Source: Birmingham City Council: http://www.birmingham.gov.uk/wards  
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Figure 7.15 correlates with Figure 7.14, illustrating that a majority of the workers 
have high geographical mobility as they reside within the West Midlands area. 
Only four workers travelled from outside the West Midlands. Figure 7.15 
displays the regional concentration of the LDV workers from the telephone 
surveys by area code and commute journey time. The majority of the workforce 
who were interviewed were part of the management or executive tier of LDV 
and would be expected to have longer commute distances than the average 
worker due to their increased wage opportunities enabling greater choice in 
domestic residence location (Green et al. 1999). 
Figure 7-10: Location of Employees 
Breakdown of the location of the workers that were interviewed in the telephone surveys  













Referring back to Figure 7.14, the distribution of the LDV workforce was sparse, 
which suggests a geographically mobile labour force that was willing to 
commute to work. Indeed, many of the management-tier staff commuted from 
outside the West Midlands area. The LDV situation contrasts starkly with the 
MG Rover closure of 2006, where about 22% of MG workers lived in the local 
community. MG Rover in Longbridge had a much higher concentration of 
workers living in one area; this had a higher economic impact upon the 
Longbridge area (Chapain and Murie 2008). The LDV situation would suggest a 






immediate area of Washwood Heath. However, contrary to this, there is a 
strong concentration of workers within multiple areas in neighbouring wards 
next to Washwood Heath such as postcodes B23-B25 and B33-B36; when 
combined together, these wards make a total of 24.9% of the LDV workforce. 
So with an influx of 247 workers within the wards of B8, B23-B25 and B33-B36 
this does place a considerable supply burden on the immediate local labour 
market. 
There is an emphasis on the importance of geographical mobility of the 
workforce in the literature, with the willingness of the worker to commute 
determining the scope of his or her ability to find work (Green et al. 1999). 
Figure 7.17 displays that the commute distance remained similar or had in fact 
decreased in comparison to their employment at LDV; nine workers had a 
reduction in their commute with a further eight workers not noticing any 
difference. Only three workers stated that they had increased their commute 
distances. This may be reflective of the reasoning provided by Green et al. 
(1999): a decrease in urban populations; a decrease in traditional industrial 
jobs; a change in population structure; and increased car usage. The proportion 
of the workforce within Figure 7.16 will be representative of these changes that 
have become more prominent over time. This trend could also reflect the 
condition of the regional economy. During the time of the closure, the UK 
national economy was in recession, with manufacturing and automotive sectors 
suffering in particular with many new jobs offering lower wages, and lower job 
security, making long-distance commuting more attractive or worthwhile instead 

















Figure 7-17: Difference in Commute: Current Employment Compared to LDV 
Displaying the difference in commuting distance of the LDV workers in comparison to their current 
employment and their employment within LDV.  





This demonstrates the importance of geographical mobility in accessing new 
employment opportunities and maintaining financial stability; this mobility is 
heavily related to the personal attributes of the individual worker (Shuttleworth 
et al. 2005:1655). This brings into play other demographic factors such as age, 
career diversity,67 skills and qualifications, as is illustrated by these varied views 
from the interviews. 
33.08 When you engaged in your job search initially, how wide was your job 
search in terms of location (commuting distance)? Did you find more 
vacancies were available in London or the SE? 
They tend to be a lot more roles around London and the SE. I was quite happy to 
consider long business trips or relocating. Indeed, a lot of my work takes me to 
London, and even as far afield as Gothenburg in Sweden for a few months. So I 
definitely didn’t have the opinion of just looking for upper end salaries within a 30-
minutes radius of my house. (Interview transcript, worker D) 
 
                                                          
67 Time spent in career positions across several companies, typically those within manufacturing, have a 






22.40 Did you ever consider looking for a job outside your local area? 
Not really unless it would have been financially worth it. I generally looked in the 
Birmingham area but I would have been willing to travel to Coventry for work, so that 
kind of distance. I also tried to get a job at Toyota in Derby. I was proactive in my job 
search. (Interview transcript, worker G) 
 
16.53 In terms of the scope of your job search, would you have been willing to 
commute? 
I did have an opportunity near London, around a 70 mile commute each way. If Tata 
didn’t offer me a position, then I would have taken this job despite the commute. 
(Transcript from worker M) 
 
18.07 When you conducted your job search did you just look within your local 
area? Did you consider moving or long distance commuting? 
No, I couldn’t afford do anything like that. I looked within about a 20-mile area of 
Birmingham. (Transcript from worker V) 
This would lead to the conclusion that workers within the higher wage brackets 
would consider long-distance commuting to maintain their higher wages and 
utilise their skill sets. Those with more generic skills sets would remain within 
their ‘established’ commuting range or undertake a smaller commute range 
when engaging in the labour market in order to mitigate wage losses and to 
reduce diminishing returns of the cost commuting as much as possible. 
 
7.3.3 The Shock of Closure among the LDV Workforce 
The loss of local and individual (in regards to the workforce) identity seems to 
be a recurring in discussions about among plant closures. Many of the firms and 
institutions that are forced to close have existed within regions and localities 
over many years, embedding themselves into the local psyche and identity 
(Pike 1999). This identity reverberates from the economic level right down to the 
individual, and becomes stronger when the local economy is not particularly 
competitive (Pike 1999). This greater sense of identity provides strength to the 
region when the local industrial sectors are strong and not under external 
pressures. However, this identity soon develops into a dependency for the 






economy fails to diversify into other competitive sectors (Tomaney et al. 1999; 
Pike et al. 2010). When the key sectors begin to fail, this dependency then 
reveals itself within the redundant workforce in their job search. This form of 
local identity was deeply embedded within LDV with both the workforce and the 
local community of Washwood Heath, stretching even to the wider West 
Midlands region. This strong sense of identity may seem surprising given the 
relatively small scale of the closure in comparison to the large closures of MG 
Rover and Peugeot. However, the identity and legacy of LDV stretches back to 
the heritage of British Leyland, and it is this heritage that augments the 
dependency of the workers on the employer (Pike 1999). Figure 7.18 
demonstrates the implications of closure and how the related shock has multiple 
facets and changes the rationale and type of intervention when these shocks 
occur. The skill sets of the LDV workers in combination with their wide 
geographic distribution suggests the need for intervention based primarily on 
the people and place aspects relating to the closure. Local actors will be critical 
in providing tailored training and education programmes that can address the 
































Figure 7.18: The Interconnections and Impacts of LDV Closure Shock 
This diagram displays the outputs of the shocks related to the LDV closure and the inter-connections of these shocks between three primary aspects: 
business, place and people. The key shocks that are associated with people relate to the LDV workers concerning their difficulty transferring their 
skills. This is linked to the place aspect as the geographical distribution of the workers placed further strain on coherent action. This drives the need 
for more innovative measures amongst local agencies to address job transition problems that may occur over the long term.  







7.4 Concluding the Employment Trajectories: Setting 
out the Four ‘Dominating Factors’ 
The initial worker outcomes established six primary factors of the LDV workers 
ranging from office worker positive experience, office worker negative experience, 
office worker troubled but positive outcome, floor worker positive experience, floor 
worker negative experience, and retired (left the labour market). This acted as a form 
of categorisation from which the analysis could begin assessing what factors 
contributed to worker trajectories and then the implications for the individual 
(financial implications, job satisfaction). It was important to establish these 
trajectories as a means to understand why certain highly skilled workers had such 
varying degrees of success and difficulty when finding new employment.  
By combining the analysis concerning factors such as age, years of service in LDV, 
and length of unemployment post closure, the chapter established the employment 
trajectory outcomes for the workers (see in Table 7.6). As seen from the interview 
data in particular, workers that have too specialist or elite qualifications are isolated, 
which can make them just as vulnerable as low-skilled workers. Furthermore, 
workers that are within a certain age group of less than 49 years would be ideally 
placed to move into a new company. Many of the workers that are 50 or over tend to 





























Table 7-6: Employment Trajectory Outcomes: 
 Trajectory 1 shows that individuals with high skill sets and sophisticated 
networks have high mobility and lower job precariousness.  
 Trajectory 2 shows troublesome transitions and financial difficulty; high 
qualifications allow for long-term adjustment.  
 Trajectory 3 shows that individuals with little knowledge of the labour market 
with detrimental demographic or skill sets have long-term difficulties and 
higher job precariousness. 
Table 7.6 Employment trajectory outcomes 
Trajectory 1-Very 
successful and quick 
transition into 
employment 
Short employment transition – Short- and long-term financial 
security, continuation of career path, utilisation of skill sets, 
lower job precariousness. 
Principal Factors Good Adaptability, low reliability on Taskforce 
interventions – Utilisation of networks (Incl. insurance policies) 





Long period of financial insecurity, minor retraining and 
adjustment (lifestyle, career choice) – Long-term financial 
security, utilising majority of skills, medium job precariousness. 
Principal Factors Disconnected, Medium Adaptability – Little knowledge of 
Labour market or networks, high level qualifications enable 
eventual transition. 
Trajectory 3-Difficult 
period of transition and 
worse job condition 
post LDV 
Long period of financial insecurity, major retraining and 
adjustment (lifestyle, career choice) – Further long-term 
financial insecurity, drastic change of career path, lower job 
satisfaction, higher job precariousness. 
Principal Factors Skills Dependency, Qualification Isolationism, Poor 
Adaptability, Disconnected – Little knowledge of labour 
market or networks, combined with low skills, make 
detrimental/negative factors more profound and difficult to 
overcome. 
From the discussion, it can be argued that there were several factors that contributed 
towards the potential employment outcomes of the LDV workers, with varying 






available networks. Those ‘factors’ are thought to be workers’ skills & dependency, 
high skills qualification isolationism, adaptability and the disconnect felt between the 
workers and the policy and job services enacted by the LDV Taskforce. The chapter 
concludes by discussing these ‘factors’ in relation to the LDV context and how they 
related to the workers’ employment situation. 
 
7.4.1 Worker Skills and Dependency 
From the evaluation of the demographic data, the respondents fit the stereotypical 
case for an industrial plant closure established by the literature (Tomaney et al. 
1991; Shuttleworth et al. 2005; Bailey et al. 2008): an ageing workforce with the 
primary age between 40-49 and 50-59, who have spent the majority of their working 
lives in a specific position within a sole company, with a majority having spent 11-19 
and 20 years at LDV. Furthermore, a significant proportion of the data set – ten 
respondents – have fewer than 5 GCSEs in terms of academic qualifications. 
However, the dataset in particular consists of a higher concentration of high or 
specialist skills that are non-manual focused. Traditional manufacturing skill-based 
workers would face considerable employment challenges and may face a skills gap 
in the labour market, as their skills will become redundant. However, the workers 
from this dataset should show the contrary and demonstrate higher flexibility, with 
skills more readily able to match the needs of employers. However, these highly 
skilled workers did experience a form of skills dependency, with their skills and 
experience being heavily ‘grounded’ within the LDV operational processes and 
automotive sector practise. Some highly-skilled workers effectively suffered from a 
form of ‘skills gap’. 
As discussed in previous chapters, British Leyland was a conglomerate of British 
automotive firms, which together formed one of the primary employers in the West 
Midlands region for several decades. The multi-firm structure of British Leyland 
promoted ‘horizontal’ career progression and internal transfers between the Leyland 
firms. Whilst this type of transfer would expose the worker to new practises, it would 
predominately maintain a similar job role and the primary skill sets, which could fall 
behind service-based skills more attuned to the changing demands of the labour 
market (Green et al 1999). The dependency of workers to pursue qualifications and 






neglect of other skills and reduced job searching capacity, which is typical of OIRs, 
as was the case with LDV (Danson 2005). 
03.00 Was that your only career, or did you have any jobs prior to LDV? 
I went into LDV from the government training scheme from school. Then I got moved from 
the production line into the warehouse and stayed there ever since. (Transcript from 
telephone with worker V) 
 
01.07 did you have any other job positions outside of LDV? 
No, worked purely at Leyland/LDV … I had no experience of being in that position before, 
19 years within a company is a long time. (Transcript from telephone with worker U) 
 
03.55 What encouraged you to join LDV in 1997? 
Well to be brutally frank, I joined my first employer at the age of 19, before I went to 
university. I worked at a variety of roles. But it was the only company I have ever 
worked for and in 1997 it was taken over by CIEDE and then rebranded and became 
Invensus (rail engineering). (Transcript from telephone with worker D) 
 
Horizontal career progression was common among the research sample as many of 
the workers had spent many years, even decades, within LDV or British Leyland, 
with little experience of employment outside of the company. The length of a 
worker’s career in combination with the types of skills they possessed further 
contributed to their level of dependency. This will be more prevalent in workers that 
have had a substantial career with LDV, and who have reduced worth in the current 
labour market (Danson 2005; Shuttleworth et al. 2005). Furthermore, regions such 
as the West Midlands that have gone through the process of de-industrialisation or 
restructuring will have further problems from an influx of workers with similar skills, 
effectively intensifying competition for jobs in the local area (Tomaney et al. 1999). 
Shuttleworth et al. (2005) demonstrate that individual qualities were vital in job 
searching in what becomes an extremely competitive labour market. It is then critical 
to Identify workers who lack certain skills and encourage re-training while they are in 
work, to reduce the volatility of job searching and overcome unemployment issues 







7.4.2 Highly Skilled Qualification Isolationism 
Much of the research conducted around plant closure notes how low-skilled workers 
within OIRs become particularly vulnerable to flexible labour markets (Danson 2005). 
In conjunction with this, there has been little discussion of the implications for higher-
skilled workers, as the assumption is that middle management or highly-skilled 
management-tier workers are capable of finding other work relatively easily. Contrary 
to this, LDV’s highly skilled workers struggled to find work befitting their skills – an 
oversight which occurred with JCP. This resulted in a form of qualification 
isolationism among highly skilled office workers with more specialised job roles who 
were unfamiliar with the job search process. This qualification isolationism created a 
further level of dependency among workers towards LDV. The JCP simply could not 
meet the needs of this type of worker, being unable to offer substantial advice on 






14.12 Referring to JCP 
During which time they were utterly, utterly useless, they simply aren’t geared up to help 
senior executive types. Bearing in mind I might be a senior executive but I have only ever 
had two employers in my whole life. No idea how to market myself... (Transcript worker D) 
 
19.56 Did you ever use JCP for job advice? 
Yeh I did, I am appalled at the people that mainly use the service.... I utilised the terminals 
to look for job offers. I found the staff very receptive but very little they could do, the 
majority of the applications I made through my own initiative. (Transcript worker N) 
Did you feel that competition for your job was tough? 
The problem was that there were just no jobs available requiring my own individual skills. 
(Transcript worker H) 
 
Within the research sample, there were three individuals who fell into this category 
(employment trajectory 2, illustrated in Figure 7.1): worker D, 48, IT director; worker 
H, 53, senior paint processor; and worker N, 42, project manager. All three of these 
workers had skilled and specialised job roles in long careers within LDV and 
Leyland; they had no direct experience of external job search. Their age factor and 
family commitments would further exaggerate their job-search problems, forcing 
them to take up consultancy roles rather than permanent job positions, increasing 
their level of job precariousness, which is the nature consultancy work (Weller et al. 
2012). What further exacerbated the difficulty for these individuals is that the higher 
wages associated with these job roles represents ‘high investments’ for companies 
and potential employers. The situation of limited finance and uncertainty brought 
upon by the recession discourages companies from making such ‘high investments’, 
as profit margins are more constricted. This explains the rise of companies utilising 
consultancy and agency firms in addition to zero-hour contracts in order to hire in 
these highly skilled workers on an ‘as and when needed’ basis. 
These individuals’ high-spec qualifications and skills actually worked against them in 
the labour market and made them more dependent on LDV to provide long-term 
stable employment. These individuals also suffered from little working knowledge of 
the job market and placed a reliance on JCP to provide assistance. Their age, social 
and domestic circumstances meant that their commuting range and ability to migrate 
to find opportunities was restricted, making them more reliant on job vacancies within 






JCP was able to publicise low-skilled vacancies but lacked the functional capacity to 
meet these highly skilled and high-spec job needs. These very capable individuals’ 
lack of recent experience of the labour market, restricted geographical mobility and 
lack of specialised assistance with high-spec qualifications resulted in prolonged 
periods of unemployment and eventually unstable employment. 
 
7.4.3 Adaptability of Skills and Job Roles 
The discussion thus far has included examples of workers with prolonged periods of 
unemployment due to their dependency on a single institution as a result of their 
length of career and combination of skills and qualifications. However, there were 
instances where some of the workforce were able to move quickly into new 
employment. 
02.23-How could you describe your career/experience at LDV in terms of your 
career development? 
I did my apprenticeship at Jaguar Land Rover then moved to Freight Rover in 1988. I was 
also within the group, then it was bought out by Leyland DAF. 
 
12.41 When LDV declared your job had been lost, what was your first port of call? 
First I went to sign on at JCP with my colleagues during the first weekend after the 
closure. 
It was through contacts that I made through my job suggested to me that there was an 
opportunity for multi parts (providing logistics for LDV) and that I should apply for the role. 
(Transcript from telephone with worker O) 
 
Worker O presents an interesting case, having had a diverse range of job roles and 
developed a wide range of skills over a highly varied career. 
02.23-How could you describe your career/experience at LDV in terms of your 
career development? 
My starting role was on the engineering fitter tester rig. I progressed into a quality role, and 
then I became manager of production and performance and managing projects making 
sure they meet the required quality. I did that role for 5 years and was happy but wanted to 
move into after sales engaging with the dealer network. In 2000 I became manager of 
dealing with the after sales role among the dealership network. (Transcript from telephone 







Worker O’s career development within LDV reduced his dependency on LDV to 
provide a future career. As he progressed through the managerial levels in a variety 
of different roles, he developed contacts and networks outside LDV. This enabled 
him to access otherwise ‘hidden’ employment opportunities to find new employment 
very quickly and made him less reliant on JCP to provide assistance in his job 
search.  
The adaptability of workers is related to their job roles and experiences within those 
roles. Importantly, this problem also extends to office-tier workers who are typically 
considered adaptable by government agencies and much of the literature 
(Shuttleworth et al. 2005; Bailey et al. 2008). Some workers were more adaptable 
due to their networks which had been generated outside LDV within their role at 
LDV. The importance of informal networks (i.e. social contacts, non-professional) 
and official networks depends on the job position of the worker. Typically, those with 
lower qualifications rely heavily on unofficial contacts and networks to move on 
successfully. This suggests that workers that are subject to high dependency or 
qualification isolationism need to be identified during the final stages of plant closure 
and redundancy. Then the promotion and development of networks and the relevant 
training in skills that are vital in job searching should be encouraged or if possible be 
promoted while the workers are at their place of work, to ease job transition. 
7.4.4 The Disconnect Between the Taskforce and LDV Workers 
The contention here is that the LDV Taskforce succeeded in the short term but 
somewhat failed in the long term, resulting in a ‘disconnect’ between the LDV 
Taskforce’s strategies and the redundant workers. The LDV Taskforce was excellent 
in implementing their strategies but their actions were too universal and failed to 
address the underlying issues many redundant workers faced within the greater 
economic context. The ex-LDV workers appreciated the speed with which the 
taskforce reacted at establishing initial services and provisions but workers 
perceived that they were simply being ‘processed’ rather than ‘treated’. The two 
primary agencies that directly engaged with the redundant workers, notably the JCP 
and the LSA, both underwent substantial reforms to their sphere of activity and target 
obligations, in addition to reductions in resources. JCP became less inclined to direct 
people from job to job per se but instead provided facilities and encouraged 






workers in the long term. Likewise, the LSA was discouraged from continuing as the 
primary agent in developing and leading training programmes and became the 
contractor, outsourcing training schemes. Furthermore, unlike previous years, both 
agencies had to enact numerous funding schemes and bids to attract fresh finance 
in promoting their projects. This reveals how from reform and restructuring the 
primary agencies involved in worker recovery became detached from their long-term 
development. Instead, by becoming a part of the ‘processing’ of the recovery, the 
direct ‘treatment’ of job recovery was left to smaller contractors or agencies, or down 
to the individuals themselves. 
This detachment results in there not being a long-term strategy to deal with the more 
complex issues related to the highly skilled redundant workforce. It primarily assisted 
individuals who were inexperienced in modern-day job searching and directing 
individuals with specialist skills into suitable job opportunities. Ultimately, those 
workers that were able to move on and recover the fastest and maintain similar job 
positions (e.g. the same level of pay, similar skill requirements) from the plant 
closure were individuals that could utilise substantial networks. Other workers stated 
that their post-LDV employment was not due to any assistance offered by the 
taskforce or the agencies; to maintain similar career positions this typically increased 
long-distance commuting or non-contracted hours (e.g. consultancy or agency work). 
Some workers had to submit to the fact that maintaining a similar job position would 
























Chapter 8: Conclusion: A 
Victim of Circumstance? 








8.1 Introduction: Reaffirming the Research 
The research aim of the thesis was to address the impact of the shock of plant 
closure on the redundant workforce, centred on the LDV closure of June 2009. The 
LDV plant closure exemplified the continuing trend of automotive rationalisation 
within the West Midlands economy. The thesis encompassed a GPE framework 
when researching the closure, which involved analysis of the LDV Taskforce 
response, changes in the regional organisation and framework for policy action from 
RDAs (Regional Development Agency) to LEPs (Local Enterprise Partnerships), thus 
influencing the policies and strategies that were implemented to deal with the LDV 
closure. Furthermore, this retrenchment in regional authority and support was 
conducted during times of economic recession, placing additional strains on regional 
and local services that could aid adjustment of the ex-workers. 
The empirical research investigated the impact of LDV plant closure on the 
redundant workers, examining their experiences in the labour market and 
considering factors such as the economic recession, the role of redundant skills and 
demographic factors. The research assessed the LDV Taskforce policies that were 
implemented to aid the redundant workers. Taskforce intervention was excellent at 
attending to the immediate needs of the workers (e.g. awareness of job services and 
out-of-work benefits) but was deficient in more long-term innovative solutions which 
can address the feeling of ‘disconnect’ experienced amongst LDV workers. Face-to-
face interviews with members of Birmingham City Council (BCC), Job centre Plus 
(JCP), and Learning Skills Agency (LSA) all provided valuable insights into which 
interventions took place before and after the closure. Similarly, interviews with the 
LDV executives gave an insider’s view of the problems facing the company; more 
importantly, they highlighted the degree of assistance received from government 
intervention. Telephone surveys and telephone interviews with the LDV workers 
classified the employment outcomes for the workers and aided in understanding the 
relevance of the taskforce strategy in helping them. The analysis of the empirical 
research was examined by a GPE (geographical political economy) framework, to 
ascertain the LDV Taskforce actions, and the limitations and opportunities that 






This conclusion builds on the qualitative analysis from Chapters 6 and 7. The main 
two conclusions established from the analysis chapters are (i) that the LDV 
Taskforce had initiated its policies effectively in the short term but were limited in the 
long-term perspective; and (ii) that all members of the sample of the LDV workforce 
(aside from the executive tier of management) were vulnerable to inferior 
employability and also the notion of skill dependency that a worker is subject to 
within a particular firm or industry.68 Importantly, however, this skills dependency is 
not limited to labour-intensive ‘blue-collar’ workers (e.g. production floor workers) but 
has implications for management tiers and highly specialised skilled workers who are 
generally considered to have more transferable and flexible skills. These factors 
taken together with the context of economic recession created a form of ‘disconnect’ 
between the government service (the LDV Taskforce’s goals and ambitions towards 
relief of the LDV workers) and the demands and expectations of the redundant 
workers (the LDV workers’ perception of the government’s responsibility). 
 
8.1.1 Re-establishing the GPE Research Process Framework  
Before progressing further, the conclusion will re-establish the role of the research 
process framework developed in the introductory chapter (Fig 8.1). The framework 
displays the thesis’ understanding of plant closures through showing the association 
of various GPE factors that constitute plant closure outcomes. This is defined in 
three segments. It first begins with wider global economic and industrial processes; 
chapter 2 engages this literature through the restructuring of the automotive industry 
(point 1) both within the UK and the global context with the implications and impacts 
upon regional economies that are reliant on automotive industries. This provided the 
main driver of the initial research and the setting of the GPE framework for 
understanding the challenges that would beset the West Midlands region and LDV. 
Figure 8-1: Research Process Framework  
The diagram below shows the integration and relationships of the various GPE issues related to plant closure. 
The numbered boxes show the research process and the theoretical development towards greater understanding 
of the LDV plant closure and the impacts on the ex-workers. 
 
                                                          
68 The term inferior employability refers to redundant workers becoming incapable of obtaining a similar job 
position and level of pay in comparison to their previous occupation. The term skills dependency refers to skills 
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Chapters 3 and 4 encompassed the middle segment (point 2) of the framework 
through the discussion of the GPE aspects of plant closures and how they integrate 
with economic development policy and labour market adjustment within a regional 
perspective. The chapter advanced the role of the geographical, political and 
economic factors in framing the understanding of policy response to plant closure. 
Chapter 4 formed the ‘bridging’ function of connecting the discussion of the GPE 
framework and other economic theories to the policy strategy and taskforce 
implementation in response to plant closure through addressing the central three key 
sub-topics. The chapter further examined the varying types of shock experienced by 
the region and by the affected workforce. Importantly, the chapter presented labour 
market policy research and discussions in combination with the GPE aspects of the 
research towards the LDV closure. 
Chapter 6 then progressed to the bottom of the research process framework through 
the empirical research and examined the transition in regional policy governance and 
the potential implications that these would have for taskforce intervention. The 
research engaged with the policy stakeholders of the LDV Taskforce, drawing 
attention to the importance of the regional government in the context of the closure, 
how the various agencies acted within the structure of the taskforce, and what kind 
of policies and strategies were put forward to help the re-employment and 
adjustment of the redundant workers. 
The empirical research that was conducted more on the LDV workers through the 
‘worker trajectories’ analysis established what factors led to successful or difficult 
employment outcomes. The chapter further developed the link between the worker 
trajectory and the concept of the inferior employability and skills dependency. The 
findings of the empirical research show that office and middle management tier 
workers can in fact experience difficult adjustments in terms of skills 
transference/flexibility (e.g. overcoming dependency on LDV job role), overcoming 
their demographic issues and constrained commuter ability that contribute towards 







8.2 Main Findings of the Research 
The conclusion will revisit the research objectives and discuss to what extent these 
objectives were achieved. The research objectives consisted of: 
● To evaluate the policy response and action taken by the LDV 
Taskforce following the LDV plant closure given the geographical 
political circumstances of this closure and to create a comparative 
insight between past experiences and contemporary reactions of 
taskforces. 
● To investigate how to integrate the regional institutional and 
governance structures that provide appropriate coordination and 
leadership structures for aiding re-employment and labour market 
adjustment. 
● To understand the impacts and shocks of closure upon the workforce, 
and to analyse demographic and geographic factors, in association 
with skills levels, and how certain characteristics of the workforce relate 
to the level of ‘shock’ individuals experience when pursuing new 
employment. 
● To inform future labour market policy and governmental strategies to 
resolve the impacts of plant closure. 
To show the extent to which these objectives were achieved, the chapter will explain 
the main findings of the research from both the theoretical and empirical analyses.  
 
8.2.1 LDV Closure: Inevitability or Opportunity? 
Since the break-up of Leyland DAF (originating from British Leyland) in 1993, LDV 
found itself in a precarious position. It was a small commercial vehicle company with 
limited investment capability in a very competitive sector against other large firms 
(e.g. Mercedes and Ford) with sufficient investment to support them. LDV was 
compelled to undergo unsustainable joint ventures and partnerships (i.e. Daewoo, 
Sun Capital and GAZ), resulting in their business plans becoming more vulnerable to 
external events.69 For every failing partnership, LDV was forced to relinquish more 
                                                          







assets, ‘hollowing-out’ the company and ever increasing the difficulty of overcoming 
the operating problems of the automotive industry, such as cost recovery (Bailey et 
al. 2010). Due to its limited investment potential and lack of economies of scale, LDV 
was unable to overcome the ‘cost recovery’ barrier to develop new models to create 
new revenue streams (Bailey et al. 2010). In comparison, its competitors like 
Mercedes or Ford had the financial capacity to support investments and 
developments that would put LDV on the ‘back foot’. During ownership transition 
periods, regional and local actors (AWM, BCC, and MAS) intervened through 
financial aid packages such as loan and subsidy schemes to ensure LDV’s survival 
until the next takeover bid. While this showed the capacity of certain agencies to 
intervene at key moments, such intervention was limited to short-term ‘bridging’ 
solutions. The aftermath of each ‘unstable’ period further weakened LDV, resulting in 
it being more susceptible to external factors, ultimately failing to resolve LDV’s long-
term problems. Despite the bridging loans offered to LDV, the firm could not 
conclude its negotiations with the Malaysian firm Weststar and was forced into 
administration. 
Similar to previous closures, the government’s stance was passive and 
retrospective, only offering bridging loans to find potential buyers rather than offering 
substantial financial support (Bailey and Clancy 2009; Stanford 2010). This 
exemplifies the weakness of a short-term approach with reliance on foreign 
intervention to initiate the next cycle of investment for long-term sustainability. In the 
case of MG Rover process, there were moments and opportunities long before 
LDV’s closure which represented ideal opportunities for intervention by the relevant 
government bodies but a taskforce failed to materialise to enact more long-term 
structural change (Pike 2005; Cook et al. 2013). Using the experience of the Rover 
Taskforce in 2000, a similar taskforce could have been established for LDV in 2001. 
The MG Taskforces in 2000 and 2005 were directed at supporting supply chains into 
different sectors, financial support for new training programmes for redundant 
workers, expanding small and medium businesses into niche markets and thereby in 
effect reducing the dependency of the local economy on MG Rover and diversifying 
the wider local economy, thus presenting new opportunities for economic growth and 
evolutionary paths. The LDV Taskforce could have utilised a similar approach, 






intervention could have consisted of investment and expertise to maximise the 
Maxus through investment in infrastructure and development costs, and directing 
LDV to more niche markets within the commercial vehicle sector.70 
When Daewoo pulled the plug in 2001, this presented an opportunity for taskforce 
involvement. LDV faced taking on the Maxus project without having the ideal 
conditions or capacity to fully utilise and develop the product. This form of 
intervention could have led to production rationalisation or attempts to diversify the 
company to strengthen its overall competitiveness (Boschma and Frenken 2006). 
Importantly, actions that may have been initiated towards LDV in 2001 through a 
taskforce could have led to further interventions through the difficult ownership 
transitions throughout 2001–09, which may in turn have influenced the outcomes of 
the eventual closure and impact on the local economy.  
However, due to the reactive nature of taskforce interventions, and the nature of the 
GAZ takeover (perceived as a secure takeover but in fact with inherent flaws), there 
were no attempts to diversify the firm’s activities and the local supply chain. This 
meant that any opportunity to influence the eventual outcome of 2009 and maintain 
some form of activity at the site was lost. 
 
8.2.2 LDV Taskforce Policy Response; Lack of Long-term Intervention 
Before the announcement of the LDV closure, there was action by JCP and LSA 
through a preparatory analysis of the workforce. Again, the strong short-term actions 
of the LDV Taskforce resonated through the instantaneous reaction through direct 
engagement with the workers on the Washwood Heath site.71 They enacted funding 
schemes and initiatives through the Working Neighbourhoods Fund and EU social 
funding with the direct aim of enrolling workers onto out-of-work benefits and 
payments (e.g. jobseekers’ allowance payments) as quickly as possible and to 
further increase awareness. The BCC with JCP support went on to establish a jobs 
fair, providing a direct link between the ex-workers and local job opportunities. This 
further exemplified the institutional capacity of local agencies towards the actions 
                                                          
70 In this case, LDV was developing electric models of the Maxus. The researcher understands that this 
technology was in its infancy and lacked the ideal infrastructure for large markets. With the correct policy, 
however, LDV could have been a forerunner in this technology in a low-range urban market. 
71 In this instance, the JCP established an on-site enquiries desk so ex-workers could enrol directly onto 






that could be taken under the auspices of the taskforce. The experience and skills 
gained through prior taskforces with the knowledge and awareness of funding 
schemes ranging from local to international levels gave this smaller and more 
localised LDV Taskforce a ‘springboard’ into action. From a short-term perspective, 
the LDV Taskforce excelled in delivering direct policy action. 
The lack of long-term action stems from two aspects concerning the LDV closure, 
these being the recessionary economic context behind the closure and the sparse 
geographical distribution of the LDV workforce. Prior to the recession, funding for 
training and job opportunities was more plentiful, increasing the employability of 
redundant workers, thus making job transitions much easier (Danson 2005; Bailey 
and Chapain 2008) with workers relying less on personal networks, contacts and 
knowledge of the labour market. Earlier taskforces also had more resources to 
monitor the long-term progression of redundant workers, and to establish where best 
to apply new schemes to prevent long-term unemployment cycles (Weller et al. 
2012). The recession brought two key changes that would alter these long-term 
positive traits of previous taskforces. First, the economic environment reduced job 
vacancies, thus increasing job precariousness (Bailey and Chapain 2009). Second, 
government regional restructuring prevented the regional agencies from conducting 
long-term tracking and monitoring, again leading to higher job precariousness among 
vulnerable LDV workers. It is this reduction in the long-term capacity of the LDV 
Taskforce that created the deficiencies that the research found according to the 
views of LDV workers with regard to the taskforce aid. 
Similar long-term capacity has also been identified in the case of the MG Rover 
Taskforce intervention. Hall (2013) attributes this to the heavy centralisation of 
funding and strategy within the taskforce structure. This strategy enabled the 
taskforce to make significant gains in the short term within a concentrated area. Hall 
(2013) notes that local agencies were left out of the key decision-making and funding 
priorities. The strategy was detrimental to the development of local initiatives, which 
could have cultivated social capital for local areas (Hall 2013). The taskforce 
response needed to have further increased the capacity of local communities 
through more interactive decision-making and funding schemes, empowering local 
agencies that had a better understanding of the needs and wants of those local 






The LDV Taskforce had a similar centralised approach, albeit with less regional 
attention and political focus. The LDV Taskforce, the Learning Skills Council (LSC) 
and Job Centre Plus (JCP) agencies took the primary role with a strong emphasis on 
enrolling LDV workers onto benefits or training schemes.72 To further compound the 
situation, the recession had reduced the funding available to the taskforce, leading to 
a narrower focus being taken by the primary agencies. If local agencies and 
authorities could have been more involved in decision making, then specific services 
could have been better directed at LDV workers. 
The thesis does not attribute this flaw in the LDV Taskforce to the incompetency of 
any of the individual agencies but rather to the reduced capacity of the agencies, 
enforced by the contextual setting of the closure. The latter comprised the financial 
and economic constraints brought about by the recession; reform of the primary 
agencies (reductions in funding and realigning the purpose of the agencies towards 
a more ‘hands-off’ remit); and the abolition of RDAs in favour of LEPs, reducing 
regional policy and strategic coherence (LEPs were in an ‘embryonic’ state; this 
meant that regional cooperation and governance was potentially at its most 
fractured). This was combined with a poor comprehension of the problems faced by 
the LDV workers, in particular highly skilled workers.73 Due to the circumstance of 
the closure, the LDV Taskforce could not dedicate the resources or the expertise 
necessary to invoke more sophisticated training schemes or long-term tracking.  
 
8.2.3 Experience of the LDV Workforce – Feeling of Disconnection 
The LDV Taskforce was forced to have short-term and limited targets due to the 
constraining political and economic context, namely the restructuring of regional 
agencies and the economic recession following the 2008 financial crisis. The goals 
and ambitions fell in line with the current government supply-side approach to 
economic readjustment, where emphasis was placed on the individual to find work 
rather than on government stimulus (Danson 2005; Birch and Mykhnenko 2008; 
Hudson 2009). This approach contrasts with the expectations of LDV workers as 
                                                          
72 Many LDV workers found the training schemes made available were inappropriate given their personal 
circumstances and qualifications. 
73 The ‘hands-off’ term reflects the JCP providing an outlet of basic services rather than sponsoring workers 
onto apprenticeship or training schemes. Likewise, the LSA changed to devolve training contracts to local 






shown in the survey results, illuminating the ‘disconnect’ between the government 
service and the demands of the workers.  
Reforms within the UK labour market over several decades have strived to increase 
labour flexibility (Shuttleworth et al. 2005; Dawley 2007); indeed, on this basis it is 
assumed that higher-skilled workers have the necessary skills to easily become 
‘flexible’. Whilst this research does not state that highly skilled workers actually 
suffered more than low skilled workers in seeking employment opportunities post 
LDV, the research does show that the needs of highly skilled workers are overlooked 
by policy makers and require more direct specific support. Whilst some highly skilled 
workers of LDV did exhibit high flexibility or moved on speedily with little or no 
hindrance, other highly skilled workers seemed to find themselves in situations 
typical of careers orientated towards heavy industry or manufacturing. Such 
positions, which are traditionally long-lasting, usually spanning many decades, 
secured through strong union representation, are contradictory to the flexible 
characteristics needed within the modern neoliberal labour market (Shuttleworth et 
al. 2005).  
LDV workers share this commonality, with the majority of them having little or no job-
search experience outside of LDV or the British Leyland ‘umbrella’, particularly in the 
last 10 years. The LDV workers expressed that they felt ‘disorientated’ in their next 
course of action and that the services provided by the local agencies were 
inadequate. The taskforce may have conducted their policies effectively but 
ultimately these policies goals were not made clear and only had a short-term 
impact. This left many LDV workers feeling abandoned or isolated so that they 
struggled to find re-employment and adjust. 
Indeed, the response offered by job services was deemed inadequate by the 
redundant workforce, with new job opportunities found through social networks with 
the training schemes offered by the job services seeming irrelevant. These problems 
could have been countered if sufficient job services and policies had been in place to 
make the transition from long-term stable employment to more flexible work. 
Shuttleworth et al. (2005) highlighted how the correct implementation of job services 
and training schemes was successful in redirecting redundant workers when given 
devolved control and direct links to the local labour market within related industrial 






and Bailey et al.’s (2008) and Bentley et al.’s. (2010) studies of MG Rover during the 
mid-1990s and mid 2000s respectively draw similar conclusions, and show that 
successful reintegration of a redundant workforce is geographically related, and that 
success relies on local demand within the local labour market. Whilst highly skilled 
workers are expected to be geographically flexible within their job searches, in the 
context of LDV many workers’ domestic needs constrained this mobility. This, 
coupled, with the GPE situation of the West Midlands, further restricted job 
opportunities and support within a limited commuting area and thus decreased ex-
LDV workers’ employability. Some of the highly skilled workers have been forced into 
less secure job positions through the increased likelihood of consultancy positions, 
some of these requiring extensive commutes (located outside of the West Midlands). 
Highly skilled workers should therefore not be considered ‘fully flexible/adaptable’ as 
in this instance they encountered similar employability barriers to lower-skilled 
workers, which cannot be resolved through orthodox job search assistance or 
training facilitated by local agencies. This in turn may lead to a higher likelihood of 
highly skilled workers leaving the labour market altogether, which over time will have 
a profound impact on regional economic prospects and further accelerate the 
conglomeration of London and the South East at the cost of OIRs.  
Taskforces need to have more direct contact with workers before and after plant 
closure takes place (Cook et al. 2013). After identifying which workers are more 
dependent on the institution through analysing their skills, demographic and career 
history, this information can be conveyed to local agencies to promote training 
schemes and development programmes that are better suited to the workforce in 
their locality, creating longer-term foundations to recovery (Green and Collis 2006; 
Hall 2013). The lack of job-search experience is one example; by providing explicit 
advice on job searches, workers can be directed to more appropriate searches. For 
workers with higher skill sets and job demands, simply acting as a mediator between 
the individual and private job agencies for more specialist assistance could prove 
vital. The importance of informal networks (i.e. social and non-professional contacts) 
and official networks depends on the job position of the worker. Typically, those with 
lower qualifications rely heavily on unofficial contacts and networks to move on 






of skills are vital in job searching and should be encouraged while workers are 
employed rather than during employment transition. 
 
8.3 Contribution to Knowledge 
The contribution of this thesis to its academic field lies in three main areas: the role 
of the GPE in framing the study of closures; the trajectories of the LDV workers; and 
the institutional transition to LEPs. The comprehension of these three main points 
together should contribute to further theoretical understanding and more robust 
policy-making within the context of the advancement of global economic forces and 
widening regional disparities, particularly within the UK. This research draws 
attention and importance to the need to support regional economies to maintain a 
vital economic structure to foster future growth and increase regional convergence. 
The research develops the GPE approach in showing how plant closure should not 
be treated as a one-off event but as an accumulation of several events that creates a 
‘path trajectory’, which leads to the closure itself and as such incorporates wider 
contextual issues with long-term goals to recovery. In this instance, the GPE 
framework refers to the geospatial position of LDV within the West Midlands and 
international economy, how it operated within the automotive industry, the backdrop 
of previous taskforces encouraging similar policy strategies and the reorganisation of 
regional government agencies. Second, the employment trajectories looked at how 
certain characteristics of highly skilled workers had in fact led to certain employment 
barriers and opportunities post-redundancy. In this regard, there are five points 
which should be considered to enable a more appropriate policy response: the 
geographical relationship of the workers and job services; demographics and 
employment history; the needs of differing skill levels (i.e. not focusing merely on low 
skilled issues); the transferability and recognition of skills; and the provision of 
appropriate job service support and functions. The third point relates to the 
discussion of the transition of regional governance from being RDA led to LEPs and 
the implications that this may have for long-term labour market policy capacity. The 
LDV closure took place at the outset of this national transition and could have led to 






topic concerns how the reformed local government agencies such as the LSA and 
JCP could be hampered within this new LEP framework. 
 
8.3.1 GPE Analysis as a Framework to Study Plant Closure Response 
The research has shown how the geographical, political and economic (GPE) issues 
behind plant closure have a strong influence on the shock of and reaction to closure. 
The GPE framework utilised the historical association of the event, which places 
emphasis on the progression of processes over time that accumulates to the point of 
the actual closure event itself. The GPE framework supported the research in 
defining the contextual factors behind the LDV closure and then how it influenced the 
level and significance of intervention and response initiated by the LDV Taskforce 
towards ex-worker outcome. The factors that predominately influenced this LDV 
response in this regard was the political reformation of regional agencies 
compounded by the economic difficulty brought upon by the financial crisis and the 
following recession. There may be similar issues shared across other plant closures 
and redundancies but the GPE circumstances will differ, bringing different responses 
in different conjunctures. 
The combination of economic–political aspects of the West Midlands in terms of 
capital accumulation, capital ownership and state regulation and constraints 
contributed towards the plant closure response (Pike 2005). The ‘ownership saga’ of 
LDV initiated the long-term ‘manifestation’ of LDV’s closure. Beginning with the 
management buyout of LDV in 1993, this set in motion a chain of events through 
continuous ownership transactions that would see LDV relinquish assets and control 
and become more vulnerable to external events. Unfortunately, the period in which 
substantial intervention took place was such that policy responses were severely 
hindered due to the economic recession; the UK saw curtailed investment 
confidence among businesses, reducing its ability to actively support industries that 
could be deemed beyond rescue. In effect, the LDV Taskforce merely functioned as 
a ‘transition vehicle’ to oversee the period of LDV’s closure.  
Despite the downturn of the automotive industry, the region would experience a 
resurgence between 2009 and 2012, with a production increase of 50% (Amison and 






categorised as a ‘phoenix industry’, in which smaller to medium-sized firms would 
‘rise anew’ from old industries to operate with similar technologies but with a process 
of open innovation taking place across firms and sectors (including universities, 
research institutions and the wider supply chain) (Amison and Bailey 2014:3). The 
failure to intervene in 2006 and again later in 2009 prevented LDV from actively 
participating within this ‘phoenix industry’ of the West Midlands. Interviews with LDV 
executives revealed that there was real potential for electric, low-carbon production, 
which is now at the forefront of the West Midlands phoenix automotive industry 
(Amison and Bailey 2014). This represents a lost opportunity to solidify this sector 
and further cultivate skills and innovation tied to low-carbon production within the 
region. Amison and Bailey (2014) expand this point further by expressing the view 
that phoenix industries are reliant on labour with the skill competencies necessary to 
support the innovation process that takes places within the industry. While the small 
operation of LDV may have been deemed an ‘acceptable’ loss in terms of overall job 
losses and economic impacts, the implications for the future development of the 
West Midlands automotive industry and other green tech sectors was 
underestimated and overlooked. 
Furthermore, during this period, the taskforce approach was in its ‘ascendancy’ due 
to the experience with the MG Rover situation. Here, the institutional capacity of the 
agencies would be at its highest combined with more readily available funding. 
Action taken during these crucial moments of 2006 and/or 2009 may have slowed 
down the process of closure or even led to ‘path branching’ that in turn may have led 
to some form of activities continuing at the Washwood Heath site. While a reactive 
stance may have had success in previous years, reductions in the institutional 
capacity of the agencies involved in the LDV Taskforce would shape and restrict the 
policies implemented, in turn making the closure an ‘inevitable process’, restricting 
the path development of the area and not taking advantage of the resurgence of the 
region’s phoenix industry. 
When assessing the West Midlands’ GPE, the research demonstrated how the area 
was subject to a number of events that presented a cyclical process. The GPE 
framework identifies the accumulation of events and wider geospatial processes that 
led to a longer-term view of the LDV closure instead of regarding the closure as a 






when interventions could have had a greater impact and the potential to create 
different outcomes. In the case of LDV, the other critical moment for intervention was 
the GAZ takeover in 2006. More direct preventionist intervention on behalf of LDV 
(through the medium of a taskforce) during the GAZ takeover could have started 
preliminary programmes, identifying vulnerable workers, establishing training 
schemes, diversifying the supply product chain and analysing the viability of GAZ’s 
ownership rather than retrospective intervention that became more limited due to the 
changing GPE circumstances. Policy implications of integrating GPE into policy 
strategising should lead to longer-term consideration of issues that could contribute 
to more constructive outcomes for the economy and affected workers. 
 
8.3.2 Worker Trajectories and Job Barriers to White-collar Workers 
Maintaining and developing high skills in a region to foster future economic growth 
and counter regional imbalances is vitally important. What this research has 
identified was a disjunction lying between the disenchanted highly skilled redundant 
workers and services provided by the LDV Taskforce. This was an issue of 
disconnection; no matter how effectively the LDV Taskforce implemented its 
strategies, they failed to have any impact on the highly skilled or specialist skilled 
redundant workers’ employment outcomes and adjustment. The research found that 
re-employability issues were displayed across the higher-skilled workforce of LDV, 
who experienced neglect in terms of direct job service and assistance with finding 
new employment. Through the theoretical understanding of plant closure paired with 
an interpretivist qualitative methodology, the research developed the concept of 
worker trajectories as a means to categorise workers into groups according to 
whether they experienced positive or negative outcomes of re-employability process 
and if they considered themselves to have adjusted successfully following LDV’s 
closure.  
The determination of worker trajectory outcomes stems from a combination of factors 
such as the type and vocation of skill, not just skill levels and knowledge of the 
labour market, which illustrates their eventual re-employment outcomes (see Table 
8.1). What the research contributes in this respect is that once these trajectories 
have been identified among the workforce, it is possible to ‘break out’ of them 






Table 8-2: Employment Trajectories Outcomes (taken from Table 7.6): 
 
Employment Trajectory Outcomes 
Outcome 1-Very 
successful and quick 
transition into 
employment 
Short employment transition – Short- and long-term 
financial security, continuation of career path, utilisation of 
skill sets, lower job precariousness. 
Contributing Factors Good adaptability, low reliability on taskforce 
interventions – Utilisation of networks (incl. insurance 







Long period of financial insecurity, minor retraining and 
adjustment (lifestyle, career choice) – Long-term financial 
security, utilising majority of skills, medium job 
precariousness. 
Contributing Factors Disconnected, medium adaptability, some 
qualification isolationism – Little knowledge of labour 
market or networks, high level qualifications enable 
eventual transition with some difficulty. 
Outcome 3-Difficult 
period of transition 
and worse job 
condition post LDV 
Long period of financial insecurity, major retraining and 
adjustment (lifestyle, career choice) – Further long-term 
financial insecurity, drastic change of career path, lower 
job satisfaction, higher job precariousness. 
Contributing Factors Skills dependency, qualification isolationism, poor 
adaptability, disconnected – Little knowledge of labour 
market or networks, combined with low skills, make 
detrimental/negative factors more profound and difficult to 
overcome. 
This research shares similar findings with the BIS (business innovation and skills) 
report Economics Shocks Report (Cook et al. 2013), with further studies of 
redundant workers needed in which data is more closely associated to the 
categories identified within the worker trajectories. This could enable future policy to 






 The geographical relationship of the workers is the place of work. In the case 
of LDV, there was a wide distribution of workers; this places a greater 
responsibility on local agencies/actors to provide more direct support. 
 Demographics of the workforce: age continues to be a significant barrier to 
employment. Older workers can lack knowledge of the labour market and 
deter employers from investing in relevant training. 
 Level of skills: high-tier management employees are highly ubiquitous and 
mobile in applying their skills and expertise. However, high/specialised skilled 
workers can be weak at exploiting job opportunities as they can be very job-
specific. More attention needs to be given towards their personal capability 
and experience at finding employment. Lower skilled workers need greater aid 
in developing desired skills and CV development to diversify their range of 
potential job opportunities. 
 The transferability of skills: highly specialised skills need linkages to their 
relevant industrial job opportunities. Unrecognised skills outside that particular 
industry will require more assistance at developing the skills wanted by the 
labour market. 
Future taskforces need to involve the establishment of a firm line of communication 
between workforce and local agencies so that redundant workers have a sound 
knowledge of how and where services will be made available (Cook et al. 2013). The 
importance of local agency cooperation needs to be recognised in sharing expertise 
for consultancy or through unilateral networking of job searching. The private sector 
must also be involved with local initiatives to inform what skills are in demand and 
sought by employers, to connect skill supply with labour market demand or informing 
workers of desirable skills. Those with highly specialist skills found this bridging 
function to be missing and had to compensate with lower job security (e.g. 
consultancy, agency work). Finally, the long-term tracking of workers is needed to 
monitor progress and ascertain if different training or consultancy approaches are 
required to reinforce the bridging function and viability of job-searching services 









Table 8-1: Worker Assessment and Policy Intervention 
Table displaying the worker assessment derived from the data analysis, explaining their characteristics and the 
required action that would be needed to ease their transition into new employment. 
 
The conclusion is that there needs to be a different approach when tackling future 
closures as different factors of the closure are affected disproportionately. The small 
scale and context of the LDV closure, the wide geographic distribution of suppliers 
and the workforce preordained that the impact on place and business was limited 
and so not a primary agenda for the taskforce. The LDV Taskforce had adequate 
warning and the skills necessary to reduce the impact of the shock on businesses, 





Highly Skilled LDV 
Workers 
Required Policy Action  
 Geographical 
Relationship 
Sparse distribution. Sparse distribution – placing a greater 






Older workforce – stronger assistance 
within the job-search activity, providing 
direct interaction between private sector 
vacancies. This also involves job 
service skills that can aid higher skilled 
workers. 
 
 Level of Skills High/specialised 
skilled, office tier 
Lower and 
unrecognised skilled.  
High/specialised skilled, office tier – 
Stronger capacity for bridging function 
of highly skilled vacancies. 
Lower skilled – Skills and CV 






High/specialised skilled – strong 
consultancy and communication with 
industrial/sectors to highlight potential 






response to the closure. Due to the close relationship between LDV and the BCC, 
there were opportunities for intervention to help LDV. The LDV workers received a 
decent provision in training subsides and out of work payments but more substantial 
training better suited to the demands of the regional labour market was absent. With 
regard to mitigating the impact of the shock on people, i.e. the LDV workers, the 
skills, experience and set-up of the LDV Taskforce enabled swift action that resolved 
the immediate concerns of redundant workers. More skill-tailored long-term support 
in giving consultation and direction is required to ease the transition of ex-workers. 
The JCPs – even on the local level – need to have greater understanding of private 
sector skill demands, providing more of a bridging function between the redundant 
workers and the labour market. This bridging capacity becomes more important for 
highly specialist skills with retraining functions more prominent for lower skilled 
workers. Whether this private sector link will be strengthened with local JCPs, LSA 
and other agencies under the LEP structure, which has the premise to involve more 
free enterprise and business direction in local economic decision making, remains to 
be seen.  
 
8.3.3 LEP Structure Directing Policy and Guiding Local Agencies 
The establishment of LEPs replacing the RDA structure has had implications for the 
development of local capability. The thesis has mentioned that local agencies may 
not have access to certain areas of expertise and so will need a regional institutional 
structure in which highly specialised expertise can be based. Importance has been 
placed on developing networks between agencies and the private sector that will 
interact in several labour markets and geographical areas. The intense competition 
for funding between LEP authorities could jeopardise cross-border co-ordination 
when competing for finite resources. Ascertaining whether employment barriers 
persist within particular demographics or skills will require long-term monitoring, 
which again may require cross-border coordination. If the LEP structure can be 
reformed to empower the agencies that reside within them and given substantial 
funding, then cohesive long-term strategies can be implemented. The LDV closure 
took place on the cusp of the LEP structure being set up in England. Since the start 
of this research, the LEPs will have been established for four years. It will be 






The Ford commercial vehicle plant closure in Southampton (2013) will be a prime 
case study for analysing how the capabilities of local agencies will have adapted and 
how future taskforces will operate within the financial and political constraints of the 
LEP structure. 
Given the importance placed upon local agencies to tackle specific problems 
associated with employment barriers and supply the correct services, developing 
necessary expert capacity is vital. Because of their reforms, the primary agencies, 
JCP and LSA, were encouraged to delegate responsibility to more local outlets. The 
funding schemes utilised (European Social Fund, Working Neighbourhoods Fund) 
were reasonably flexible as to where funding could be allocated for locally generated 
schemes. Given the geographic distribution of the LDV workers, this would seem 
appropriate. However, these agencies did not have the sufficient capacity to provide 
the necessary services. 
Services provided by the local JCPs failed to provide the assistance that was sought 
by the workers. Rather than just providing facilities, these local agencies need to 
develop expertise that can tackle these issues. Leaving these individuals isolated 
within their job search will likely lead to future employment being of a lower level 
(conditions, wages). Local agencies could develop stronger representation with 
private businesses to increase understanding of local skill and labour demands, 
constituting more direct communication between higher skilled redundant workers 
and the private sector. Should the LEPs develop their role as a sub-regional body 
and integrate effective working relationships with the private sector, then the 
possibility of more direct employer engagement could occur, leading to better job 
and skills training. 
In the years prior to the LDV closure, the taskforce approach had been refined 
through the accumulation of skills and experience among all of the agencies 
involved, in addition to the various agencies having the financial support to approach 
their tasks in a sophisticated manner. This created a system of effective coordination 
between Advantage West Midlands (RDA), the LSA and JCP (among others) where 
resources and skills could be synergised to provide not just short-term strategies but 
longer-term capacity to deal with worker transitions into new employment. The 
impact of the shift from RDAs to LEPs within the LDV Taskforce context was 






the closure, the AWM role was minor; indeed, the immediate reaction response of 
the LDV Taskforce was very much characteristic of its predecessors but limited in 
significance. Further reforms, cuts to funding and the distribution of powers to small 
local bodies across several authorities led to the loss of expertise, knowledge and 
skills that had been built up over the previous years, diminishing their ability to 
deliver effective policy. This loss of ‘permanent intelligence’ has to be rebuilt and 
reintegrated into the new LEP system. The tracking, monitoring and intelligence 
gathering abilities of AWM, LSA and the JCP have now been effectively squandered, 
further compounding the loss of ‘permanent knowledge’ and the ability to conduct 
longer-term tracking and monitoring activities. The need for the UK to develop and 
maintain coherent regional governance infrastructure is essential to ensure effective 
labour market policy. 
8.4 Concluding Remarks 
The research has demonstrated that the needs of highly skilled workers remain a 
pressing issue in tackling future plant closures. With production networks becoming 
ever-more integrated into global markets, the threat of manufacturing TNCs 
restructuring remains high and can entail shocks for all aspects of problems facing 
the workforce. In addition, the current economic situation continues to stress the 
need to maintain higher-skilled workers to propel the economy beyond low-wage 
economic growth. 
The research has found that highly skilled workers within manufacturing sectors can 
suffer employment barriers akin to those of low-skilled workers as their highly 
specialist skills are dependent on declining industries. While current taskforce 
approaches have adequate ability to resolve short-term issues via instigating flexible 
funding schemes and creating basic training opportunities, they fail to deal with the 
barriers experienced by highly skilled labour. 
Further research needs to be conducted on how the GPE framework can be used to 
improve the response of future taskforces or agglomerations of local agencies, in 
particular how the GPE framework can factor in the needs of highly skilled workers, 
directing them to the best employment outcomes within accessible labour markets. 
The Southampton Ford plant closure provides another comparative model with 






with the GPE facets of that area. This would entail research into the labour mobility 
of certain skills groups in relation to geographical and economic proximity to the 
dynamic economy of London and the South East, or if the socio-economic 
development of Southampton has in fact isolated the area, inhibiting the ability of 
local networks, including future taskforces in directing economic recovery (showing 
similarities to Birmingham). 
The research firmly places GPE within the process of forming a policy strategy, to 
identify the main opportunities and barriers for policy intervention through 
understanding the economic and political context. The conclusion reinforces the fact 
that there needs to be a balance between people, place and business within policy 
reaction and recognises that that balance will alter depending on the situation, but, 
more importantly, how that balance can be addressed through the GPE perspective. 
This research shows how the people aspect of the LDV closure was neglected, 
resulting in a difficulty for highly skilled workers in finding re-employment. In this 
regard, the GPE approach contributed towards the understanding and analysis of the 
worker employment trajectories and the employment barriers that white-collar 
workers experienced. 
However, while neo-classical economic thinking remains to the fore, it remains to be 
seen whether the GPE approach will be adopted in mainstream policy thinking. The 
GPE approach has a more profound long-term vision, incorporating many aspects 
beyond the pure economic and monetary value of an area when evaluating growth 
trajectories or path dependencies. This will often clash with the short-term demands 
of national and regional politics within the current perspective of overall economic 
development policy, which has increased the mobility of global capital. Future policy 
aimed towards highly skilled workers needs to embrace a mid/long-term focus, 
factoring in the importance of local agencies to develop a higher capacity of 
expertise and consultancy capability to direct highly skilled workers to where demand 
for their skills is located. The importance of this research will have prominence 
during the age of austerity when the value of future job creation is a pressing factor 
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Appendix I: Media Appeals  
The following images and descriptions explain the media appeals launched by 
Coventry University that attracted LDV workers to the research. 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright.This item has been removed due to 















This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright.This item has been 
removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be 
found in the Lanchester Library, Coventry University
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party 
Copyright.This item has been removed due to 
3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged version of 








Radio appeals were also undertaken as another source of attracting ex- DV workers. 
David Bailey conducted an interview with BBC West Midlands on the 29.01.2013 
 
Coventry University@covcampus25m 
Prof @dgbailey was on @bbcwm radio this morning talking about the @LDVGroup study 
he's conducting. Listen in at http://bbc.in/126eelt (53.00) 
BBC WM - Pete Morgan @ Breakfast, 29/01/2013. 
 




What happened to the LDV workers? – appeal for volunteers for study 
 
A new study is set to investigate the fate of the 850 workers who lost their jobs when Midlands-
based van manufacturer LDV went into administration in June 2009. 
 
Experts at Coventry University are appealing for volunteers to come forward to help them piece 
together the stories of former LDV staff and find out what happened to them, how they have got on 
since, and how the company’s demise impacted on their lives and their families. 
 
The study will be led by Professor David Bailey of the University’s Business School in conjunction 
with PhD student Tom Dudley, and follows the distinguished work Professor Bailey and his team 
carried out on the MG Rover workers after the closure of the Longbridge plant in 2005. 
 
Professor Bailey has worked hard to keep the plight of former MG Rover staff in the public eye ever 
since, and has written and blogged regularly on the need to support manufacturing – including in the 
case of LDV. 
 
Whilst many of the MG Rover workers did get back into work, a recent study (see link here) by 
Coventry and Birmingham universities found that three years on they earned much less on average 
than they did at MG Rover and felt less positive about their work. The work showed that high quality 
manufacturing jobs matter.  
 
When LDV went into administration it was much more difficult for its former workers to find 
employment given the state of the economy, and when Professor Bailey and his team contacted 







But the recent ‘mini renaissance’ of the automotive industry may have opened up opportunities for 
ex-LDV workers in the region. The study is hoping to explore how these workers have fared in the 
job market, whether they’ve retrained, and whether they’ve had help along the way. 
 
Professor Bailey is now looking for volunteers to interview over the telephone in the new year – all 
results will be anonymised and nobody’s details will be made public. 
 
Anyone willing to talk to Professor Bailey is being encouraged to call 07768725027 or email 
LDVstudy.bes@coventry.ac.uk, leaving their name and number for the team to call back. 
 






Appendix II: Media and Auxiliary Documents 
The following extract documents the immediate support offered in reaction to the 
LDV closure. 
 
£20M PROJECT SUPPORTS LDV WORKERS 
 
LDV workers recently made redundant are benefiting from a £20m support programme operated by 
Better West Midlands. 
 
Better West Midlands has been able to work alongside LDV staff as soon as the redundancies were 
announced - giving them help and support. 
 
Regional Minister, Ian Austin, met LDV staff who are already benefiting from a range of services 
offered by Better West Midlands in Wolverhampton, including retraining courses, interview 
techniques and CV writing. 
 
The Minister said: 
 
“The recession was caused in America, but it’s having a real impact across the whole of the West 
Midlands, and what local people need is a government on their side, providing real help now with new 
jobs and help with training. 
 
“I’m really impressed with the work going on here at Better West Midlands, where people recently 
made redundant from LDV and elsewhere are immediately getting the support they need. This is 
another example of the government funding real help now to get the West Midlands through the 
recession.” 
 
Better West Midlands is funded by the West Midlands Learning and Skills Council (LSC) and the 
European Social Fund (ESF). The current project, running from April 2009 to December 2010, will 
offer support to over 17,000 workers in the West Midlands affected by redundancy from any sectors.  
The project is delivered and operated through a consortium of trade unions working in partnership, 
including Community, GMB, Unite, USDAW and Unity. 
 
John Adams, LSC Contract Manager said: 
 
“The key to this partnership is working with employers, worker groups and key agencies to facilitate 
engagement with those affected at an early stage – whilst under the threat of redundancy. This enables 
individuals to access the range of support, enabling them to get back into work as quickly as 
possible.” 
 
Notes to editors 
Project intervention includes: 
 Initial assessment; 
 Skills for life screening (including ICT); 
 One to one confidential advice given by qualified Careers Advice and Guidance staff (Matrix 
Accredited); 
 Training needs analysis; 
 The development of a careers action plan before considering how learning can support their 
individual short and longer term aims; 






 Providing support and the opportunity for individual workers to train and re-skill / up-skill to 
meet the demands of a changing job market. This can be academic or practical vocational 
training leading to employment, including unaccredited and accredited courses; 
 Training delivered through the project specifically targets their early return to work; 
 Referrals to specialist organisations: 
E.g. re benefit allowances, debt counselling, Business Link in the case of people wanting to 
become self-employed or start up their own business, Train to Gain etc; 
 Ongoing support, mentoring and tracking; 
 Job search to enable progression into employment; 
Exit interview. 
 
ISSUED ON BEHALF OF THE REGIONAL MINISTER 
BY GOVERNMENT OFFICE FOR THE WEST MIDLANDS 











Appendix III: LDV Worker Questionnaire and 
Interview Topic Templates 
The below tables shot the questions and form of coding used for the LDV worker 
surveys and questionnaires. The structure and basis of these questions were based 
on the MG Rover survey (Bailey et al. 2006) format with some questions been more 
precise and specific to the LDV situation.  
INTRODUCTION to the Telephone Survey 
 
Good morning / afternoon / evening, my name is Tom Dudley; I’m calling on behalf of 
Coventry University conducting research onto the closure of LDV and how the workers have fared since 
the closure. 
 
A1) Can I speak to…  
 
ADD IF NECESSARY: We’re calling in regards to a survey that we are undertaking on 
behalf of Coventry University, looking at the impact the closure of LDV has had on former Washwood 
Heath workers and their families three years after the closure. The survey will take approximately 20 
minutes to complete.  
 
Yes, speaking 1 CONTINUE INTERVIEW 
Yes, passed on to named respondent 2 RESTART INTERVIEW 
No – not available at moment 3 ARRANGE TIME FOR INTERVIEW 
No – refusal 4 THANK AND CLOSE 
 
Introducing the Research  
 
Before we proceed with the interview I would like to briefly explain what your participation entails 
and how this telephone interview will help towards achieving the goals of the research. 
Coventry University wants to better understand the impact of the closure of LDV on you and your 
family and how you have progressed through the recession. The interview will ask questions about 
how LDV workers have moved on; how difficult it has been to find new jobs; has job satisfaction got 
better or worse; and understand the experience of the workers during this economically difficult 
period.  
The data gathered from the interview will enable the research to ascertain if government policy or 
approach to factory closure should change to better accommodate the needs of redundant workers, 
especially during periods of recession. 
 
Are you willing to continue with the questionnaire? During the questionnaire you are free to decline 
to answer any questions that you may feel uncomfortable answering. All responses will be treated in 
strict confidence and no respondent will be individually identified. 
 
 
REASSURANCES: ADD AS NECESSARY: 
• The research will form the basis of a PhD thesis conducted by myself on the behalf of Coventry 
University and will be disseminated to local, regional and national policy makers.  
• The interview will take about 20minutes to complete 
• My research phone can be contacted on 07768725027 
• Any queries or problems please contact Prof. David Bailey on 02476 887 688  
 






Name   
Gender  
Age when leaving 
LDV 
 
 Current ward or 
county you live 
in 
 
Contact details  
SECTION B: EMPLOYMENT AT LDV 
I’m now going to ask you some questions about your time working for LDV 
 
 














B3) Which department were you working in at the time? 
PROMPT AS NECESSARY 
 
Manufacturing  1  
Human Resources 2 
Sales & Marketing 3 
Information Systems 4 
Finance 5 
Sourcing 6 
Product development 7 
Other (SPECIFY) 8 
 
B4) Was your LDV salary based upon part-time or full-time work? 
Prompt: Part-time work defined as less than 30 hours per week 
 
Full-time  1 
Part-time  2 
 
 
B4a) And at the time of the closure, what was your final salary? 
PROMPT: Your gross annual salary before tax. 




IF ANSWERED DK/REF PROMPT WITH RANGES 
 








£10,000 – 14,999 2 
£15,000 – 19,999 3 
£20,000 – 24,999 4 
£25,000 – 29,999 5 
£30,000 – 34,999 6 
£35,000 – 39,999 7 
£40,000 – 44,999 8 
£45,000 – 49,999 9 
>£50,000 10 
 
B4b) During the time of the closure what was your weekly wage? 
PROMPT: Your gross annual salary before tax. 
 





B5) And in addition to your salary, did you receive any of the following benefits in your final position at 
LDV? 
READ OUT. CODE ALL THAT APPLY 
 
A company car or a special 
lease on a car 
1  
Pension (to which LDV 
contributed) 
2 
A bonus scheme 3 
Shares (options) in the 
company 
4 
Private medical insurance 5 
Other (PLEASE SPECIFY) 6 
None/Not applicable 7 
 
B6) At the time of the closure did any of your close or immediate family also work for LDV? 
CODE ALL THAT APPLY. DO NOT READ OUT. 
 
No – no family member worked for 
LDV 
1  
Yes – spouse / partner 2 
Yes – parent 3 
Yes – brother / sister 4 
Yes – son / daughter 5 





I would like to ask some questions about your qualifications. 
 
B7) And how old were you when you finished your FULL-TIME education? 
DO NOT READ OUT 





19 or older 6 
Still studying  7 
 







DO NOT READ OUT 
Post-graduate qualification 1 
University degree, HND, HNC, NVQ level 4 or 
equivalent 
2 
A-levels, vocational A-levels or AS levels 3 
CSEs / GCSEs / O-levels – at least 5 grade C or 
grade 1 or above 
4 
CSEs / GCSEs / O-levels – less than 5 at grade 
C or grade 1 
5 
Part 1 City & Guilds 6 
City & Guilds 7 
NVQ level 1 / 2 8 
NVQ level 3 9 
BTEC General Certificate 10 
BTEC National Diploma or Part 3 Advanced 
City & Guilds 
11 
Foundation GNVQ 12 
Advanced GNVQ 13 
Other (write in) 
 
14 
No academic qualifications 15 
 
 
B9) Did you achieve any of these qualifications whilst working at LDV? 
No 1 




B10) Have you had education/training since leaving LDV? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Don’t know 3 
 
 
B11) Is there any qualifications you have that aren’t mentioned in the previous question?  
 
No 1 







SECTION C: ACTIVITY SINCE WORKING FOR LDV 
 






 READ OUT. CODE ALL THAT APPLY. 
Self-employed 1  
Employed full-time 2 
Employed part-time 3 
In full-time education / 
training 
4 
In part-time education / 
training 
5 
Unemployed, looking for work 6 
Unemployed, not looking for 
work 
7 
Caring for children or 
relatives 
8 







Other (SPECIFY) 12 
 
WORKING - IF C1 OR C1A IS 2 OR 3  
 
 
















C1c) How many people in total work at your workplace approximately? 





Over 500 6 
 
 
C1d) Which of the following describes the arrangement of your employment status?  
 
READ OUT ALL CODED. SINGLE CODE ONLY. 
 
Agency work (with temping agency) 1 
Casual (temporary, paid by the hour) 2 
Fixed term contract (with a specified end date) 3 
Permanent (with no specified end date) 4 
 









DO NOT READ OUT. CODE ALL THAT APPLY 
 
From Job Centre plus 1 
Job Fair 2 
Newspaper 3 
Company approached me directly 4 
I approached the company directly regarding vacancies 5 
Trade union 6 
Support group 7 
I started my own company 8 
Was not happy with the job that I found 9 
Other (SPECIFY) 10 
 
 
C3) We’re interested to know the extent to which ex-LDV workers have found job roles similar to the 
ones they held before the closure. Would you describe your role as…? 
 
READ OUT. SINGLE CODE ONLY 
 
Exactly the same role as you had at LDV 1 
A very similar role, using many of the same skills 2 
A slightly different role, but using some of the same skills 3 
A different role, using few of the same skills 4 
A completely different role, using completely different skills 5 
Other (Specify) 6 
 
C3a) Is your commute to work further than it was to LDV? 
Significant decrease (20 minutes less) 1 
Significant increase (20 minutes more) 2 
Not noticeable or very little difference 3 
 
 
C3b) Could you tell us some of the problems you have faced trying to find employment?  
READ OUT. ALLOW MULTICODE. 
Age 1 
Lack of Skills 2 
Overqualified 3 
Too many people applying for the same job 4 
Negative reputation of LDV workers 5 
Other (specify) 6 
 
C4) Have you had more than one paid job since LDV closed? 
 
Yes 1 C4a 
No 2 C5 
 
C4a) Could you tell me the month and years approximately when you changed jobs? 
 








   
2009 2010 2011 
C4b) For the paid jobs that you had, what were the reasons they ended? 
ALLOW MULTICODE. DO NOT READ OUT 
 
Casual / agency / temporary fixed term and I wanted a permanent job 1 
Salary issues 2 
Unsatisfying work 3 
I didn’t like the work environment 4 
I didn’t feel that I fitted in with my colleagues or the company culture 5 
It was too far or expensive to travel 6 
Job was beyond skill level 7 
Job was below skill level 8 
Work-life balance issues 9 
Health issues 10 
Other (specify) 11 
 
 
C5) Do you receive any of the following benefits in your current position? 
READ OUT. CODE ALL THAT APPLY 
A company car or a special lease on a car 1 
Pension (to which your employer contributes) 2 
A bonus scheme 3 
Shares (options) in the company 4 
Are you entitled to more than the statuary 28 days’ annual leave 5 
Private medical insurance 6 
Other (PLEASE SPECIFY) 7 
None/Not applicable 8 
 
 






C6) Which of the following statements comes closest to describing how you feel about your 
current job? Would you say that it is…? 
READ OUT. SINGLE CODE ONLY. ALLOW DK. 






A job that you don’t like, but see yourself doing for the foreseeable future 2 
A stop-gap while you wait for something better to come along 3 





C6b) On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is highly dissatisfied and 5 is highly satisfied, how satisfied are 





   Highly 
satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
C6c) Which factors of your work make you the most dissatisfied?  
 
The work that you do 1 
The amount of working hours 2 
Your salary  3 
Your work colleagues 4 
The travel to work 5 
 
 
C6d) Overall, would you say your current job is …  
READ OUT, CODE ONE ONLY 
 
Better than your job at LDV 1 
About the same as your job at LDV 2 
Worse than your job at LDV 3 
Not sure 4 
 
UNEMPLOYED, LOOKING AND NOT LOOKING FOR WORK 
 
 








C7b) How likely are you to look for work in the future? 
PROMPT IF NECESSARY 
Definitely will 1  
Probably will 2 
Undecided / in the balance 3 
Probably will not 4 
Definitely will not 5 
DO NOT READ OUT) Don’t Know 6 
 
















If C7b = 1,2, 3, 4 or 6, then C8.  If C7b = 5 then C10 
 
C8) What type of job would you like? 
Permanent (open-ended contract) 1 
Fixed-term (specified end-date) 2 
Casual (temporary, paid by the hour) 3 






C9) Would you like to work full or part time? 
Prompt: Part-time work defined as less than 30 hours per week 
Full time 1 
Part-time 2 
 
C10) How many job applications have you submitted since you were at LDV? 







More than 50 7 
 
C11) Have you been interviewed for any jobs since the closure of LDV? 
ALLOW DK/REF 
Yes 1 Ask C12 
No 2 Ask C13 
 
 
C12) How many jobs have you been interviewed for? 
ENTER AS ABSOLUTE NUMBER 




ALLOW REF / DK 
 
 
C13) Have you had any job offers since LDV? 
ALLOW DK/REF 
Yes 1  Ask C 
No 2 Ask C16a 
 
 
C14) How many job offers have you had? 
ENTER AS ABSOLUTE NUMBER 
 











ASK IF HAD JOB OFFER/S BUT NOT WORKING (C9>=1) GO TO C10; OTHERS (C9=0 
OR DK/REF)  GO TO C12 
 
 
C14) Did you turn the job offer(s) down? 
ALLOW MULTICODE 
Turned the job offer(s) down 1 Ask C15 
I haven’t made a decision on the job 
offer(s) yet 
2 UNLESS 1 OR 2 ALSO CODED, 
GO TO C16a 
 
I’ve accepted and I’m waiting to start 
or for 
references 
3 UNLESS 1 OR 2 ALSO CODED, 
GO TO C16a 
 
 
ASK IF TURNED THE JOB DOWN (C10=1); OTHERS (C10=2 or 3) GO TO C12 
 
C15) Why did you turn the job offer(s) down? ALLOW MULTISCALE 
DO NOT READ OUT 
Casual / agency / temporary fixed term and I wanted a permanent job 1 
Salary issues 2 
Unsatisfying work 3 
I didn’t like the work environment 4 
I didn’t feel that I fitted in with my colleagues or the company culture 5 
It was too far or expensive to travel 6 
Job was beyond skill level 7 
Job was below skill level 8 
Work-life balance issues 9 
Health issues 10 
Other (specify) 11 
 
C16a) Did you face us some of the problems you faced when trying to find employment? 
READ OUT. ALLOW MULTICODE 
Age 1 
Lack of Skills 2 
Overqualified 3 
Too many people applying for same job 4 
Negative reputation of LDV workers 5 
Other (Specify) 6 
No problems 7 
 
C16b) How many paid jobs have you had since LDV closed? 
Prompt: Part-time work defined as less than 30 hours per week 





C16c) For the paid jobs that you had, what were the reasons they ended? 
ALLOW MULTICODE  DO NOT READ OUT 
Casual / agency / temporary fixed term and I wanted a permanent job 1 
Salary issues 2 
Unsatisfying work 3 
I didn’t like the work environment 4 
I didn’t feel that I fitted in with my colleagues or the company culture 5 
It was too far or expensive to travel 6 
Job was beyond skill level 7 
Job was below skill level 8 






Health issues 10 
Other (specify) 11 
 
 
RETIRED, HOME MAKER/HOUSE WIFE, CARING FOR RELATIVES-  IF C1 =8, 9, 10. 
 
C17) How long have you been …. for? 
______________________ weeks/months/years 
 
C18) Why did you decide to …. since leaving LDV? 
READ OUT. SINGLE CODE ONLY 
Financial security 1 
Spend more time with family 2 
Spend more time on hobbies 3 
Disability 4 
Unable to find other employment 5 
Family obligations 6 
Other (Specify) 7 
 
 
C18a) Would you prefer to be working? 
Yes, Working 1 ASK C18a 




C18c) What type of working arrangements would you like? 
Permanent (open-ended contract) 1 
Fixed-term (specified end-date) 2 
Casual (temporary, paid by the hour) 3 




IF ON INCAPACITY OR DISABILITY BENEFIT IF  C1 or C1a =11 
 
C19) How long have you been on incapacity/disability benefit for? 
______________________ weeks/months/years 
 
C19a) Could you tell us what led you to receiving the Disability Benefit? 
 READ OUT. SINGLE CODE. 
Recommended by doctor 1 
Recommended by Job Centre 2 
Recommended by spouse/friends/family 3 
Other 4 
 
PLEASE SPECIFY _________________________________ 
 
 
SELF EMPLOYED IF  C1 or C1a = 1 
 
C20) How long have you been self-employed for? 













C20a) What sort of work do you do now?  









C20b) Do you run your own company? 
Yes - on my own 1 
Yes - jointly with business partner/s 2 
No 3 
Don’t know 4 
 
 
C20c) If currently self-employed or run own company do you do work for one client or more than one 
client? 
One client (dependent contractor) 1 
More than one client (independent contractor) 2 
 
 
C21) Do you receive any of the following benefits in your current position? 
READ OUT. CODE ALL THAT APPLY 
A company car or a special lease on a car 1 
Pension (to which your employer contributes) 2 
A bonus scheme 3 
Shares (options) in the company 4 
Private medical insurance 5 
Receive more than the statuary 28 days’ annual leave 6 
Other (PLEASE SPECIFY) 7 




C22) Which of the following statements comes closest to describing how you feel about your 
current job? Would you say that it is…? 
READ OUT. SINGLE CODE ONLY. ALLOW DK. 
A job that you like, and see yourself doing for the foreseeable future 1 
A job that you don’t like, but see yourself doing for the foreseeable future 2 
A stop-gap while you wait for something better to come along 3 






C22a) On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is highly dissatisfied and 5 is highly satisfied, how satisfied are 





   Highly 
satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
C22b) What factors about your work are you most dissatisfied with? 

















C22c) In terms of your opinion of your current job, would you say your current job is …  
READ OUT, CODE ONE ONLY 
 
Better than your job at LDV 1 
About the same as your job at LDV 2 
Worse than your job at LDV 3 
Not sure 4 
 
EDUCATION / TRAINING   IF C1 = 4 OR 5  
 
C23) What qualification(s) are you currently working towards/ did you work towards? 
 
DO NOT READ OUT. 
Post-graduate qualification 1 
University degree, HND, HNC, NVQ level 4 or equivalent 2 
A-levels, vocational A-levels or AS levels 3 
GCSEs – at least 5 grade C or above 4 
GCSEs – less than 5 at grade C 5 
Part 1 City & Guilds 6 
City & Guilds 7 
NVQ level 1 / 2 8 
NVQ level 3 9 
BTEC General Certificate 10 
BTEC National Diploma or Part 3 Advanced City & Guilds 11 
 
11 
Foundation GNVQ 12 
Advanced GNVQ 13 
Other [WRITE IN] 
 
14 
No academic qualifications 15 
 
C23a) Why did you decide to retrain/study? 
ALLOW MULTICODE 
I was not able to find work in my field with my qualifications 1 
I was unemployed 2 
I found jobs but I was not satisfied with them 3 
I wanted to increase my opportunities 4 
I wanted to change carrier/vocation 5 
I was attracted by the financial incentives 6 





C24a) What was your highest qualification before training? 
Post-graduate qualification 1 
University degree, HND, HNC, NVQ level 4 or equivalent 2 
Your working hours 2 
Your salary 3 
Your colleagues 4 
The travel to work 5 






A-levels, vocational A-levels or AS levels 3 
GCSEs – at least 5 grade C or above 4 
GCSEs – less than 5 at grade C 5 
Part 1 City & Guilds 6 
City & Guilds 7 
NVQ level 1 / 2 8 
NVQ level 3 9 
BTEC General Certificate 10 
BTEC National Diploma or Part 3 Advanced City & Guilds 11 
 
11 
Foundation GNVQ 12 
Advanced GNVQ 13 
Other [WRITE IN] 
 
14 
No academic qualifications 15 
 
C24b) Did you attain any of the qualifications at LDV? 
DO NOT READ OUT 
Post-graduate qualification 1 
University degree, HND, HNC, NVQ level 4 or 
equivalent 
2 
A-levels, vocational A-levels or AS levels 3 
CSEs / GCSEs / O-levels – at least 5 grade C or 
grade 1 or above 
4 
CSEs / GCSEs / O-levels – less than 5 at grade 
C or grade 1 
5 
Part 1 City & Guilds 6 
City & Guilds 7 
NVQ level 1 / 2 8 
NVQ level 3 9 
BTEC General Certificate 10 
BTEC National Diploma or Part 3 Advanced 
City & Guilds 
11 
Foundation GNVQ 12 
Advanced GNVQ 13 
Other (write in) 
 
14 
No academic qualifications 15 
 
 
SECTION D: HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 
 




D1a) What is your current marital status?  
PROMPT AS NECESSARY 
 
Married / living with partner 1 















Rather not say 3 
 
 






D2) Could you describe the employment status for your husband/wife/partner? 
 READ OUT ALL CODED. SINGLE CODE ONLY. 
Agency work (with temping agency) 1 
Casual (temporary, paid by the hour) 2 
Fixed term contract (with a specified end date) 3 
Permanent (with no specified end date) 4 
Not employed 5 
 
 
D3) Which of these statements would you say apply to your household’s financial situation at the 
moment? 
READ OUT, CODE ALL THAT APPLY (SINGLE CODE ONLY) 
We are in debt 1 
We need to draw on our savings to make ends 
meet 
2 
We can just about manage with our current 
income 
3 
We are in a position to save a lot of money 4 
We are in a position to save some money 5 
None of the above 6 
 
D4) Thinking about the time when you were at LDV, would you say that your household was financially 
better off then, worse off then or about the same as it is now? 
SINGLE CODE 
Better off then, than now 1 
Worse off then, than now 2 
About the same then as now 3 
 
 
D5) WHO EARNS THE MOST IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD? 
Myself 1 
My partner/spouse 2 
Both equally (spontaneous answer) 3 
 





D7) Are you currently receiving one or more of the following sources of income? 










Job seekers allowance 4 
Incapacity/disability benefit 5 
Bursaries, education or training allowance 6 
Career or family allowance 7 
Other (PLEASE SPECIFY) 8 
None/Not applicable 9 
 
IF MULTICODE AT C18, ASK C18a 
 





Job seekers allowance 4 
Incapacity/disability benefit 5 
Bursaries, education or training allowance 6 
Career or family allowance 7 
Other (PLEASE SPECIFY) 8 
None/Not applicable 9 
 
 
D7b) And what are your current ….. Earnings, before tax? (see C18b) 
PROMPT: Your ….. (see C18a) before tax. 






<£10,000/YEAR / up to £833 /month / up to £192/ week 1  
£10,000 – 14,999/ YEAR / £833 - £1249 /month / £192 - £288/week 2 
£15,000 – 19,999/ YEAR / £1250- £1,666/month / £289 - £345 /week 3 
£20,000 – 24,999/ YEAR / £1,667 - £2,083/month / £346 - 
£481/week 
4 
£25,000 – 29,999/ YEAR / £2,084 - £2,500 /month / £482 – £577 
/week 
5 
£30,000 – 34,999/ YEAR / £2,001 - £2,916 /month / £578 - 
£673/week 
6 
£35,000 – 39,999/ YEAR / £2917 - £3,333/ month / £674 -£769 
/week 
7 
£40,000 – 44,999/ YEAR / £3,334 - £3,750/ month / £770 - £865 
/week 
8 
£45,000 – 49,999/ YEAR / £3,750-£4,166 a month / £866 - £961 a 
week 
9 
>£50,000/ YEAR / £4,167 or more a month / £962 or more a week 10 
 
IF ANSWERED DK/REF PROMPT WITH RANGES 
 
 [PLEASE ENCOURAGE ANSWERS TO ABSOLUTE NUMBER OR AT LEAST A RANGE] 
 
 
SECTION E: ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS 
 
We are interested in finding out about the level of support former workers at LDV have received since 








E1) The first set of statements I am going to read out concern the level of support that you personally 
have received in the first3 months? 









I feel supported by family and 
friends at this 
time 
1 2 3 4 5 
I am receiving support from ex-
LDV 
employees 
1 2 3 4 5 
I am receiving adequate support 
from the trade 
unions 
1 2 3 4 5 
I am receiving adequate help from 
government 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
E2a) We know that former LDV workers were offered the following forms of help with money and other 
related forms of advice from local or national advice agencies. Did you know you could get help in the 
form of the following? 
 Yes No N/A 
Advice on benefits/making claims for benefits/ 
redundancy money 
1 2 3 
Rescheduled Child Support Agency payments 1 2 3 
Help on negotiating lower rates loans to purchase 
LDV vehicles 
1 2 3 
Advice on mortgages / rent 1 2 3 
Advice on credit card debt 1 2 3 
 
 
E2b) Can I now ask you if you obtained help from any of the above forms of assistance from local 
or national advice agencies, and the extent to which you agree that they were helpful. Again, 
please can you rate this on a scale of 1 – 5 where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly 
agree? 













claims for benefits/ 
redundancy money 
 





0 1 2 3 4 5 
Help on negotiating 
lower 
rates loans to purchase 
LDV vehicles 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Advice on mortgages / 
rent 
 






Advice on credit card 
debt 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
E2c ) Following the closure of the LDV plant Birmingham City Council set up a 






E2d) Did you use the service and if so was it helpful? 










0 1 2 3 4 5 
 










E4c) Can I also check, have you made a claim for Jobseekers Allowance or other benefits since 
LDV closed? 
Yes 1 Ask E4d 
No 2 Ask E5a 
 





E5a) Can I now ask whether you received any of the above forms of assistance and, secondly, the 
extent to which you agree they were useful? Again, it is a scale of 1 -5 where 1 = strongly 











Training Needs Analysis 
/Assessment 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Training Needs Analysis 
/Assessment for partner 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Free place on a Training 
course 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Free travel to a training 
course /job interview 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Free place on a training 
course for partner/ 
wife/husband 
 







Child care allowances 
for going on a training 
course 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Sent on training course 
by new employer 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Visit to a Job fair 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Information on Job 
Opportunities or Help 
from Jobcentre plus 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Help with setting up 
your own business 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 




0 1 2 3 4 5 
 




No Partner 3 
 
  











E6) Could you rate the competency of the agencies that helped you? 
 
Again, please answer on a scale of 1 – 5 where 1 = Very bad and 5 = very good. 
 Wasn’t 
obtained 
Very poor poor Neither 
good or bad 
Good Very good 
Job centre 
plus 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Learning 
skills council 




0 1 2 3 4 5 
Birmingham 
Colleges 













E6a) Could you rate the usefulness of the agency or agencies that help you? 
 
Again, please answer on a scale of 1 – 5 where 1 = Very bad and 5 = very good. 
 
 Very bad bad Neither good 
or bad 
Good Very good 
Job centre 
plus 
1 2 3 4 5 
Learning 
skills council 




1 2 3 4 5 
Birmingham 
Colleges 





1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
E7) Were you aware that there was a jobs fair organised at Villa Park during the 24th and 25th June 2009? 
Yes 1 Ask E11 
Yes, but attend 2 Move to section F 




E8) The jobs fair that was organised at Villa Park on the 24th-25th June 2009, How useful was it to you 
in…. READ THE CODE, ALLOW FOR MULTICODE  
Again, please answer on a scale of 1 – 5 where 1 = Very bad and 5 = very good. 
 




Finding new employment 1 2 3 4 5 
Accessing new training 1 2 3 4 5 
Learning about new trades or 
industries 
1 2 3 4 5 














F2) Since the closure of LDV has you done any of the following? 
READ OUT. MULTICODE 
 Yes No 
Moved home 1 2 
Sold your home 1 2 
Paid off part of your mortgage 1 2 







Become a tenant 1 2 
Refinanced your house 1 2 




F3) What type of residence do you live in now? 
READ OUT. SINGLE CODE. 
Detached house 1 
Semi-detached house 2 
Terrace house, row or townhouse 3 
Flat, unit or apartment 4 






F4) In this residence are you? 
READ OUT. SINGLE CODE. 
The outright owner/ joint owner 1 
Paying off a mortgage 2 
Renting from the Council or Housing Association 3 
Renting privately 4 
Living with parents/partner who own or paying 
off mortgage 
5 










F6) How long have you lived in your current house and neighbourhood? 
 Less than 
one year 
1-3 years 4-9 years 10-15 years More than 15 
years 
Your current house 1 2 3 4 5 
 Your neighbourhood 1 2 3 4 5 
 
IF F6 is: Less than one year OR 1-3 years then ask F7and F8 
 4-9 years ask F8 
 10 years or more ask F10 
 
F7) What were the reasons why you moved? 
ALLOW MULTICODE 
Wanted to change career 1 
Redundancy/Job no longer existed 2 
Retirement 3 
Change in personal/family circumstances 4 
To be nearer family/friends 5 
To get a larger home 6 
To get a smaller home 7 
To get a house rather than a flat 8 







Could not afford mortgage repayments 10 
Could not afford service charges 11 














F9) What type of residence did you live in at your previous address? 
READ OUT. SINGLE CODE. 
Detached house 1 
Semi-detached house 2 
Terrace house, row or townhouse 3 
Flat, unit or apartment 4 





F10) In this residence were you? 
READ OUT. SINGLE CODE. 
The outright owner/ joint owner 1 
Paying off a mortgage 2 
Renting from the Council or Housing Association 3 
Renting privately 4 
Living with parents/partner who own or paying 
off mortgage 
5 




F11) Since you moved, have your housing costs (such as interest rates) …? 
Decreased Stayed the same Increased 
 
1 2 3 
 
Telephone Interview with the LDV workers 
The LDV workers that agreed to participate in the second stage of the research took 
part in telephone interviews. These questions were created based on the results and 
feedback of the telephone surveys, placed within a semi-structured format these 
questions were aimed to progress the research aims but allowing for any adaptation. 
 
1-Experience at LDV 








 How did you feel whilst working at LDV in term of job and financial security, 
Personal Well-being and over job satisfaction? 
 What was your career prior to LDV (Those with a short involvement with 
LDV)? 
 
2-Experience of Redundancy 
 What were your reaction and feelings to been made redundant?  
 What were your first primary concerns when you were made redundant? 
 To find employment ASAP- Financial and job security 
 Take opportunity for career change 
 Opportunity for time off  
 
 Your first actions after been made redundant? 
 How has the closure impacted the people around you? E.G your family and 
home 
 The support services you received, what did they consist of? How did they 
help you personally? 
 How could these services be better improved to help you? 
 Were your encouraged to undertake some form of re-training? 
 Did they assist you in the job search, helping you to re-adjust to the labour 
market? 
 What was your perception of these services in your circumstance? 
 
3-Experience of Job Search 
 Could you describe you experience of your job search? 
 The number of applications you made? 






 What were the main difficulties you experienced in your job search? 
 Qualifications 
 Suitable job positions 
 Personal Circumstances 
 Competition for certain jobs within your field  
 At any point did you feel compelled to relocate or drastically alter your lifestyle 
to accommodate your need for new employment? 
 Did you feel constrained by your personal circumstances in finding new 
employment and moving on from LDV? 
 
How did you attain your current employment? (Key question) 
 
Did you set yourself a rigorous timetable for job applications? 
How do you feel you could have been better helped to find employment that you 
would feel satisfied/comfortable with? 
What services could have been improved? 
 
Interview Question Framework with Policy Stakeholders 
The following illustrates the main area of questioning involved when interviewing the 
policy stakeholders. As declared in the methodology chapter the interviews were 
established within the semi-structured format, the questions were developed prior to 
the interview covering key areas but leaving room for discussion and expansion of 
those questions and subjects areas in more specific regards to their direct 
experience and association with the LDV Taskforce.  
Interview question development  
Contextual Knowledge about the interviewee and rapport building (Intro) 
 Describe your role within the council- Gaining knowledge about the 







 How long have you been in this current job role? - Gaining knowledge about 
the interviewee and what their association/relationship is with the LDV 
taskforce 
 
 How did you get into this job sector, (or motivation/career path)- Gaining 
knowledge about the interviewee and what their association/relationship is 
with the LDV taskforce? 
 
Direct affiliation with the LDV taskforce concerning their job role 
 
 How did you get involved in the LDV taskforce? – Gaining knowledge about 
their role within the LDV taskforce 
 
 
 What was your position and role within the taskforce? – Gaining knowledge 
about their role within the LDV taskforce 
 
 Did your role change during your tenure as a part of the LDV taskforce? – 
Gaining knowledge about their role within the LDV taskforce 
 
The OBJ and aims of the LDV 
 What were the main objectives of the taskforce? (Just to offer job assistance 
or to offer more substantial training options or even assist local 
businesses/supplier in taking on ex-LDV workers)? 74– To establish what type 
of recovery (according to Pike 200275) the taskforce was what did the taskforce 
actually do? 
 
 What was the scope of the LDV taskforce? I.E focused on local issues or did it 
entail a wider regional perspective for example? - Understanding the aims and 
the objectives behind the taskforce 
 
                                                          
74 Two main types of support can be identified; they deal with socio-economic aspects of the impact of job loss. 
There was support relating to financial issues, for example, benefits; debt counselling and so on and, secondly 
support for workers to go on training courses, and to find jobs. 
 
75 Employer based, resolving redundancy problems; Sectoral based, analyzing trends in sector and improve 






 What funding and resources were available to the LDV taskforce and where 
did the funding or resources come from? – Understanding the scope of the 
taskforce and the national/regional priority placed for the job recovery- 
political legitimacy  
 
 Was the funding and resources available sufficient to fore fill the objectives of 
the task force? – understanding the limitations of the taskforce and also the 
political legitimacy of the taskforce  
 
 Did the timing of the LDV collapse hinder the success and the potential of the 
LDV taskforce in helping ex-workers? (I.E in the beginning of the financial 
crisis) – Gaining better understanding of the role of political legitimacy and 
economic circumstance in prohibiting the success of the taskforce 
 
 Was the time scale to complete the objectives sufficient? – understanding the 
objectives and targets of the taskforce 
 
 Did the LDV taskforce face any external restrictions in implementing or 
creating policy? (I.E lack of investment/ existing unemployment rates, 
macroeconomic situation) – Understanding the limitations of the taskforce 
within the existing economy 
 
 What agencies/bodies were involved in the taskforce? –Increasing contextual 
knowledge on the LDV taskforce 
 
 Why were these agencies brought together under the taskforce? What were 
their strengths/benefits? – Increasing contextual knowledge on the taskforce 
and understanding the individual agencies contribution to policy 
implementation 
 What support did each of the actors/agencies offer to the workers? – Increasing 
contextual knowledge on the taskforce and understanding the individual 
agencies contribution to policy implementation 
 
 Did the LDV taskforce take any ideas or inspiration from other previous 
taskforces (MG Rover) or other examples (both national and international) of 
mass redundancy and job recovery? Or was there a fundamental different 






taskforce differed from other taskforces and examples but to also establish if 
the LDV taskforce was innovative in policy making 
 
Questions developed from interviews aiming more at the LEPS replacing the RDA 
(Advantage West Midlands) and the RDA’s involvement with LDV and Local 
Economy 
 
 Did AWM get involved with LDV before the closure? I.E setting up 
consumer/supply networks, training staff ETC 
 
 Because of the wide distribution of the workers’ home locations, how 
influential was the RDA in cushioning the impact of the LDV job loss 
around the West midlands? 
 
 During the Vila Park Jobs fair on the 24th June, how essential was the 
RDA in brining companies, training collages and other business 
enterprises together 
 
 How damaging do you think the Coalition reforms of the RDA’s to LEPS 
are to local area development and job recovery?  
 
 What’s happening to the LDV resources? How are they being re-
distributed amongst the new LEP structure? 
 
 What are the main drawbacks and weaknesses of the LEPs in 
comparison to the RDA’s? 
 
 Do you think the West Midlands region will still be able to attract the 
business and enterprise to re-balance the economy and essentially 




 In the run-up to the LDV closure, there seems to have been a well-
established body of networks and experience between the different 






success of the LDV taskforce. Do you think that this practise/method 
will be able to be adapted to the LEP structure should future plants 
closure? 
 
The workers Reaction to the taskforce 
 
 Did the workers find the taskforce helpful in finding new employment? - 
Increasing knowledge on the effectiveness of the LDV taskforce. 
 
 Did the ex-workers ask for any particular sort/type of assistance (such as 
financial help)/training? - Uncovering the strengths and weaknesses of the 
taskforce 
 
 When trying to help/assist the ex-workers, what was the most common 
problem you found or the biggest difficulty you had to overcome in helping 
the workers? – Gaining knowledge on what may have prohibited success but 
also gaining the policy stakeholders view of the condition of the workforce 
 
 Could the taskforce have improved upon any of the services that it offered? – 
Uncovering the strengths and weaknesses of the taskforce 
 
 In the long-term perspective do you think the LDV taskforce was successful? – 
gaining more precise detail about the objectives of the taskforce and how the 
policymakers perceived the success of the taskforce (does it match the 
workers’ opinion?) 
 
 What do you think was the most successful aspect of the taskforce? – 
Uncovering the strengths and weaknesses of the taskforce 
 
 In your opinion, what do you think may have been done differently to improve 
the taskforce? - Uncovering the strengths and weaknesses of the taskforce 
 
 
Questions not aimed at gathering direct data but expanding research contacts 
 Would you be able to release/offer information about the LDV population? 






of the workers. - Gaining data about the LDV workers themselves and enabling 
me to progress my research 
 
 Could you name the key leaders or policy makers within the LDV taskforce 
that would be willing to be interviewed on this topic? – Expanding my 
research contacts  
 
 
 
 
